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A b s t r a c t
W ARNING RECEPTIO N, RESPO N SE, AND RISK BEH AVIO R IN THE 3 M AY 1999 OK LAH OM A  
CITY LO NG -TRACK  VIO LENT TORNADO
On 03 M ay 1999, a long-track violent tornado killed 40 people and injured -8 0 0  in and near O klahom a City, 
Oklahoma. Following the disaster, surveys were collected from persons residing or w orking within the damaged 
areas regarding their actions, and the actions o f those in their care or company. Similar data were obtained for 
fatalities. The purpose o f the field operations were to collect geographical, demographical, behavioral, and 
attitudinal information from a sample o f  survivors, and to the fullest extent possible, for all decedents. 
Respondent data were analyzed for patterns in warning access, source, com pliance, and lead time, as well as 
for geographical and cultural variables such as shelter availability, tornado hazard perception, and opinions 
about warning systems. Goals were to catalog significant differences betw een survivor and decedent traits to 
identify successful warning operations and m edia practices; to delineate the w arning environm ent as 
characterized by societal risk perception and response; and to compare these findings to previous research. 
Situational risk factors for death included: living in a mobile home or unincorporated area; living near the 
starting point o f the tornado path; and being physically disabled, elderly, or o f  lower socioeconom ic strata. 
Cognitive risk factors for death included misjudging the tornado path or severity in spite o f  receiving warnings; 
choosing inadequate shelter; and attempting to flee too late. Risk factors for survival included access to 
televised warnings and receiving warnings via telephone; sheltering below ground or fleeing the path; and 
general familiarity with w eather information and local geography. Risk factors for survival did not substantially 
include warnings from siren systems or NOAA W eather Radio. The perform ance o f  tornado detection and 
surveillance systems. Integrated Emergency M anagement, and the timely dissem ination o f  detailed warnings 
via electronic m edia were all im portant in holding the death toll down. Yet, none o f  these were able to 
com pletely mitigate the risk to certain highly vulnerable populations or individuals. W arning system efficacy 
for this extreme event, having occurred among a large population with relatively-high severe w eather awareness 
is explored, along with some unusual findings regarding warning com m unication and evacuation behavior. 
Keywords: Tornado; W arning; Natural H azard; Disaster; Oklahoma; USA
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W ARNING RECEPTION, RESPONSE, AND RISK  
BEHAVIOR IN THE 3 MAY 1999 OKLAHOM A CITY  
LONG-TRACK VIOLENT TORNADO
1-INTRODUCTION
O n M onday 3 M ay 1999, an outbreak o f  some 70 tornadoes in the Southern Plains killed 44 people in 
O klahom a, and six people in Kansas. Forty Oklahoma deaths (80% ) were directly due to a long-track violent 
tornado'' that struck O klahom a City, O klahom a and portions o f  its southern and eastern suburbs- The 
'Oklahom a City Tornado' (hereafter O CT) w as exceptional no t only for record-breaking dam age and human 
traum a, but because it presented the rare convergence o f  a violent tornado with a large m etropolitan area. The 
OCT injured -8 0 0  (~ is approxim ately) and caused significant damage to -8 0 0 0  structures, nearly three times 
m ore than any other single tornado in U nited States (U S) history (Henson 2000). N um erous assessm ents set 
total dam ages for this single tornado in excess o fo n e  billion US dollars (1 B Î), which is greater than the modem 
day national mean aggregate value fo r all annual tornado damage (ESIG c.2006). It is ranked by the Storm  
Prediction C enter (SPC) as the 4”’ most damaging tornado in inflation-adjusted dollars (SPC c.2006). G razulis 
(2001) has the OCT ranked 1", also considering inflation. In addition, the event occurred in the heart o f 
Tornado A lley’'  -  a vernacular region o f  the Plains (see Figure 1.1) having the highest tornado frequency and 
intensity -  that is home to a unique concentration o f  w eather forecasting resources, research institutions, and 
electronic m edia, which all maintain very high profiles within the modernized warning system''.
Significant T o rn a d o  Alley
'1  (1 dayM*e»d», 60% M ar peak)
Figure 1,1 • Significast Tornado Alley. M ap by Concajinon e t al. 
2000, Copyright -  Used with permission.
■ L e i l e r  d e n o t e s  a  g l o s s a r y  te r m
-1-
Post-event data were collected from various agencies involved in the warning process, as well as from survivors 
regarding their observations, actions, and opinions. Previous research suggests that historically, Oklahomans 
have possessed relatively high levels o f  public  awareness^ about severe weather, and are w ell-prepared to deal 
with tornado risks (in the Official Period^) due to: 1) their personal, familial, and institutional experience with 
past tornadoes; 2) their fam iliarity with warning products and safety measures; and, 3) their heightened 
exposure to the aforementioned m odernized warning technologies and interaction w ith weather, m edia, and 
em ergency m anagem ent agencies^ (EMA). Thus in theory, the OCT event provides a sort o f  benchm ark event 
with regard to warning infrastructure and warning behavior for future events and in other regions (Biddle 2000; 
H am m er and Schmidlin 2002; Brown et al. 2002; Brooks and Doswell 2002; Daley et al. 2005).
There is general consensus that OCT warning dissemination functioned to nearly faultless levels (NOAA 1999; 
Biddle 2000; Quoetone et al. 2000; Hammer and Schmidlin 2002) leaving it challenging to address 
shortcomings and identify needs for the next wave o f warning system improvem ents or to predict how similar 
tornado events would play out in other regions o f  the country. M ore importantly, w hat lessons can be learned 
about the spectrum o f  behaviors, risks, and technologies exemplifying the OCT warnscape^  and how might 
these lessons be applied to future warning programs, public health and safety initiatives, and comm unity 
mitigation policies? This dissertation is intended to be self-standing such that it includes a comprehensive 
literature review  on relevant contem porary paradigm s o f  natural hazards and vulnerability, as well as tornado 
risk behavior and modern warning systems. For this reason, the appendices are also extensive and include a 
variety o f  detailed background inform ation. W here this is not practical or pertinent -  such as for detailed 
m eteorological information -  readers are directed to the relevant literature or internet websites. The goal is to 
place the data from the field and subsequent statistical analyses in context with the conceptual framework o f 
the human ecology o f the modern tornado disaster.
1.1  -  K e y  R e s e a r c h  Q u e s t i o n s
This study provides descriptions o f  the tornado event and the physical and cultural landscapes on w hich it
occurred, in addition to forensic reports on the warnings, observations, and im pacts. Some key questions
include: W hat do survivors have to say about the information they used and where they got their information?
- 2 -
How do risk factors for survival differ from risk factors for death? (R isk is the probability o f  occurrence 
multiplied by vulnerability, and has consequences like uncertainty, the social values o f acceptable risk, and 
perceived risk in its formula). W hat are the possible implications o f  the survey findings on future warning 
system efficacy and w hat has emerged as the key research gaps? This information leads to the following 
problem statements:
• Television (TV) was the most commonly used form o f  severe weather warning for the OCT. O f
147 o f  164 (89.6 %) o f  those surveyed, used TV as their prim ary means o f  receiving w eather
warnings and advisories.
• A sm aller num ber o f the elderly did NOT evacuate (65 and over) relative to the median.
• A m ajority o f  juveniles (and their families) did evacuate relative to the median.
• M obile hom es and manufactured homes were the most dangerous places during severe
weather.
• Approxim ately 25 % o f the victims were disabled, which is higher than the national population
o f disabled.
How do the primary findings o f this work compare to those o f other similar works from  recent tornadoes, 
including the handful o f  other works on this same tornado disaster? U ltimately, a goal o f  this work is to provide 
an accessible and tangible body o f  evidence that yields not only a 'snapshot' o f  the human ecology o f  the OCT, 
but also provides useful information to the National Weather Service [NW S] and EMA. Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita exposed m any shortcomings that m ost citizens would not have supposed existed. W hile tornadoes 
occur on spatial and tem poral scales much smaller than hurricanes, earthquakes, w ildfires, or floods, there are 
many lessons to take from other disasters. W e will see m ajor tornado disasters in the future, regardless o f  their 
recent infrequency (Grazulis et al. 1998).
1 .2  -  A  R e v i e w  o f  N a t u r a l  H a z a r d s  R e s e a r c h  a n d  W a r n i n g  T h e o r y
'Natural hazards' are the perils to life and property resulting from the interaction o f  natural (environmental) 
systems and human agency (societal and cultural systems). A synthetic definition o f  natural hazards might be 
that they "are extreme geophysical events which exceed normal expectations o f  society in magnitude and 
frequency, to result in large-scale death, hardship, or capital loss" (K irby 1990, p. 3). O f key im portance is 
accepting that natural hazards cannot be considered independently from the people or property they affect 
(Burton et al. 1993). G ilbert F. W hite's pioneering work, along with that o f a handful o f  other geographers 
(e.g.. Burton, Kates) and sociologists (e.g., Drabek, M ileti, Sorensen) rem ains im portant, particularly in a
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W estern or developed societal context. The w ork provides the framework for integrating o f  the role o f human 
agency in environmental hazards, and illustrates that societal and individual behavior are manifest in 
m agnifying vulnerability to geophysical processes -  which are by nature ju st that -  natural. Post-structural 
scholars have criticized the earlier works o f W hite and the 'Hazards School' for ignoring the way that social 
inequality and the broad workings o f  political econom y produce human vulnerability to natural events. W atts 
(1983), for example, claims that the 'traditional Hazard M odel' overlooks the ways that social systems increase 
hum an vulnerability by reducing social safety nets and weakening risk management strategies. During 
tornadoes, mobile and m anufactured homes (M M H) residents tend to support W atts' claims because there is 
a correlation between vulnerability and socioeconomic status (which would have provided some shelter beyond 
M M H). These more recent natural hazards paradigm s (Hewitt 1983) also place the role o f human agency as 
that o f  causative force and stress that much o f  the choices involved in individual and comm unity assumptions 
of, and adjustm ents to, risk. R isk is framed by forces that in fact severely constrain available choices (Steinberg 
1999).
D isasters are still comm only seen by many scientists, mass media, and bureaucracies alike, as reflective o f  the 
costs o f  doing business on a perilous Earth. Popular media accounts continue to present disasters as 'freak 
events' or 'Acts-of-God' outside the realm o f  everyday life that fall through the cracks o f  accountability at 
individual, community, governmental, and societal levels. Steinberg (2000, p. 98) observes that "risk does not 
simply exist. It is produced. Risk is manufactured, and who bears its burden is one o f  the m ost im portant 
questions we can ask in exploring the history o f  natural disaster." N atural hazards such as tornadoes include 
m ore than their geophysical elements. They also include technological, sociological, psychological, and 
cultural components (W hite and Haas 1975). The inherent infrequency o f  extreme events provides few metrics 
by which to measure success or improvement. Incorporating change and upgrading mitigation strategies can 
be com plicated, owing to the many jurisdictions involved, and the 'non-normal' aspects o f the actual use o f  the 
systems. M ulti-disciplinary perspectives in hazard studies have been an early and consistent theme. M itchell 
(1989) proposed investigation o f  hazards as interactive phenomena having layered causes and consequences, 
encouraging interdisciplinary approaches to the research because m ethodologies must apply to infinite scenarios 
with humans viewed as the pre-eminent common risk variable. Others (Palm  1990; Showalter et al. 1993) have
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stressed contextual m ethodologies for 'real world' problems, which likewise demand multi-disciplinary 
examinations.
1 .3  -  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  R i s k  a n d  R i s k  P e r c e p t i o n
There are two basic categories o f  variables that frame public risk perception and subsequent risk behavior and 
response. They are the physical properties o f the risk agent itself, and the societal characteristics o f the 
community affected. W hile the role and dynamic o f perceptual variables upon adjustm ent to hazards (and the 
evolution o f mitigation program s) rem ain largely uncharted waters, a w ell-m apped concept is that public 
reactions to risk are governed more by perceptions than logic about the natural. R isk perceptions also become 
politicized and mitigation program s and policies are ultimately shaped by w idespread risk perceptions, which 
may not reflect the science-of-the-day. Risk perceptions are thus reflected in risk comm unication. M ileti and 
Fitzpatrick (1991, p. 21) maintain that "behavior which results from risk com m unication is the consequence 
o f  [risk perceptions]." Risk communication research indicates that the heuristics and biases employed in human 
adjustm ent and response decision-m aking to hazards also vary greatly by hazard type. Information reception 
and mitigation choices do not always follow systemic or linear patterns. This makes modeling societal response 
frameworks problematic (Slovic 1991; K ates 1997). Compounding this is the fact that response options are 
dictated by a spectrum o f  variables that are not generally seen as rational choices. The information processing 
and problem -solving skills needed by the public to receive and com prehend risk m essages come with no 
guarantees that said public has the ability or opportunity to take responsive action, because m itigation resources 
are unequally-distributed throughout society (W atts 1983). Societal and governm ental bodies are under 
increasing pressure to seek tangible and rational strategies (including warning systems) to cope with extreme 
events (Tierney et al. 2001). As we move away from antiquated assumptions that disasters are m erely acts-of- 
God beyond human intervention, greater emphasis is placed on the possibilities o f  acting rational in an irrational 
world (Kirby 1990).
Several methods are used to characterize the levels o f  risk posed by a natural hazard or activity. Among the 
m ost common are cost-benefit analyses -  which simply weigh costs versus benefits o f  an (in)action; and 
decision analyses -  which aim to control economic and environmental costs o f  hazards which are often latent
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and hidden to maximize long-term benefits by projecting the implications o f  various response scenarios (Smith 
2001). Such assessments o f capital and resources versus costs and vulnerabilities are political attempts to 
clarify waters muddied by the fact that humans -  no matter their backgrounds or status -  all perceive risks 
differently from each other, and from event to event. The policy ram ifications o f these psychological aspects 
o f risk are enormous. Cost-benefit analysis, in theory, modifies or nullifies perceptual variance via statistical 
analysis. G ood policy design requires that actual risk  be as equal to perceived risk as possible, thus maximizing 
cost effective mitigation. However, this is seldom the situation. W hen perceived risk is significantly larger 
than actual risk, costly over-protection ensues. W hen the perceived risk is significantly sm aller than the actual 
risk, under-protection may yield short-term savings, but usually by transferring costs to future generations. 
W ho directs the cost-benefit analysis process politically, and how costs and losses are m easured and valued 
often fail fully to characterize vulnerability. A comm on critique o f  cost-benefit analysis is that it is asocial, 
positivistic, authoritarian, bureaucratic, and beneficial to a select few with political and socio-econom ic stature 
(Tobin and M ontz 1997). It also tends to over-em phasize benefits, which are o f  higher visibility and thus 
m easured w ith greater ease than costs, which tend to be spread out over time, mis-allocated, or unquantifiable 
(Chiras 2001). Policy design and management decisions based on cost-benefit analyses, sustainable 
developm ent program s, and m eta-policies aim ed at identical risks and societal structures, often result in 
m arkedly different programs that tend to serve certain interests over others (Cuny 1983).
The successful comm unication o f  acute risk from the scientific comm unity to the public through responsible
governm ental authorities involves a wide variety o f  individual, societal, cultural, political, environm ental,
institutional, and organizational variables. In the U S, this is generally manifested in a bipolar way. W hile
individual responsibility is ingrained in the culture, there are disaster program  expectations am ong many for
a big governm ent response in the rescue phases and large 'bail outs' in the recovery phases (Platt 1999). M ost
individuals are not experts in natural hazards. Thus, the role o f governm ent has evolved to process the
scientific knowledge about a hazard, and to provide the logistical capacity and infrastructure to dissem inate this
knowledge to citizens. All aspects o f  community safety cannot rest extensively in the hands o f  scientists or
governm ental personnel, however. This makes the science o f  crafting mitigation and preparedness program s
for low-probability, high-consequence, rapid-onset, extreme events much different from that o f  most other
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forms o f risk com m unication -  such as cancer prevention (e.g., often tied to certain behaviors), earthquake 
mitigation (e.g., often tied to certain locations), or seat belt use (e.g., often tied to the frequency o f exposure). 
Risk comm unications for short-fuse hazards from scientific bodies or governm ental authorities commonly take 
the form o f warnings.
1.3.1 - C o m m u n i c a t i n g  R i s k  V ia  W a r n i n g s
Sociologists and psychologists have noted the hum an tendency to convert vague risk and its accompanying 
uneasiness into defined risk that carries a sense o f  control (Kirby 1990; Q uarantelli 1998). Devising networks 
to share information regarding known hazards and developing risks are as old as smoke signals and posting look 
outs. The prim ary way to communicate acute danger effectively from short-fuse hazards is via warning 
systems. In general, according to Mileti and Sorensen (1990, p. 2-1), a warning system is a "means o f 
comm unicating information about an occurring or impending hazard, aimed at eliciting successful mitigative 
response by people in danger from the hazard." Contem porary w arning systems tend to be complex, inter- 
organizational, m ulti-jurisdictional, multi-tiered, multi-cultural, and technology-laden. Somewhat surprisingly, 
most warning systems are specialized and address a single hazard or risk mode (e.g., tornadoes, tsunami, 
chemical release), although often the communications networks and hardware may be used interchangeably 
for multiple hazards. There continues to be lobbying among emergency m anagem ent associations and 
professionals for a unified and coordinated system (PPW 2002). W e appear to be far from realizing such for 
a variety o f  logistical, economical, and political reasons. In order to motivate public m itigation activities, a 
warning system must m eet two basic functions: assessment -  the organizational activities associated with 
detecting the hazard and deciding a given risk threshold has been met to w arrant a warning; and, dissemination 
-  issuing and transmitting a warning message to the intended audience (Nigg 1995). Prim ary components o f 
a warning system may be broken down to include detection, management, and response subsystem s, with most 
warning systems currently in use designed to address hazards that present the following comm on traits (adapted 
from M ileti and Sorensen 1990):
• Low probability o f  occurrence, yet plausible evidence o f  potential to materialize (past history).
• Threat o f  large-scale damage, disruption, or mass casualties.
• Hazard agent is detectable / can be forecasted.
• Public response upon receipt o f warning can mitigate the risk or damage.
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H owever, there is little in the guidance that spells out how vulnerability is to be assessed, and less about how 
vulnerable populations are to be identified, engaged, and integrated into the warning process. There is 
considerable available insight into successful warning communication techniques, and much o f  the semantics 
on w hat works and w hat has generally failed is well docum ented, although some may be antiquated in light o f  
the 'Age o f  the Internet' and rapidly occurring U S dem ographic changes. The prim ary historical source is Mileti 
and colleagues (M ileti 1975; 1995; 1996; 1999; M ileti and Sorensen 1990; M ileti and Fitzpatrick 1991; and 
M ileti and O 'Brien 1992). The typical successful warning process (reception and response) is sum marized by 
the following characteristics or processes (adapted from Mileti and Sorensen 1990):
• Reception of the warning
• Understanding of warning
• Beiief in validity
• Confidence in accuracy o f warning
• Credibility afforded to warning agent(s)
• Confirmation (corroboration) of warning from alternative sources
• Personalization of risk associated with the warning
• Spurs appropriate decisions in warning response
• Timely response is possible
• Frequent updates of warning information
• Message redundancy in warnings received via other channels
• Reason for warning is clear
• Suggestions on mitigation options included
• Time-frame o f warning is detailed
• Geographical references included in warning
• Projected impacts and magnitudes noted in warning
• Uncertainty o f warning information expressed
1.3.1.1 - C o m m u n ic a tin g  U n c e r ta in ty  -
U ncertainty exists in most all environmental problem s, and especially so with scientific information regarding 
risk. Such is the case with w eather forecasts, which are a product o f  incom plete scientific know ledge, limited 
availability o f  environmental observations, im perfect com puter models, dynamic variability tied to tem poral 
and spatial scales, and finally, human interpretation. W e need to cope w ith uncertainty, minim ize it where 
possible, and m ost importantly, not deny its existence by failing to communicate about it accurately and 
honestly. As stated by M oore and Thomas (1976, p. 12), "a formal theory o f decision-m aking m ust take 
uncertainty as its departure point, and regard precise knowledge o f  outcom es as an unobtainable ideal." And, 
M urphy (1993, p. 283) acknowledges this in stating "since forecasters' judgm ents necessarily contain an 
elem ent o f  uncertainty, their forecasts must reflect this uncertainty accurately in order to satisfy the basic 
maxim o f  forecasting. In general, then, forecasts must be expressed in probabilistic term s. . . expressing 
forecasts in a non-probabilistic (i.e., categorical) form at generally is a decidedly inferior strategy in term s o f
reaching high levels o f  consistency." M urphy further noted (p. 291) . . ."a basic maxim o f  forecasting is 
violated w henever forecasts do not correspond to judgm ents [of the forecaster]."
For a variety o f  complex reasons, probabilistic products have not been widely-deployed for short-fuse hazards 
such as tornadoes, at least not for the general public. The most commonly noted reason seems to be the well 
docum ented difficulties that many people -  including professionals from within the m eteorological community 
-  have comm unicating about uncertainty in general, and in digesting and utilizing probabilistic expressions o f 
uncertainty specifically. The academic discourse about the potential operational benefits and pitfalls and the 
considerable challenges in the eventual education and training o f users to enable skilled use o f probabilistic 
warning products remain hot topics (Elia and Laprisè 2005). The potential for warnings clearly remains a 
frontier o f sorts with untapped riches (Doswell 2006), yet many significant pitfalls exist (M ileti 1999). W arning 
agencies and forecasters, as well as stakeholders, would benefit from additional policy and program  focus and 
continued communications and behavioral research in attempting to prom ote the eventual integration by NW S  
into the 'mainstream ' suite o f  products. For now, the diversity o f  opinions regarding the value and limitations 
o f  probabilistic products and the varying interpretations o f the very same warning information by myriad users 
continue to handicap its progression and usage.
1 .4  - T h e  H u m a n  E c o l o g y  o f  W e a t h e r  W a r n i n g s  a n d  V u l n e r a b i l i t y
The m anner in which warning program s are designed, implem ented, m aintained, and utilized, varies from 
region-to-region, among organizations, and in particular, among individuals. M yriad personality traits and 
individual circumstances dictate that no two persons respond to risk, or warnings, in exactly the same manner. 
Likewise, few communities address warning program s exactly the same as their neighbors because institutional 
experiences and resources are highly variable. Still, for the purposes o f  comm unicating about policy-m aking, 
program  design, and technical im plem entation o f  warning systems, it is necessary to speak in generalities 
regarding the broadest category o f  stakeholders -  the "general public". The term, problem atic in its vagueness, 
is useful when discussing the broadest spectrum o f  users. As placed in a warning systems context by Nigg 
( 1995, p. 378), the term "the public" is frequently used as though it were a single hom ogeneous group o f  people, 
when in fact we should be talking about "various publics." Doswell et al. (1999) echoed the notion that, at least
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for severe w eather w arnings, the stakeholder population is not some 'monolith' with homogeneous needs or 
reactions. Thus, in order to optimize the societal benefit from warning programs (in terms o f  sound economic 
and institutional policy), efforts to characterize the heuristics o f tornado risk need to be pursued as vigorously 
as the unsolved meteorology. The general public cannot be thought o f as the demographic mean and must 
reflect different age groups, socio-economic classes, ethnic groups, and cultures. It always m ust be 
rem em bered that response to warnings o f imminent disaster is a social process. That is, citizen interpretations 
o f  danger do not take place in a vacuum, nor should be thought o f  as having a taken-for-granted outcom e. In 
this research then, the term 'general public' includes non-organizational, non-institutional, individual citizens 
that live within the jurisdiction o f  a given warning system, are targeted to be served as stakeholders by the 
service agencies involved (often by the authority granted to such agencies by the public via public funds), and 
constitute the spectrum o f  users that do not otherwise demand or require 'specialized' products or services in 
their day-to-day living.
A fundamental concept o f  disaster epidem iology (counting the people w ounded and killed) is that m orbidity 
and m ortality occur in patterns (Lillibridge 1997). Tornadoes are not an exception, as geographic and 
demographic patterns emerge to implicate sectors o f the public at greater risk than others. Such patterns may 
be delineated by era, region, state, as well as by various social and cultural characteristics. In turn, there is a 
small body o f  research -  some epidem iological studies (e.g.. Glass et al. 1980; Brenner and N oji, 1995) along 
with non-m edical geography-based studies (e.g., Schmidlin and King 1997) -  that have examined tornado risk, 
including warning system performance relative to human ecology. Such characteristics, com bined with 
attitudes about warning systems, the technological and managerial make up o f  the systems, and the frequency 
o f  the use o f  the warnings, all play significant roles in public awareness and subsequent warning com pliance^.
Tornado disasters reflect, ultim ately, failures in the social system. These failures include aspects o f  warning
program s, in that im pact is directly tied to relationships betw een the environm ent, and social and cultural
attempts (or failures) to plan, respond, and recover. According to Aguirre (2000, p. 99) "there is considerable
consensus among social scientists that it is useful to conceptualize the public’s response to warnings as a
function o f  the physical environment, population, technology, social relations, and culture. M oreover, it is
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necessary to differentiate between the warning message and the system which produces it." Substantial applied 
research examining the human ecology o f  w eather warnings began in the 1970s (M cLuckie 1970; M ileti 1975) 
and has struggled to keep pace with advancing warning and detection technology ever since. M ost recent 
efforts have examined systems from holistic standpoints as foundations for warning policy (M ileti and Sorensen 
1990; Nigg 1995; Gruntfest and Carsell 2000), while others have conducted forensic audits o f specific events 
to focus on behavior and culture as response factors (e.g., Gruntfest 1987; Schmidlin and King 1995; Liu et al. 
1996; Legates and Biddle 1999). The construction and delivery o f  warnings, and their reception leading to 
successful mitigation by stakeholders are complex scientific, political, and social processes. Sims and Baumann 
(1983, p .168) summed up these com plexities with the highly-inconclusive conclusion that "warning information 
may lead to behavior change, under highly-specific conditions, if  properly executed, and delivered specifically, 
to targeted recipients."
Currently, there is only limited contem porary insight in the human ecology o f severe w eather risk and warning 
systems, and the knowledge base is itself changing as rapidly as the technology and m eteorological knowledge. 
M ethodologies to address the implications o f  changing US demographics on warning system design and policy 
are underway in earnest. For instance, the US population in 2025 will be less rural, significantly older, and 
generally sm aller in family size than 3.18 (Gruntfest 2002). It w ill reflect substantial ethnic and cultural 
change, such as a projected Hispanic population o f -1 3  %. Emergent technologies aimed at dissem inating 
warnings to areally-discrete levels (e.g., household alarms, PDA, hand-held computers) highlight the incum bent 
need to characterize fully the environmental, cultural, and societal status quo  among various public and 
comm unications subcultures. Im provements in technical systems should in theory yield equal benefits to all 
users in all regions prone to tornadoes, while catering to a technophilic, highly-mobile, and diverse society 
where entire families move from one region to another with significant regularity. Often, however, 
technological advancements are pushed on the public w ithout substantial understanding o f  the needs of, or pull 
from stakeholders. Advances often are the result o f  efforts focused on product content and pathway, at the 
expense o f  attention to product content and target. Conversely, since the overall warning program  is 
theoretically tailored to the overall general population that encompasses many groups, cultures, and individual
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needs, there is a sort o f  dumbing down' generalization that occurs to make products understandable to lower 
common denom inators o f society.
In earlier times, especially in Oklahoma, rural populations faced increased risk from tornadoes owing to their 
disconnection from media and communications networks that benefit their urban cousins. In the 1940s for 
instance, rural residents who spotted a tornado may not have had a means to pass on warnings. W ith the 
proliferation o f  the first telegraphs, then radio and telephones, to television, and now the Internet, the way that 
warnings are disseminated has resulted in more complete coverage nationally. There is some evidence that 
increased risk has passed from the rural population to those in m etropolitan areas (B iddle 1996). People in 
cities are becom ing more and more rem oved from the natural environment, and part o f the 'rat race' that is too 
busy working, playing, or driving from point A to point B to notice weather conditions until such conditions 
literally confront them (Grazulis et al. 1998). M edia networks now serve rural and urban populations more 
uniform ly with regard to weather information. Delineating these trends rem ains problem atic however, as there 
are ultim ately many factors in play, including proximity to public safety services such as search and rescue and 
rapid access to medical care. Urban populations present greater opportunities for mass-casualty disasters by 
presenting targets o f  concentrated population, whereas rural populations suffer differing vulnerabilities related 
to housing and resource allocation. The aforementioned eultural changes (e.g., increases in foreign language 
populations), demographic shifts (e.g., aging, shrinking middle class), political trends (e.g., funding decisions), 
and housing (e.g., proliferation o f  mobile homes), coupled w ith any natural or anthropogenic climate changes, 
result in fluid regions o f risk. For instance, even the possibility o f future increases in storm frequency and 
magnitude (and any associated changes in tornado risk) that could be attributable to 'global warming' has 
generated enough concern to spur the insurance industry to commission numerous studies (Flavin 1994).
Regional differences in coping with risk are also hard to define and measure. Aside from fam iliarity with the
look, character, and impacts o f storms, as well as with w arning system routines and how to get w arning
information, there do not appear to be any tangible differences in the way Oklahomans perceive tornado risk
itself. Yet, there may be differences in the Oklahomans they cope. Often w hat is expressed in attitudinal
surveys does not correspond well to w hat actual response behaviors are demonstrated. For instance, in spite
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o f the high profile that religion takes in the 'Bible Belt', there is no evidence that Oklahomans are excessively 
fatalistic about dealing with w eather risks (Biddle 1996). People may claim that "God will protect them," but 
these same people get in the storm shelter when the tornado approaches. A ll this may mean that it is the 
warning environment culture that differs, rather than the make up o f society in general. Still, there clearly are 
cultural geographical patterns in increased risk factors -  most notably poverty and education levels -  which 
greatly alter abilities to access the warning products that are available. A dditional challenges exist to serve the 
very young and elderly, the mobility, vision, and hearing impaired, and those in sub-standard housing such as 
mobile homes. It is an unsubstantiated assertion that the issues remain concerns in O klahom a to the same 
extent as in M ichigan, or M ississippi, or any other state. Likewise, key safety issues such as providing shelter 
access are in need o f additional redress.
1.4.1 - W a r n i n g  B e h a  v i o r  a n d  C o p i n g  S t y l e s
Attem pts to characterize the behavior o f disaster victims and survivors stress two prim ary sets o f  personal 
profiles (Drabek 1986; Tobin and M ontz 1997). The first, 'cognitive factors' -  are attitudinal variables and 
behavioral characteristics that influence risk perception -  such as religious beliefs, political ideologies, and 
personality traits. Theoretically, these are the personality traits and personal choices available to individuals. 
The second, 'situational factors' -  are physical and demographic variables that affect a persons range o f  choices 
and responses to the risk -  such as shelter availability, parental responsibility, or personal mobility. Thus, these 
personality profiles are the circumstances that enable or limit the range o f choices. An example o f  a cognitive 
factor influencing warning compliance is seen in the 'cry w o lf e f fe c f  -  where subjects ignore w arnings after 
becom ing conditioned owing to warned events o f the past where no personal im pact followed (Breznitz 1984). 
Examples o f  situational factors include cases where subjects are precluded from complying with a warning 
because o f  inability to afford shelter, or mental or physical impairments limiting ability to act on a warning. 
For instance, elderly persons are less likely to heed warnings as a consequence o f com prom ised mobility, 
situational communication factors, and previous experience with the risk agent (G runtfest 1987). A dditional 
w arning failure modes include: being completely unaware o f  the risk, owing to preform ed attitudes about the 
hazard (cognitive); the inability to evacuate because one does not own a car (situational); failure to understand 
the w arning owing to a language or physical barrier (situational); or beliefs that "it w on't happen to me" or "God
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will protect us" and thus there is no purpose in mitigative action (cognitive). To elicit mitigative response, a 
warning must convey that the threat is real. I f  there is significant doubt about its validity, it will be ignored. 
I f  it is only given marginal credibility, it is likely to evoke 'confirmation behavior' -  by which recipients seek 
other sources (such as often happens with tornadoes) -  by dangerously venturing outside or to a window to look 
for the tornado (Drabek and Stevenson 1971).
Sims and Baumann (1972) suggested that regional 'coping styles' were partially responsible for differing 
tornado death rates between those living in differing regions o f the US. They concluded after surveys that 
Southerners' interactions with nature (and tornado risk) were determined by external forces -  attributable in a 
large part to religious convictions prom oting an 'external locus o f  control' where individuals present with 
fatalistic attitudes regarding m oderation o f risk posed by 'Acts-of-God' -  and m anifested by a neglect o f the 
benefits to be derived from governm ent and technology, such as w arning systems. Their prem ise was that there 
were significant cultural differences in the way various societal sectors accessed and utilized tornado warning 
systems, and their theories resonate in some o f the contem porary hazard literature (e.g., A lexander 2002) 
despite limited applicability, insignificant sample sizes, and antiquated generalities (Biddle 1996; Etkin and 
M yers 2000). U ltimately, risk is not restricted to a lack o f  awareness among regions, the poor, disenfranchised, 
or elderly. For many people, the more common concerns o f  daily life overshadow consideration o f  some low 
probability event, no matter how catastrophic or lethal its potential. This is especially true if  little control is 
perceived over its probability (Drabek 1986). Biddle (1996) found that most o f Tornado A lley has similar 
access to warnings, and similar awareness o f tornado risk. N ational watch and warning program s (W W P) are 
instituted in a generally homogeneous fashion. Local attention to storm risks and w arning dissem ination 
program s vary on the local level, but cultural behavior factors -  if  they existed on a regional basis to affect 
warning efficacy -  have eroded or are now com pletely overshadowed by stronger local and situational 
characteristics. Today, other more basic demographical and environmental factors (e.g., population density, 
age, health factors, and especially socioeconomics) play much larger roles than ethnocultural traits. 
Nonetheless, despite a lack o f  contem porary supporting research, the idea that warning compliance and efficacy 
is significantly dictated by a multitude o f cultural conditions is still a regularly cited concept. However, 
m ethodologies for investigating and confirming this paradigm rem ain absent. W hile warning systems have
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undergone major and frequent overhauls, both locally and nationally, so have the human ecological variables 
related to warnings, which are likewise dynam ic. Thus, human ecological factors have never been fully 
researched, nor adequately incorporated into w arning system planning. This greatly im pedes ability to serve 
stakeholders, as well as to param eterize warning systems or to develop perform ance metrics.
A key to future warning system design and technological upgrade is investigating and cataloging various 
aspects o f  response, reception, and utility in contem porary events. Much o f  what was identified by the response 
literature produced at the dawn o f  form al w eather warnings may no longer be valid, considering the many 
changes to both the system and stakeholder populations. M ost assessments have been tied to and biased 
tow ard the era(s) considered (Grazulis et al. 1998). People in cities are becom ing more and more disconnected 
and insulated from the natural environment. For instance, there appears to be conflicting evidence about 
tornado risk in rural populations versus those in m etropolitan areas. In the past, rural com m unities were at 
increased risk by segregation from information sources. Today media networks tend to serve rural and urban 
populations more uniformly (Biddle 1996). Urban populations present greater opportunities for mass-casualty 
disasters by presenting targets o f  concentrated population, w hereas rural populations suffer differing 
vulnerabilities related to housing and resource allocation (Grazulis 1996). Delineating these risks in any broad 
sense is difficult. Ultimately, many factors influence overall tornado risk, such as proxim ity to public safety 
resources and advanced medical care, as well as numerous situational factors and personality traits.
1.4.1.1 - Confirmation Behavior -
For most people, the initial reaction to warning is denial and disbelief (Drabek 1986). To elicit mitigative 
response, a warning must convey that the threat is real. I f  there is significant doubt about its validity, it w ill 
be ignored. Even when credibility o f  the warning source is not in doubt, the natural reaction is to search for 
corroborating information. This is known as confirmation behavior^, also called 'normalcy bias' (D rabek and 
Stevenson 1971; Perry et al. 1981) -  by which recipients seek other information -  such as dangerously 
venturing outside or to a w indow to look for the tornado upon receiving a tornado warning. Confirmation 
behavior processes 'self-correct' receiver perceptions o f  risk to comfortable levels o f reasonableness, attempting 
to overcom e inertial feelings o f disbelief, and is consistently identified in the literature as an inherent part o f 
the warning process and human condition (M ileti and Fitzpatrick 1991; M ileti 1999). In general, when
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individuals receive a warning, they assess its significance to themselves and to others significant to them, based 
on a variety o f  factors. These factors include past interaction not only with the hazard agent involved, but also 
any warning systems, played against various elements o f  personality (ideologies, values, goals, responsibilities). 
Reinforcem ent o f  the message is sought by observing environmental cues (e.g., going outside to look at sky; 
hearing the wind), checking alternative warning sources o f  the message is com m only sought (e.g., polling 
multiple TV channels), and inquiring how peers perceive the impending risk (e.g., phoning neighbors). The 
comm on sequelae  o f  actions subsequent to a warning can be described also as 'queuing' -  where risk 
information is accum ulated and mentally stored until a risk aversion threshold is reached -  by environmental 
cues, additional warnings, or cognitive realizations. It is in essence a "queuing o f  cues," until a tipping point 
is reached to spur warning compliance and protective action. The confirmation process is so common that 
attempts to bypass or eliminate it have been fruitless. Instead, warning authorities m ust integrate this behavior 
into the planning process. This is attempted by increasing lead times, m aintaining w arning message consistency 
and source credibility, and continuously directing receivers with explicit instructions on how to respond with 
what is known as 'call-to-action' (CTA) statements.
Haas (1973) noted long ago the importance o f  environmental cues to inducing w arning reaction. In the modern
era, as especially indicated in recent tornado events, perception o f environmental cues is now commonly
achieved via TV. Images o f the w eather are less often derived by naked eye, but rather by live digital image.
It is im portant to note that such images are still based on environmental cues (vision), only that they are not in
situ. Tornado video in a warning situation is significantly different than receipt o f  the exact same information
conveyed by a radio report or TV text 'crawl'. W ith regard to risk comm unication, "a picture may indeed be
worth a thousand words." Biddle (2000) found that video broadcast live as a tornado approached a m etropolitan
area had a m ajor im pact on warning awareness and compliance among view ers and the folks that talked to
them. There are numerous questions regarding the spatial aspects o f  such conveyances. For instance, does
such video result in high numbers o f  viewers wrongly perceiving themselves to be in the path o f a threatening
tornado or within a valid warning? M ight there be a large de fac to  false alarm com ponent to video im ages that
accom pany verbal or text w arning information that lacks geographic specificity? Lopes (1992) suggested
people can become desensitized when exposed to actual disaster or damage images, possib ly  due to greater
- 16 -
fears o f  the unknown and its imagined impacts. That was not the case for the OCT, because it was big in size 
when it was south o f  Amber (Figure 1.2). The impact o f  video is complex and involves a number o f  situational 
and contextual variables. Similar to the instant and emotional impact o f  imagery supplied by 'combat camera' 
in an ongoing war, the policy implications brought by exposure to live tornado video on individual and 
community perceptions can be virtually instant, yet may not be understood until well after, permanently altering 
the human ecological response for that event (Moeller 1989).
Figure 1.2 • OCT at 7 ml South o f  Am ber, Ok. R. M cPherson, W olfinbarger, R eader, and 
D uvall, 1999, O klahom a C llm atologlcal Survey. Used w ith perm ission. Copyright.
Given that previous studies (Hansoti et al. 1979; Grazulis et al. 1998; Gruntfest 2002) indicate that past 
experience with weather risk is an important factor in response to subsequent risks, there is little doubt that real­
time images o f  tornado events affect the warning process. Slovic (1987) suggests that the most likely impact 
is increasing acute awareness ('availability heuristic'). Video imagery also seems to increase overall (or chronic 
awareness) particularly during an event in areas climatologically most prone to tornadoes. By simply keeping 
the risk tangible and real, the result is a behavioral state known as 'hyper-vigilance.' However, the same 
imagery in less climatologically active areas may foster 'it doesn't happen here' attitudes ('affect heuristic’),
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decreasing awareness and preparedness (Slovic 1987). Every time a tornado w arning is issued and the sirens 
do not wail, or that each time the sirens wail when there is n o t  a tornado warning, there is a cost (Lindell 1987; 
Biddle 1996, Biddle 2000). Public response evolves as fast as the warning technology, and much faster than 
our ability to characterize these responses.
1.4.1.2 - False Alarms, Close Calls, and Cry W olf Syndrome -
Cry w olf effects -  the declining attention to, and lowered confidence in, community warning programs that
emerges following a fa lse  alarm^ (or series o f  false alarms) -  is a cognitive factor o f  recurrent concern in the
literature (M ileti 1975; Burnham 1992; Atwood and M ajor 1998). W hile detailed false alarm research
regarding short-fuse w eather hazards is sparse, some hazard literature has gone so far as to suggest that every
cancelled warning produces a negative im pact (Breznitz 1984). Other works have found that false alarm
im pacts are magnified by the media (M ileti and Fitzpatrick 1992), or that false alarms followed closely by
official explanations can lessen the negative im pact (Baker 1993). Emerging research suggests that the impacts
o f  previous false alarms may not have negative impacts in all situations, particularly in high-consequence,
short-fuse events. The implications o f this remain a topic for further study, but ideas put forth by G runtfest et
al. (2002) indicate an inherent value to both warning networks and stakeholders in false alarm experiences
where the predicted event did not fully materialize. These experiences are labeled 'close calls'^ or near-miss
events^  and are found in many situations to serve as learning experiences, tests o f  procedures and technological
systems, and publicized incidents that remind people o f  the hazard and the functions o f  the warning systems
them selves. Still, there is little doubt that some stakeholders can develop some level o f  conditioning if  exposed
to a significant num ber o f  false alarms. False alarms are most prevalent when w arning systems are new, and
magnified in situations where warnings are issued for large areas and long time-frames. The spatial and
tem poral size o f  a warning (in severe local storm scenarios) dictates that many recipients covered by warning
will not experience any impact. U nder formal N W S  verification schemes, if  the warned event does occur within
the w arned area (e.g., a county), no portion will be classified as a 'false alarm' -  even a large portion o f the area
saw no impact. Also, the N W S  w ill mark a tornado warning as valid even if  there were high winds or hail in
the storm, and it does not produce a tornado. Still, many people experiencing no personal im pact could
perceive the event as a false alarm. Thus, it is a practical goal o f warning systems to make warnings as discrete
in time and space as possible. Research from other hazards, such as flash floods, hurricane landfalls, and
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chemical spills, may not translate well in characterizing the warning ecology for severe local storms, as impacts 
vary significantly based on the frequency o f  events and local event im pact histories (Dow and Cutter 1998). 
The false alarm dynamic remains an area ripe for further research, especially if  plans for an 'all hazard warning 
system' materialize, as it would surely bring with it changes in false alarm ratios and perceptions o f  warning 
system utility and value.
1.4.2 - W a r n i n g  M e s s a g e  C o n t e n t
K ey elem ents o f warning compliance are related to warning message content. In its m ost basic form, a warning 
must convey the 'what, where, and when' o f  the risk, with some inclusion o f the 'why' and regarding 'who' is 
at risk. W arning message content influences compliance directly (Carter 1980). The more consistent the 
message across several broadcasts and m edia, the more direct and timely is compliance (M ileti and Sorensen 
1990). Reliability and 'officialness' o f warning source(s), and observed actions o f  local authorities, are also 
im portant to compliance. This is because identical warning messages evoke differing responses among 
stakeholders. There has been a trend to streamline N W S  warning formats (by NW S) to key bits o f  information 
('bullet format' - NW S 2001) for short-fuse scenarios such as tornadoes. The claimed utility o f  such formats 
is to enhance and expedite understanding and com pliance, but little aside from anecdotal evidence is available 
to support these claims.
1.4.2.1 - Call-to-Action Statements -
'Call-to-action' statements are bits o f verbal information addressing recom m ended preparatory and response 
actions to be undertaken by users. They are short, direct, supplementary messages that advise people about 
specific threats in specific locations, aimed at spurring specific mitigative actions to p ro tect personal safety. 
For example, if  a storm is about to cross a lake, a CTA might focus on quick action to be taken by boaters in 
the path. If  a tornado is known to be 'rain-wrapped and not visible,' a CTA could be used to rem ind people that 
they will likely not see the tornado coming, so they shouldn't wait for its appearance (Troutman et al. c.2003). 
Some CTA statements are remedial and seemingly obvious -  such as "this is a dangerous storm , take cover 
now!" -  but they may be im portant to streamlining the confirm ation process, especially among highly- 
vulnerable personalities. Conversely, CTA can take up valuable time and bandwidth that could be utilized to 
comm unicate more detail about storm path and intensities, and a controversy for planning and for confirmation
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behavior ensues. The value o f CTA statem ents have been lauded by NW S  in recent tornado disasters in 
Oklahoma (1999), Texas (2000), and Alabam a (2002), though there is some criticism o f  the CTA concept and 
p o s t hoc assessments o f  their value (Doswell 2003).
1.4.2.2 - Spatial and Temporal Inform ation -
There is a discrete, yet largely-uncharacterized 'window o f  opportunity' in time for a warning to capture public 
attention and spur mitigative response. Theoretically, the longer the lead time -  or the more advanced the 
warning -  the higher the efficiency and compliance. Surprisingly, this does not seem to be the situation, as 
it appears that the relationship between lead time and compliance is quite com plicated, illogical, and non-linear. 
Some response research (Balluz et al. 1997) has indicated that, in spite o f  available lead time, most who have 
sought shelter in a warning situation did so within five min or less o f  reception. This suggests that even with 
clear understanding o f  the hazard and early reception o f credible warning information, the confirmation process 
has not been extirpated with technological and programmatic advancem ents in the w arning process resulting 
in the tangible mitigation improvem ents expected. It seems earlier and superior warning information is often 
lost in the period between the reception and reaction phases. Similar behavior has been noted in recent 
tornadoes in spite o f  very long average lead times (Biddle 2000). The ALT (Average Lead Tim e) for the OCT 
official warning was 18 min, with some areas having more than a 30 min lead time before tornadoes struck 
(Quoetone et al. 2000). This is explored in detail in the survey results below, as it has emerged as one o f  the 
key observations o f  this work.
Given that w arning information has becom e more precise in time and space, the numbers o f  people spending
hours in storm shelters has dropped in kind. Y et, this has brought new challenges to the EM A community. N ot
only do advances in ALT not always translate into higher compliance rates, increased ALT have made flight
from a tornado path upon receipt o f a tornado warning much more possible and common. This is essentially
an evacuation, a concept not previously considered possible (or intended) for a short-fuse hazard such as
tornadoes. ALT coupled with the nature o f  real-time tornado coverage on TV is resulting in ever-increasing
examples o f people choosing to take to the highways to flee the tornado (Hamm er and Schmidlin 2002).
A lexander (1993) noted that longer warning ALT can lead to situational apathy and distract from optimal
response. Mileti (1999, p. 175) summarized the improvements o f tornado w arning ALT time over the past two
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decades; " In 1978 warnings were issued for 22 percent o f  tornadoes; the average lead time was three minutes. 
In 1995 the percentage had risen to 60 and the lead tim e to alm ost nine minutes" and further noted that "the 
nation is moving from 'detected' warnings to an era o f'predictive ' tornado warnings." W ere such ambitions to 
come to full fruition, they would likely turn the current paradigm  o f human ecology o f tornado w arnings 
(lim ited in definition as it is) on its face by dram atically altering views o f  the warning landscape in m ultiple 
ways. W arning lead time relationships w ith reception and compliance are im portant research gaps. W ith 
future ALT projected at ever-increasing durations, the supporting human ecology research is rendered purely 
theoretical. The im plications o f  longer lead times on warning behavior and mitigation options dem and careful 
and thorough examination (Gruntfest 2002; Doswell 2003), particularly with regard to im pacts on flight from 
tornadoes in vehicles, and is also discussed at length below.
Technologies or forecasting skills that allow for more site-specific warnings are, in m ost instances, beneficial 
to the system and inherently result in smaller numbers o f  persons subjected to false alarms, minimize the cry 
w olf effect, and increase compliance over time (M ileti 1975; D rabek 1986; N igg 1995). Conversely, there is 
a theoretical threshold minimum warning size im posed by the technological and logistical capabilities o f  the 
warning system. Logistically, it is not practical for authorities to warn each household w ith the proverbial 
knock at the door from a police officer. W hile technological innovations such as cell phones and Blackberry™  
devices suggest personal warnings may eventually be possible, the availability o f such systems to the bulk o f 
society, particularly to some o f  the most vulnerable sectors, is years away. Thus, the size o f  a warning area and 
the population therein remain important factors for warning applications. Mileti (1997) noted that the areal 
extent o f  warnings presents significant logistical hurdles for the systems to overcome. Threats to larger areas 
involve warning more people and require working through more media and organizations. Similar threats to 
smaller areas facilitate localized warning efforts that are more readily coordinated cutting the num ber o f  people 
inaccurately or unnecessarily warned, and insuring that those not in areas 'under the gun' do not cease normal 
activities. Small areas are a logisitical challenge however.
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Akin to the impact o f  increasing tem poral warning precision, the response spectrum for scale changes and 
accom panied procedural changes are also purely speculative. It is unlikely that compliance continues to 
increase past certain tem poral precision thresholds, but it would seem logical to assume response param eters 
are positively affected with spatial precision, assuming a reasonable false alarm ratio (FAR). D elineating these 
thresholds rem ains a major research gap. A system that seeks spatially and tem porally sm aller warnings allows 
customized responses, with stakeholder utilization commensurate with given activities and risk exposures. 
Such efforts might be automated with detailed mitigation plans in place, with w arning systems calibrated to 
acceptable levels o f probability o f  detection (POD), FAR, and ALT over a given test period. The use o f 
probability-based w arnings to better communicate the increased uncertainty that comes with more precise 
warning scales may eventually prove w orkable, but there are many unknowns with regard to changes in 
decision-m aking thresholds that might result in perform ance or utility trade-offs in FAR (i.e.. Type I and Type 
II errors), and associated societal costs (Stewart and Bostrum 2002).
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I f  you don't like the weather in Oklahoma, wait a minute and it'll change.
-  W ill  R o g e r s  -  
P o lit ic a l  S a t ir is t  a n d  N a t iv e  O k la h o m a n
The image o f  Man-Ka-Ih (tornado) - a great wild horse  -  roams the skies. It is violent. Kiowas speak to it, 
asking it to pass over as they enter storm shelters, that take the shape o f  the Earth.
-  N . S c o t t  M o m a d a y  - 
THE W A Y  TO RAINY M OUNTAIN
2  -  C o n t e m p o r a r y  T o r n a d o  W a r n i n g  S y s t e m s
Severe convective storms and their progeny -  most notably tornadoes -  present significant risk to life and 
property. M ileti (1999) noted that tornadoes are the leading cause o f injury from any natural hazard in the 
US, ranking 2"'’ in mean annual deaths, and 3'** in mean annual property loss. Federal Em ergency  
M anagem ent Agency [FEMAJ allocated in excess o f $1B for presidentially-declared tornado disasters in the 
first-half o f the 1990s (M ileti 1999) while again -  the 1999 OCT alone carried a price tag in excess o f  $1B 
(Grazulis 2001). Y et, tornado casualties have shown significant and somewhat steady declines since the 
im plem entation o f severe local storm warning systems over the last half-century. The severe w eather 
forecasting and WWP as overseen by NW S, has operated in virtually the same m anner since its inception 
beginning in the early 1950s. Exceptions to this have been prim arily in infrastructure upgrades (Grazulis 
1996) and include the proliferation o f  detection and communication technologies. However, it is im portant 
to note that the w ay warnings are disseminated and received has dram atically and consistently changed, and 
that these changes are reflected in the spectrum o f  human risk (Grazulis et al. 1998). W arning system 
modernization has often occurred in evolutionary spurts, with the rapid integration o f the telegraph, radio, 
telephone, television, and now Internet and wireless m essaging systems. A significant research gap exists 
within the overlap between what is technologically possible and what is socially feasible. Technological 
advancem ents are not the only factors, as Doswell et al. (1999) docum ented the evolution and im portance 
o f  public awareness campaigns and storm spotter networks to the overall perform ance o f  severe w eather 
w arning programs. In addition there is a clear, but dynamic population bias in historical and contem porary 
observational data (Biddle 1996).
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2.1  - E v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  W a t c h - W a r n i n g  P r o g r a m
W hile US thunderstorm and tornado fatalities have steadily dropped, damage totals have steadily increased. 
As extrapolated from G razulis (1996) since 1680, about 20 000 deaths have been recorded from more than 
4000 tornadoes. In the 'Official Period' o f  severe w eather forecasting [1953-present], mean annual tornado 
deaths were 65.8 per annum (Grazulis 2001). Over the last decade [1996-2005], tornado deaths fell to 57.8 
annually, and only twice in the last two decades have total annual deaths topped 100 -  in 1984 and 1998 -  
with 122 and 132 deaths respectively (SPC c.2006). Grazulis et al. (1998) found that the NW S  severe 
w eather W W P has had a definitive impact on tornado casualties, saving at least 5800 lives since the 
program  was initiated by the US Weather Bureau  in 1953. Doswell et al. (1998) estim ated more than twice 
this num ber o f lives saved over the same period.
Successes o f  warning systems and mitigation program s aside, hubris in the face o f the regular and still 
significant risk posed by tornadoes to society -  in particular to certain vulnerable sectors -  is foolish. There 
rem ains significant opportunity to see a 300-plus tornado fatality year or 100-plus fatality event if  weather 
forecasting programs and w arning networks fail to keep pace with an increasingly com plex society and the 
dynamic human environment. Grazulis et al. (1998) noted that w hile casualties show signs o f'bo ttom ing  
out', the potential for mass casualty events lingers. Large venue special events (e.g., stock car races, 
stadium events, outdoor festivals) are increasing both in frequency and total attendance per event. Edwards 
and Lemon (2002) caution that numerous tornado disasters have been narrow ly averted, highlighting the 
currently very real risk o f a mass casualty tornado to suggest that it is not a question o f  if  such a catastrophe 
will occur, but when and where. It is easy to envision scenarios that involve tornadoes within the heart o f 
an urban area or bum per-to-bum per rush hour traffic, particularly in regions on the margins o f  high tornado 
frequency where warning netw orks, personal experience, and public awareness may not be as advanced as 
the norm in Tornado Alley (Grazulis et al. 1998). It is also unknown how future climate change might alter 
the physical environment in such a way as to increase tornado frequency in certain areas, bringing with it 
concurrent increases in risk (Etkin and M yers 2000). All o f the above seem to justify  w hat little resources 
are currently extended to severe weather warning programs, and argue for continued research and
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developm ent for all components o f  the warning system, including warning content, format, dissemination 
methods, and reception variables. Advancements in technology alone will not be enough to eliminate the 
risk to certain vulnerable sectors o f  society, and to increasingly large, mobile, and urban populations.
2.1.1 - B r i e f  H i s t o r  y  o f  NW S W a r n i n g  P r o g r a m
In the early 1950s, the existence and benefits o f  the Departm ent o f  Defense [DOD] program  became 
increasingly known to the civilian population and the media, and political demands to establish a public 
program  pushed the US Weather Bureau  to establish a Severe Weather Unit in Kansas City, aimed at 
im plem enting a national program for severe w eather forecasts delivered through local Weather Bureau  
offices. A w atershed year was 1953 for tornado warning programs as it marked not only the first full year 
o f centralized severe local storm prediction (W ashington, DC), but also saw numerous intense tornadoes 
that killed 100-plus each in the w idespread locations o f  W aco, Texas; Flint, M ichigan; and W orcester, 
M assachusetts. In 1956, the Weather Bureau  began to address public safety and warning program  
awareness w ith various pamphlets and documentary style TV program s. On Palm Sunday o f  1965, a major 
M idwestern tornado outbreak killed 265 persons. This focused further attention and resources on w arning 
dissem ination issues and resulted in the creation o f  the Skywarn Spotter Program and N C A A  W eather 
Radio (NW R).
In 1966, the tornado watch^ was introduced by the SEvere Local Storms [SELS] unit in Kansas City. The 
W W P concept has generally rem ained conceptually the same since its inception. M ore recent 
developm ents to the history o f warning programs include the 1988 com pletion o f  the NEXRAD D oppler 
radar program  as part o f a formal NW S  M odernization and Restructuring (M AR) effort, and the moving and 
reorganization o f  the SELS  to Norman, Oklahoma as the Storm Prediction Center [S P C ]. For more 
detailed information on the history and evolution o f US severe weather forecasting and warning program s 
see Galway 1982; Galway 1989; Ostby 1992, Grazulis 1993; Grice et al. 1999; and Bradford 2001.
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2.2 - T h e  US T o r n a d o  P r o b l e m
Historically (1953-1999 - Grazulis 1993), the US experiences an average o f  ~85 tornado-related fatalities 
per year. For 2000-2006, it was an average o f  33.2 fatalities (SPC c.2007). If  one compares the two time 
frames, it shows that deaths were roughly one-third the last seven years compared to the O fficial Period. 
G razulis (2001) suggests the steady drop in tornado fatalities began in the 1930s -  prior to the onset o f 
organized warning and forecasting efforts -  indicating that other societal forces are partially responsible. 
In noting that fatalities per capita have dropped in magnitudes incongruent to what could reasonably be 
attributed to warning programs alone, his hypotheses include: rural depopulation and migration to the W est 
Coast early in the 20“* Century; the proliferation o f  radio and then TV in the mid-century; increasing 
capabilities in emergency medical care; and institutionalized safety programs o f  the W orld W ar II 
m anufacturing culture that persisted until recently w ith 'duck-and-cover' civil defense mind sets o f  the Cold 
W ar / N uclear Era (Platt 1999). Nonetheless, the im print in the historical record marking advancem ents in 
forecasting techniques, observing technologies, severe storm research, and IT applications and 
telecom m unications, that combine as warning systems is well documented (Grazulis et al. 1998; D oswell et 
al. 1999; G razulis 2001). Brooks and Doswell (2002) describe trends that clearly demarcate the im pacts o f 
the W W P on tornado m orbidity and mortality, w ith death rates dropping since 1925.
The consistent decline in tornado fatalities in the modern era has greatly altered definitions and public 
perceptions o f  w hat constitute a 'tornado disaster''^ (Grazulis et al. 1998). The last single tornado to kill at 
least 50 persons was in 1971 in M ississippi, and the last one to kill at least 100 was in 1953 in M ichigan 
(Grazulis 2001). Still, it is not unusual after a tornado event to see newspaper articles discussing a lack o f 
warning (Daily Oklahoman 30 M arch 2007). However, usually with some investigation it is clear that, in 
m ost cases, there was in fact adequate warning available, and that it simply was not accessed or could not 
be acted upon. That the W W P has been available for some three generations and the system has by most 
m easures im proved with time, is by most accounts a success story. Baselines relative to alternatives that 
have not been employed, or for what may be tried in the future, are not currently evident (B rooks and 
Doswell 2002).
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2.2.1 - T o r n a d o  C l i m a t o l o g y  a n d  t h e  G e o g r a p h y  o f  R is k
Grazulis (2001, p. 269) identifies three prim ary ways to define tornado risk: 1) the risk o f  encountering 
some part o f a tornado; 2) the risk to property; and 3) the risk to human life. For the m ost part, warning 
program s (and this research) are concerned with risk to human life. There are approxim ately 2.3M US 
deaths per annum from all causes, o f which about 350 are due to natural hazards. Usually about one-fouth 
o f  these deaths are tornado-related. A 1995 study put the annual risk o f  death from tornadoes per million 
people at 0.5 (or I in 2M ). For perspective, this compared to 1500 per million for health problem s related 
to air pollution (B otkin and Keller 1995). Based on more recent statistics, tornado risk is now as low as 
0.12 deaths per million persons per year, or less than one in 8.33M (Brooks and Doswell 2002). Lifetime  
odds^ for a person born in 1999 to die from any form of'ca tac lysm ic  storm' (including tornadoes) are 1; 27 
573 (NSC C.2005). A ll things considered, the risk for death by storm generally, and death by tornado 
specifically, is relatively low and can be modified considerably by choice and behavior.
a
Figure 2.1 - Recurrence Interval of Tornadoes (east of Rocky M tns). T. G razulis, The 
Tornado: N ature’s Ultimate W indstorm. Used with perm ission. Copyright.
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W hile there is tornado risk in the m ajority o f  the US, most o f  the risk lies in the central portion. Tornado 
events have resulted in significant casualties in M assachusetts, Florida, W yoming, and extreme southwest 
Texas, as well as many locations in between. However, certain  areas o f the Great Plains, M idwest, and the 
South have significantly higher recurrence intervals'^ (RI) for Significant Tornadoes^ (Figure 2.1) as 
compared to the national mean. M itigation programs including warning systems tend to receive more 
attention and resources in these areas. Such programs are warranted throughout the eastern two-thirds o f 
the US, where higher potential for mass casualty events exist. However, there is much variation in warning 
program  im plementation. Regional and local variation is considerable even in Tornado Alley, as one town 
may have little or no warning infrastructure while its neighboring town may have a 'cutting edge' system 
with all the modern 'bells and whistles.' Basic evidence o f  this is found by noting the varied numbers and 
organizational structures o f Skywarn Programs^ in given regions, as well as charting the locations o f 
Stormready^ certified communities (NO A A c.2007). Areas with lower RI often garner less than adequate 
attention, fostering complacency among the public as well as response agencies (Grazulis et al. 1998). For 
these reasons, it is stressed that while warning systems should be considered uniform ly im portant in the 
m ajority o f  the US, most o f the risk lies east o f  the Rocky M ountains. Tornado events have resulted in 
significant casualties in M assachusetts, Florida, W yoming, extreme southwest Texas, as w ell as many 
locations in between. However, certain areas o f  the Great Plains, M idwest, and South have significant 
fatalities to the other areas o f the US (Figure 2.2). Research and developm ent o f  modernized technologies 
and techniques should aim to serve all jurisdictions in a uniform manner.
Figure 2.2 - Tornadoes With a Death (a point for at least one 
fatality). M atthew Biddle, The Tornado: N ature’s Ultimate 
W indstorm . Through 1998. Copyright. -28-
2.2.1.1 - Tornado Epidem iology -
M ost tornado victims are killed by either by being struck by highly-energized flying debris, or when they 
are lifted, bounced, or sent airborne and subsequently strike the ground or some other statie object. M ost o f 
these fatalities are generically elassified as 'blunt force trauma', and comm only affects the head and spinal 
column, and 'major complex trauma', whieh includes major missile injuries, lacerations, internal 
hemorrhaging, and amputations. A sm aller category is 'mechanical asphyxiation', which occurs when large 
debris, such as a wall or tree, falls on the victim, preventing expansion o f  lungs (Brenner and N oji 1995; 
L illibridge 1997).
A non-physiological risk factor for death is the strength o f  the tornado. Simply, the stronger the winds, the 
more damage, and the more damage, the more morbidity and mortality. In fact, violent tornadoes [F4/F5 on 
the Fujita Scale] comprise about 1 % o f  all tornadoes, yet they regularly account for about ~70 % o f  all 
fatalities (Table 2.1). Also, as should be expected, nocturnal tornadoes cause more fatalities than their 
daylight counterparts. Night-time tornadoes are simply are less likely to be spotted, which can delay the 
confirmation process even if  a warning has been issued. Since most o f  the population is asleep, available 
warnings fail to be accessed and may not reach those in the path, and there are fewer opportunities for 
people to comm unicate w arnings in informal networks. Structures below  ground or other engineered 
storm -proof structures clearly contribute to survivability; thus, a significant risk factor for death is a lack o f 
available shelter (M arshall 2000).
Table 2.1 - Percent O ccurrence and Fatality Rates o f Tornadoes (Fujita Scale)
W eak Tornadoes (FO/Fl) Strong Tornadoes (F2/F3) V iolent Tornadoes (F4/F5)
88%  of all tornadoes 11% of all tornadoes 1%  o f  a ll  to r n a d o e s
Less than 2% of deaths Nearly 28%  of all deaths 70 %  o f  a ll  t o r n a d o  d e a th s
Lifetime: 1 to 10 minutes Lifetime: 20  m inutes or longer Lifetime: 1 hour or longer
Winds less than 110 mph W inds 111 mph to 2 05  mph Winds greater than 2 0 6  mph
W ith regard to tornadoes, the mobile and manufactured home (M M H) population is known to exhibit such 
disproportionally-high vulnerability compared to those in regular frame houses than the mean population. 
W ith few limitations, there simply is no severe storm or tornado scenario where occupying a m obile home 
is safe (AMS 2004). 'Shelter-in-place' is not a viable option, as it has been shown that m any mobile homes
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have been destroyed in winds significantly less than 150 km/h (<100 mph). The MM H population 
continues to grow as the popularity o f  the structures -  traditional among the poor in particular -  has 
increased and now includes m id- and upper-incom e groups seeking seasonal and retirem ent homes, 
especially in the 'Humid South'. The statistics tell the story: in recent years MMH accounted for between % 
and % o f  annual tornado deaths (Grazulis 2001); and, over the last two decades h a lf  o f all tornado deaths 
have been among M M H (Golden c.2003).
A recent tornado disaster -  a nocturnal N ovem ber (2005) tornado near Evansville, Indiana -  killed a total o f 
23 people, at least 19 o f which were M M H occupants. A ccording to Brooks and Doswell (2002, p. 355) the 
"mean (m edian) annual [MMH] death rate from 1975 to 2000 in was 1.23 (1.19) per million per year, 
whereas the mean (m edian) rate from 1985 to 2000 in perm anent housing was 0.06 (0.04) per million per 
year. In short, the death rate is approximately 20 times as high in mobile homes as in perm anent homes, and 
the [MMH] rate is about 70 % o f  the rate for the total US population prior to 1925." It is not serendipity 
that a disproportionate num ber o f tornado fatalities come from the largely-poor MM H. It stands to reason 
that with roughly one-twelfth o f the population accounting for half the tornado-related deaths that the 
equation is skew ed by societal rather than natural forces. W hile much o f  the underlying causes for this 
situation can be traced directly to socio-econom ics (i.e., inability to afford perm anent housing) and are tied 
less directly to w arning issues, future warning programs should design new methods aimed at MMH 
populations with the problem  addressed as what it is -  a public health crisis.
Finally, as noted above, the existence o f warning program s and the timely reception o f warnings 
rem arkably decrease tornado risk exposure. W arning systems and increased aw areness have dram atically 
lowered tornado fatality rates, there may also be a small but significant m edical advancem ent bias in the 
decrease. Deaths have dropped o ff in part due because m edical treatment, search and rescue, and 
em ergency transport capabilities have all undergone dramatic advancem ents. This is partly evident in the 
incidence o f higher percentages o f  fatalities killed in the field, as compared to the historical tornado 
m ortality (G razulis 2001). M any forms o f injury that were fatal in the past are less so today. Additional
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demographic shifts related to urbanization also alter perceptions o f warning system im pacts and can foster 
m isrepresentations. These factors may augm ent data that champion "better warning" or "increased 
awareness," and care must be taken to note the changes in the data as well as comparing aggregates.
2 .3  - O k l a h o m a  T o r n a d o  C l i m a t o l o g y
Central Oklahoma averages -6 0  thunderstorm days a year with about ha lf classified as "severe" (Kessler 
1983), and -21  tornado days per annum (CCS c.2006). "Tornado Season" for O klahom a is roughly April 
through June, but significant events have occurred in every month. Oklahoma experiences -5 0  Significant 
Tornadoes yearly, with about 16 between the hours o f 4:00 pm and 8:00 pm (2100 and 0100 UTC - Grazulis 
1996). Total Oklahoma tornado deaths over the last two centuries are about 1400 persons (Grazulis 1996; 
SPC c.2006), with an average rate over the last two decades o f  3.75 persons per annum. By any m easure, 
the OCT was one o f  the w orst tornadoes in magnitude and intensity to ever strike O klahom a, and at least in 
the contem pary era to occur in the US. W hile it was the first 'violent tornado' (F4/F5) to hit within OKC, 
the city has a history that includes many tornadoes and tornado disasters. About 100 Significant T ornadoes 
have been recorded in Oklahoma County alone, with at least six notable disasters since 1930 (Branick 
1994). Grazulis (1996; p. 16) reported "when the concentration o f tornadoes. Significant Tornadoes, and 
violent tornadoes are calculated, Oklahoma is num ber one. Concentration per unit area is probably the 
truest measure o f tornado risk." Using N W S  Official Period data, portions o f  central O klahom a yield RI o f 
-2 0 0 0  yrs, among the shortest anywhere on Earth (Grazulis 2001). Assessment o f  tornado risk based on 
political subdivisions (such as states) is always problematic. Y et, it remains im portant to note that by 
virtually any scientific measure, Oklahoma is at or near the top o f  all im portant statistical categories for 
tornado frequency, magnitude, and risk (Stein and Hill 1993). There have been -2 7 5  killer tornadoes in the 
history o f  the state for which there are reliable records (Grazulis 2001). W hen population density is 
considered, Oklahoma ranks 4"’ among states in tornado fatalities at 77 per million persons (NW S 2001), 
yet 36'*’ in km^ at 56 470 per million persons (USBC 2001). In average annual adjusted economic damages 
(1950-95), Oklahoma ranked 5“' at -$23M  (ESIG c.2006). By any data set, the high tornado frequency.
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high ratio o f Significant Tornadoes, and the continued urbanization o f  greater OKC, all conspire to make it 
the m ost tornado-prone m ajor city (Grazulis 1996).
In the public psyche, both inside and outside Oklahoma, it is quite clear in the vernacular that O klahom a is 
Tornado Alley. Oklahomans seem resigned to, and perhaps even proud of, their homeland's association 
with tornadoes. Likewise, national associations o f  Oklahoma with tornadoes are pervasive^. To the extent 
that these perceptions impact tornado risk generally, and how they may have molded the coping styles o f 
those affected by the OCT specifically, pose a number o f im portant questions. Previous studies (e.g., 
H anson et al. 1979; Grazulis et al. 1998) indicate that past experience with tornado risk is an im portant 
factor in response to subsequent risks. Such would seem to be the case in O klahom a, w ith the stature o f 
intense m edia coverage o f weather, and the proactive stance o f  the NW S  and location o f  the weather 
industry'^ in the area. Indeed, the area is significantly tornado-prone to justify  the placem ent o f  the first 
national center dedicated to the study o f  tornadoes -  the N ational Severe Storm s Laboratory [NSSLJ -  
where it rem ains ~10 km (6.2 mi) from the OCT path. Oklahomans benefit to a degree simply by 'rubbing 
elbows' with personnel o f these operations, as well via the incum bent public relations, educational, and 
m edia attention that surround the w eather industry. W hile most w arning system com ponents and structures 
in the study area are similar to those found in majority o f the US, some are unique to O klahom a (Crawford 
and M orris 2000; Biddle 2000; Svenvold 2004). Regular confrontations with severe w eather (and w eather 
media) appear to augment abilities to reap the benefits o f m odernized w arning systems (Doswell et al. 
1999).
N orm an, O klahom a is currently home to numerous agencies o f  the N ational O ceanic and A tm ospheric  
Adm inistration [NOAAJ, a division o f the U.S. D epartm ent o f  Commerce [D O C ], including the Oklahoma 
City Area Weather Forecast Office [W FO] that serves all o f central and western Oklahoma and a portion o f 
north Texas with forecasts and warnings. This office was the prototype for contem porary severe w eather 
operations nationally as a part o f  the N W S  recent moderation and resturcturing (M AR) -  that included an 
upgrading o f  technology agency-wide including the new W SR-88D D oppler radar -  that was tested and
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developed at the OU N orth Base (Bluestein 1999). The em ergence o f  Norman as a world center for 
research, m onitoring, and prediction o f tornadoes and severe local storms, began in 1948 at nearby Tinker 
A ir Force Base where tornado forecasting was pioneered. This was followed by establishment o f  NSSL  in 
Norman in 1964 where D oppler w eather radar was pioneered and tested. In 1997, under other MAR 
initiatives, the SPC  -  responsible for the issuance o f  severe w eather w atches and hazardous weather 
guidance nationwide -  relocated to Norman from Kansas City. Additional NOAA  agencies including the 
NEXRAD R adar O perational Center [RO C], and numerous federal and state atmospheric research institutes 
associated with NSSL  and the University o f  Oklahoma, were placed under one cooperative umbrella in 1998 
as the so-called N ational Weather C enter [NWCJ. The center, with emphasis in the developm ent o f 
num erical forecast models, environmental monitoring systems, tornado research, and severe w eather 
forecasting, directly employs more than 600 people and injects over $60M annually into the economy 
(Biddle 2004a).
2.3.1 - P r e v i o u s  OKC - A r e a  T o r n a d o  E v e n t s  o f  I m p o r t a n c e
The OCT was the 3"' Significant Tornado event to strike the OKC metro in less than a year (13 June and 4 
O ctober 1998). W hile minor in com parison (no fatalities), the media heavily covered both earlier events, 
forcing many people to reconsider tornado risk in their own "backyard". These events may have acted as 
antidote to any accum ulated com placency as a result o f  a period o f relative storm inactivity in the area over 
the previous decade. No cry w o lf effect many feared had evolved from excessive exposure to warnings for 
non-significant events (Grazulis et al. 1998) m aterialized in OCT warning response. On 8 M ay 2003 and 9 
M ay 2003, no fear o f  false alarms was found either (NOAA 2003). On 8 M ay 2003, w hat amounted to a 
Top 10 in SP C  tornado damage (SPC c.2006) killed one person and was rated F4. There was less time to 
be warned for that tornado because o f  the time-of-day. M any were not back from work yet. The 1999 OCT 
entered M oore about 1915 CDT (0015 UTC), whereas the 2003 tornado entered M oore about 1649 CDT 
(2149 UTC). The difference in time was essential to enabling w orkers to get home and see warnings on TV 
(1999). In 2003, the tornado formed in M oore instead o f  upstream. On 8 M ay 2003, 75 % were w arned by 
TV (Comstock and M allonee 2005) which is a significant num ber com pared to the baseline o f this study.
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2 .4  - T h e  T o r n a d o  W a r n i n g  P r o c e s s  U n d e r  t h e  I n t e g r a t e d  W a r n i n g  S y s t e m  
There are numerous threats to life and property from severe convective w eather, most associated with 
supercell thunderstorm s (for discussion o f  the m eteorology, see Doswell 2001) -  namely tornadoes, high 
winds, large hail, lightning, flash flooding -  as well as m iscellaneous threats to transportation activities 
such as wind shear, acute erosion, and com prom ised visibility (e.g., heavy rains or blowing dust). These 
phenom ena are covered in forecasts and warning products for severe thunderstorm s or severe convective 
w eather -  specifically Severe Thunderstorm and Tornado Warnings -  and their associated Convective 
Outlooks, Watches, and Nowcasts. Outlooks and watches -  issued by SPC  on a national basis and warnings 
and, nowcasts -  issued by N W S  locally, form the nexus o f  the current national W W P (the history and 
evolution o f which have been described elsewhere, see Galway 1989; Ostby 1992; Grazulis 1993; Bradford 
2001). It is again stressed that with the exception o f technological advancem ents, the program  has 
rem ained in place roughly unchanged since its inception in the 1950s. It is im portant to note that the W W P 
came together as a function o f  the evolving m eteorological technologies and techniques o f the era, and the 
insight added by the personnel on hand to im plem ent the program  as political and public demand emerged. 
The program  was not the result o f  an appreciable amount o f  sociological research, risk analyses, or policy 
investigations, and has been described as having 'evolved in a vacuum ' (Doswell et al. 1999).
M oller et al. (1993) identify three prim ary groups o f  warning program users (stakeholders): the news 
media; the lE M S ('Integrated Em ergency M anagem ent System') and EM A; and the general public. All 
three groups interact amid m yriad independent and overlapping mitigation program s, dissem ination 
netw orks, and coping mechanisms o f greatly varying formality. The N W S \s the governm ental authority 
responsible for the issuance o f  severe w eather warnings (NWS c.2005). Approxim ately 2700 tornado 
warnings are issued each year (Steinberg 2000). Once N W S  issues a warning, information 'cascades' down 
through various stakeholder tiers -  such as the mass media and EMA -  to targeted end-users. In some 
instances, N W S  disseminates warnings directly to the public (e.g., NW R). D osw ell et al. (1999) noted the 
im portance o f  warning processes proceeding within the general guidance o f  inter- and intra- jurisd ictional 
Integrated Warning Systems (IWS). IWS is a warning system framework and subset o f  a broader
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'Integrated Emergency M anagem ent System' to ensure four 'integrated elements o f  warning systems' -  
forecasting, detection, dissemination, and response (M ileti and Sorensen 1990) -  are utilized as keys to 
mitigative success (M oller 2001). In the late 1980s, NW S  adopted the IWS concept as procedural policy 
(NW S 2000) and it is among the most frequently utilized aspect o f lEM S in the US. The N W S  b lueprint for 
the current warning program remains within the NW S Fam ily o f  Services^ (FOS), a suite o f severe w eather 
forecasts, w arning products, and dissemination routes that serve the NW S mission^ to protect life and 
property (NWS c.2005). Ultimately, the goal is to have m ultiple media and sources disseminate the same 
warning information to targeted stakeholders (usually the general public) as expeditiously as possible.
W hen severe w eather is observed, reported, or detected. Warning Forecast Offices [W FO] have 
responsibility for generating warnings. WFOs utilize an array o f  resources to accom plish this, including 
D oppler radar and ground-based reports from spotter networks. However, many other information sources 
contribute to forecaster decision-m aking and 'situation awareness' (e.g., satellite imagery, observational 
data, model output, personal experience) are involved in the warning process (A ndra et al. 2002). W hen 
w arnings are issued, they are relayed via numerous media o f the WirS-FOS im m ediately and 
simultaneously. N etw ork media include, but are not limited to: the Emergency A lert System (EAS), the 
N ational W arning System (NAW AS), NW R, and m iscellaneous Internet and W orld W ide W eb systems. 
W arnings are then re-disseminated by electronic mass m edia (local radio, TV), certain cable TV systems 
(e.g., The Weather Channel), vendor messaging systems (pagers, cell phones, alarm systems), and EM A 
w arning networks (radio nets, sirens, loud speakers, etc.). In some instances, many warnings and nowcasts 
may be issued by a single WFOs in a very short time-frame. Active severe w eather days present significant 
challenges to warning systems and forecasters alike. The more severe w eather in a given area over a small 
period o f  time, the more logistical stress upon the entire IW S, including end users who m ust receive and act 
upon the information. In the 1999 OCT for instance, N W S  personnel issued 70 W arnings and processed 
100 field spotter reports over some 6 hr (M cCarthy 2002).
Few changes in the actual inform ation content o f weather warnings them selves have occurred for most 
users. However, many new forms o f  'value added' information have been developed for those users with
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specialized needs or interests. For instance, effort has been made at some WFOs to provide multiple 
formats o f enhanced inform ation to fit a variety o f scenarios, rather than simply generating one or two 
standard forms o f  tornado warnings. The stated purpose is to increase effectiveness by providing specific 
information about the nature o f the tornado threat (Smith and Piltz 1999). Such situational approaches 
allow forecasters to define tornado warnings -  w hether prom pted by D oppler-generated or spotter reports -  
by their meteorological and geographical contexts (e.g., storm morphology: supercells vs. squall lines, 
environment: G reat Plains vs. Florida, etc.). In addition, a variety o f specific formats has been designed 
that include statements tailored to certain stakeholders (e.g., RV parks, boating areas, rural areas, highway 
overpasses), or certain storm climatologies (e.g., nocturnal events, coastlines, hurricane landfall events) that 
have molded WFO expertise (Troutm an et al. c.2003). In some regions, specific warning program s for 
hearing im paired users have been implemented as w ell (W ood and W eisman 2003).
2 .5  - D i s s e m i n a t i o n
Subsequently, warning information is dissem inated to EM A and the m edia for relay to the public for 
mitigative uses. Noted technological advancem ents have greatly added to the means and forms o f  warning 
dissemination. W arning systems include sirens, TV, public radio, NW R, and forms o f  w arning using the 
telephone, PDA, cellular telephone, the Internet, and autom ated GPS warning transceiver. A fter the 2007 
storm season, the NW S  w ill stop using county-wide warnings and issue polygons (which will be given 
county or city boundaries).
2.5.1 - S i r e n s
Sirens are generally dichotomous. They are sounded if  there is a warning, and silent if  there is no warning. 
In theory, polychotom ous schemes for sirens could be designed, with differing auditory signals for differing 
warning thresholds. But the prospects o f this are quite problem atic, would require significant study, and 
require complex and expensive technology and hardware. Sirens were designed to alert special populations 
(e.g., outdoor w orkers, factory grounds, go lf courses, etc.) and rarely intended as a prim ary source in this 
era. They are o f high utility in certain situations, such as small towns or M M H . Sirens are difficult or
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im possible to hear in many locations, especially at night when insulated and air conditioned homes and 
buildings are sealed up. New siren placement does not always keep pace with housing developm ent, and 
m aintenance is inadequate in many locales. Changing political priorities and supervisory philosophies can 
result in lapses in funding and m anpower to maintain siren systems in many communities. W hile sirens 
remain im portant tools and in high demand in many areas (especially rural communities), there are 
indications that their utility as primary or secondary warning sources has dropped with the proliferation o f 
other electronic comm unications media, and they are for the m ost part, outside only (Biddle 2000).
2.5.2 - Te l e v i s i o n
TV has overwhelm ingly become the m ost common source o f warning reception, as was evident in recent 
major tornado events. Legates and Biddle (1999) found that 68 % o f  those surveyed in the damage path o f 
the 1998 Birmingham, A labama Tornado utilized TV as the prim ary warning source, w ith 17 % m ore using 
it as a secondary warning source for a total o f 85 %. Sim ilar data for the 1999 OCT with prim ary and 
secondary users at 69 % and 19 %, respectively for a total o f  88 %, are discussed in detail in later chapters. 
Im provements in ALT over that last decade also are partially  related to the utility and efficiency o f  TV- 
based dissemination. TV would also seem to be a prim ary medium for the dissemination o f  various 
advanced warning products, such as probability-based warnings, given the hypothesized graphical 
requirem ents o f  most o f  the products. It remains to be seen w hether TV probability presentations directly 
to the public will result in higher quality information and higher com pliance rates, versus the current verbal 
and lexical presentations o f  traditional warning formats. In any case, probability data might assist on air 
TV personnel in prioritizing which storms to give the most attention to in order to convey the most urgency. 
U nder current county-based warning schemes, the efficiency and high dissem ination rates for TV as a 
prim ary and secondary source cannot be denied. Any drastic changes to the system will be hard pressed to 
match current numbers in warning reception.
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2.5.3 - R a d i o
AM / FM radio remains a popular and effective medium for communicating warnings, and is usually the 
most comm on secondary source o f recent studies (B iddle 2000). One drawback to radio dissem ination has 
always been the limitations to communicate spatial information verbally, such as probability contours or 
path projections overlain on local maps, over radio air waves absent the graphical capabilities o f  TV. 
However, radio is the medium commonly used by motorists. Local radio stations poll out to the TV 
stations when there is w eather in the metro (tornado warnings in general). Basically, when there is a 
tornado w arning for Oklahoma City metro area, the radio stations go to one o f five TV stations for help and 
they broadcast in unison. This systems is better that nothing, but is less than adequate for the radio 
audience because o f the lack o f  graphics and other visual information cues compared to what TV viewers
2.5.4 - NOAA W e a t h e r  R a d i o
NW R is intended to disseminate information to the users o f  w eather information, but the 'nowcasts' has 
been a failure even at N W S-Norman. Doswell (c.2005) writes "the nowcasts contain little or no real 
information about what is going on and the forecast aspects o f the nowcasts sound more like a plain 
forecast, than one based on mesoscale information. The Central Region H eadquarter's [CRH] standards in 
this regard are the absolute w orst I have encountered. Their decisions on how to operate the NW R have 
been terrible, from my perspective. They give the users so little real information, it's hardly worth having. 
CRH apparently have program m ed for the least common denom inator and so have produced a broadcast 
that approaches being content-free". At the height o f the outbreak (OCT) the use o f NW R was less than 3 
% o f  those surveyed.
2.5.5 - O THER D i s s é m i n a t i o n S y s t e m s
Some o f  the greatest potential for future warning product developm ent and dissemination methods is tied to 
the new est form s o f dissemination media -  in particular, the Internet. W orld W ide W eb-based 
presentations not only have graphics capabilities, but easily can be personalized and locationally-specific
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such that detailed spatial data may be presented over base maps o f  users' exact locations. Probability 
thresholds, as well as tem poral and spatial scales, can be defined by the receiver. The ability o f  such 
systems to ignore weather occurring outside the area o f  user concern brings with it an inherent capacity to 
lower potential FAR and reduce cry w olf effects. In addition, various wireless technologies with graphics 
capabilities (such as cell phones) may prove to be efficient platforms for visual presentations o f 
probabilities. Probability-based information, including specific time and location data as well as forecast 
confidence intervals, are easily and commonly presented in a digital format. In theory, this allows for 
additional user-defined thresholds for alert protocols. Users may set various receiver devices to alert them 
only when certain warning thresholds o f  storm intensity, probability, and location are met. For instance, a 
m otorist with a Global Positioning System (G PS-based) warning transceiver driving on the Interstate could 
enroll in a program w hereby they set their reception o f a warning alert predicated with their being 
physically in a warned area. Probabilities might facilitate high consequence users (e.g., school bus) to be 
alerted w henever there is for example, a tornado warning with a probability value o f  10 % or higher within 
a 20 km (12.4 mi) radius, whereas a different user (e.g., a highway patro l cruiser) may choose to be alerted 
only for tornado warnings with a probability value o f 50 % or higher within a 10 km (6.2 mi) radius.
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"I don't think she's seen the sky, 
since we got the satellite dish. "
-  J a m e s  M c M u r tr y  - 
Levelland
W H ERE’D YO U H ID E THE BODY
"Video killed the radio star."
- T r e v o r  H o r n  (T h e  B u g g ie s )  - 
Video Killed the Radio Star 
TH E AG E OF PLASTIC
3  -  T h e  3  M a y  1 9 9 9  O u t b r e a k : O v e r v i e w s
3 .1  -  P h y s i o g r a p h y , L a n d  C o v e r , a n d  E n v i r o n m e n t
Storm A (the storm that produced the O klahom a City tornado) entered the northern Grady County line from 
Caddo County on 3 M ay 1999, south o f  State Highway 92 west o f Chickasha at approxim ately 1720 CDT 
(-2320  UTC) two km (1.24 mi) south-southwest o f  the town o f  A m ber (-3 5 .1 2 °  N, -97 .89° W ). It 
dissipated at -1 949  CDT (-0049 , 4 M ay 1999) in northwestern M idwest City in eastern O klahom a County 
(-35 .49° N, -97 .40° W ). Over i t s -1 .5  hr life span, the OCT left a 62 km path (38.5 mi) along an azimuth 
o f -0 4 5  degrees (-015° last -1 0  km) across portions o f four counties -  Grady, M cClain, C leveland, and 
O klahom a (Figure 3.1). The OCT was rated F5 or "violent" on the Fujita Scale^  (see Grazulis 2001), and 
assessm ent teams noted that the extent o f  F4 to F5 damage was unusually great. Path w idth was up to a 
kilom eter at times (>1 mi), and areal extent o f  significant damage was estim ated to be -2 5  km^ (NWS 
2001; see Figure 3.1 for path and Figure 3.2 for the deaths).
At -1 855  CDT (2355 UTC), the OCT crossed the Canadian River near 1-44 (-35 .30° N, -9 7 .5 6 °  W ). This 
point in the path marked a general mid-point for the tornado: 37 o f  62 km; 48 o f 88 min on the ground; and 
13 o f  40 fatalities. As the OCT entered the city o f M oore at -1 910 , it rem ained highly visible (Figure 3.3) 
while it changed physiographic, demographic, and epidem iologic regimes. Because o f  these differences, 
these two different portions o f  the OCT path are used to characterize data. Thus, SWPA  refers to the 
'Southwest Path Area,' or the upstream  portion south and w est o f  the Canadian River. NEFA  refers to the 
'Northeast Path Area,' or the rem aining downstream path north and east o f  the Canadian River. This 
tornado killed .449 persons per minute, and caused $14 .IM / min o f  damage. In the SW PA, .351 persons 
were killed per km over a distance o f  37 km. In the NEPA, .926 persons were killed per km over a distance 
o f  25 km. The difference is the num ber o f  homes per unit area within the N EPA , much higher than mostly
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Figure 3.3 - OCT A fter it C r o s s e d  the Canadian River in Cleveland C ounty (in rural 
O klahom a City), 3 M ay 1999. Photograph by CA D osw ell III, Copyright.
In the SW PA (particularly the Bridge Creek area), re lief is more variable (-8 0  m) with north-south trending 
ridges that face east. Prim ary SW PA land cover Is agricultural grasses and pastures, but small valleys in the 
area are m oderately-vegetated with trees and riparian shrubbery. More SW PA residences tend to be in 
valleys than on ridge lines. In the N EPA , terrain is broadly m ore level and re lie f varies only by 50 m. 
V egetation is typical o f  urban and suburban environments, with few dense areas o f  vegetation. Typically, 
visibility to the apparent horizon along the SW PA is good-to-poor (varying with the obstacles noted above), 
w hereas NEPA line-of-sight is generally farther (excepting man-m ade obstacles). H ousing in N EPA  is less 
scattered, with clustered patterns having little regard to topography- Roads take on the comm on American 
urban-suburban grid pattern. The study area is physiographically-situated in the Osage Plains. Regional 
topography is "gently rolling southeastw ard-sloping plains o f  m oderate slope, along tributaries o f  the 
Canadian" (USDA 1987). M ost o f  the central portion o f  the state is either covered with Black Jack / Post 
O ak forest, or once was a tall grass prairie (D uck and Fletcher 1943).
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3 .2  - H u m a n  E n v i r o n m e n t
The OCT caused significant-to-severe damage in one or more 'jurisdictional spheres' o f the following 
communities: Amber, Bridge Creek^, B lanchard, Tuttle, The Chickasaw N ation, and N ew castle (all 
SW PA); and M oore, Oklahoma City, Del City, Tinker A ir Force Base (TAFB), M idwest City, and Spencer 
(all NEPA ). The SWPA cut across the northern third o f  Grady County and a small sliver o f northwestern 
M cClain County. Population in the Oklahoma City M etropolitan Statistical A rea is ~1 000 000 persons 
(USBC 2001). M ost o f  central Oklahoma has undergone moderate population growth over the last decade, 
largely in 'bedroom comm unities' suburban to O klahom a City and Norman (Selland et al. 1998). It is 
estim ated by the survey that -5 0  000 people lived directly in, or within two km either side o f  the center of 
the OCT path. As with physiography, the Canadian River marks a transition zone in settlement patterns. 
The SW PA is predom inately rural, as indicated by Grady County's population density o f -1 0 0  persons per 
km^. This compares to mostly suburban NEPA areas in northern Cleveland (-1 0 0 0  persons/km^) and 
southern Oklahoma Counties (-2300/km ^). SWPA land use is -7 0  % agricultural, dropping to -2 5  % in the 
N EPA  (OCS 2001). M inority population in the SWPA is -1 0  % and increases to -2 5  % toward the urban- 
center portions o f  Oklahoma County. The projected 2000 aggregate percentage o f  all m inority groups in 
central Oklahoma was -1 0  % (USBC 2001), which mirrors the 90 % o f decedents identified as "White" 
(OCM E 1999). The OCT did not directly im pact predom inantly Hispanic and B lack neighborhoods in 
south-central and northeast OKC, respectively. In general, no significance to OCT survey data was 
identified that correlated to race. Therefore, further demographic analyses or speculations based on race are 
omitted.
3.2.1 - Tr a n s p o r t a t i o n  AND I n d u s t r i a l  S e t t i n g s
The OCT crossed four Interstate Highways (1-44, 1-35, 1-240, and 1-40) and numerous heavily-traveled 
m ajor thoroughfares. Total daytime traffic along the 1-35 corridor in M oore is more than 75 000 vehicles 
per day. Estimated weekday rush hour traffic (-1800  CDT) for this location is 7200 vehicles per hour 
(ACOG pc.2001). A m ajor rail line (Burlington Northern - Santa Fe) parallel to 1-35 was crossed by the 
OCT in M oore. It carried -2 2  trains per day in 1999 (ODOT pc.2001), including two Amtrak trains. Will
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Rogers W orld A irport (~75 departures per day) is located -1 0  km (6.2 mi) northwest o f  the OCT path 
(OCCVB 2001). There were no reports o f  incidents regarding trains or aircraft in transit, although there 
w ere train cars in the wreckage.
Significant lands zoned as commercial or industrial lay in the NEPA. Dense pockets o f'se rv ice  industries' 
and market places are found in Moore and southern OKC, prim arily betw een 1-35 and 1-240. W hile two 
fatalities occurred in this area -  at a m ajor comm ercial truck and warehouse facility (AM F) -  population 
density is considerably lower than other portions o f  the NEPA, owing to the lack o f  residences in the 
section. Given the time frame o f the OCT, most o f these sites were vacant, as m ost w orkers had left for the 
day. The OCT passed -fo u r  km (2.4 m i) southeast o f  Crossroads M all, a m ajor marketplace that hosts 
-2 5 0 0  shoppers daily (OCCVB 2001). Another densely-com mercial area is found toward the end o f the 
OCT path along 1-40 near TAFB, where >1000 vehicles were destroyed in a concentrated area o f  car 
dealerships (-1 0  000 vehicles were "totaled" in the OCT). TAFB  is an Air Force Logistics Center with 
personnel and resident populations comparable to a city o f  -3 0  000 (USAF 2001). N um erous restaurants, 
hotels, and portions o f Rose State College also were dam aged or destroyed. Aerial photography and census 
tracts indicate that many opportunities for the release o f hazardous materials were narrowly-averted along 
the OCT path. Surprisingly, environmental regulatory agencies reported no 'significant hazm at' releases 
that required specialized response associated with the OCT (OCFD pc.2000).
3.2.2 - E m e r g e n c y  R e s p o n s e  AND M e d ic a l  C a r e
First responder search and rescue in the SW PA prim arily consisted o f small volunteer fire departments. 
N EPA  responders were predom inantly professional fire departments. Despite the rural setting in the 
SW PA, and the m agnitude o f the disaster in the N EPA , search and rescue was efficient and w ell-conducted 
in both sections (FEM A 1999). The coincidental location o f  the OCT to the Interstates allowed rapid 
transport o f  injured to hospitals. Injured were taken to either the only Level Three Traum a Center 
(University Hospital) or eight other "M ajor Trauma Centers"^^ in metro OKC. An additional benefit o f 
proxim ity to OKC was the rapid deploym ent o f  mutual aid equipm ent and m anpower from neighboring
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jurisdictions, private heavy equipm ent contractors, and the Oklahoma National Guard. A helicopter 
param edic-transport service based in OKC (Lifeflight) was also utilized (Hogan et al. 1999). Such 
geographical fortunes are m oderating factors for death tolls in contem porary tornado disasters (Legates and 
B iddle 1999). Area EM A indicated that experience w ith recent minor tornado events, as well as mutual aid 
responses to the 1995 A.P. M urrah Federal Building bombing in OKC, increased coordination and overall 
response capability. W hile the scales o f  both disasters were very different, the recent experience o f  the 
bom bing in the coordination o f mutual aid response, inter-agency, m ulti-jurisdictional comm unications, and 
field triage and coordinated transport to multiple hospitals are particular examples (OCFD pc.2000).
3.2.3 - E l e c t r o n i c  M e d ia
Television weather coverage in the Southern Plains is extensive and highly-detailed. TV stations in OKC 
and Tulsa devote more resources to w eather coverage than counterparts in such large m arkets as Los 
Angeles or Chicago (England 1996). In the OKC market, all m ajor netw ork affiliates take aggressive and 
competitive approaches to warning dissemination. M any o f  the TV w eather innovations o f  recent years 
w ere developed or first employed in the OKC market. In fact the first televised tornado w arning ever 
broadcast was in Oklahoma (Bradford 2001). Cable TV and satellite connections to national networks that 
broadcast some w eather information are also common. Some locales (e.g., M oore) have the ability to 
interrupt cable program m ing regardless o f  w hat channel viewers are watching. However, usage rates for 
such technology is interm ittent and inconsistent. Total TV access in the OKC metro was >600 000 
households (USBC 2001). At least 25 radio stations serve the OKC metro area, o f which about ha lf report 
that they "regularly" broadcast w eather w arning inform ation by the survey. M any area residents also have 
access to instant warning information via the Internet and wireless media such as cell phones or pagers. 
However, usage totals on these populations, while clearly growing rapidly, remains unknown. N W R is 
broadcast from a tall tower in OKC (W XK-85) and was receivable in m ost locations along the entire OCT 
path (NWS 2001).
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3 .3  - T h e  O K C  T o r n a d o  E v e n t : F o r e c a s t s  a n d  W a r n i n g s
Chronology and geography for the OCT are noted above and indicated in Figure 3.1. D etailed 
meteorological data for the OCT are available on the NW S-Norm an  web site, and discussed elsewhere in 
this issue. Focus here is on the reception and im pact o f various forecast and warning products. G enerally, 
the event w as w ell forecast and given increased attention by warning networks as the day unfolded and risk 
magnified.
3 .3 .1 - L o n g -R a n g e  F o r e c a s t s
The Convective Outlook^^ 'Day Two Severe W eather Outlook' (SWO -  a regularly-issued forecast product; 
the glossary and acronyms have the definitions) from SPG -  issued on 2 M ay 1999 (valid for 3 M ay), and 
the 3 M ay 1999, 0530 CDT (1130 UTC) 'Day One' SW O, both forecast a 'Slight Risk' for severe storms 
with tornadoes in the OKC area. The next issued SWO at 1115 CDT upgraded the same general region to a 
'M oderate Risk'. At 1230 CDT, NW S-Norman  issued the daily 'Hazardous W eather O utlook' (H W O ) that 
also noted a 'M oderate Risk' with significant tornado potential. At 1549 CDT, SPC  issued an SWO 
upgrading the area to a 'High Risk'. The nature with which risk was expressed in increm entally-increasing 
steps, generally resulted in kind with increasing awareness and preparedness among stakeholders, 
especially the media. Although the magnitude o f  severe w eather potential was not obvious to N W S  until 
late afternoon, N W S  did express the possibility much earlier (Quoetone et al. 2000). Via the attention given 
to updated products, when severe w eather began, it was highly-anticipated. It is believed that the steady 
"ratcheting up"(o f the NW S) o f  tone regarding both storm likelihood and anticipated impacts w as an 
im portant aspect o f  event awareness. This was corroborated by many anecdotal reports by the survey from 
the field.
3.3.2 - W a t c h  C h r o n o l o g y
A t 1645 CDT (2145 UTC) SPC  issued tornado watch (hereafter W W T) #195 for most o f  Oklahom a. The 
first tornado warning (hereafter TOR) was issued at 1651 CDT for a small tornado in Comanche County in 
southwest Oklahoma. This tornado was the first o f 14 associated with the cyclic supercell that spawned the
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O C T . At 1859 G D I, SP C  issued W W T (#198), replacing W W T #195. W W T #198 w as a 'PDS' 
(Potentially  Dangerous Situation), meaning it included "enhanced wording" with regard to violent tornado 
potential (Thom pson and Edwards 2002).
3.3.3 - W a r n i n g  C h r o n o i o g y
A t 1721 CDT (2121 UTC). a  TOR was issued for G rady County (SW PA) ju s t w est o f  Cyril, which w as -1  
hr before the first OCT fatality. At 1755 CDT, a TOR was issued for G rady County for a  tornado 3.2 )tm (2 
mi) north o f  Laverty. It is im portant to note that this is -2 9  min upstream and - 1 0  km  (6.2 m i) from the 
first OCT fatality. Shortly thereafter, the storm produced num erous small tornadoes, as well as a very large 
tornado that passed into northern portions o f  the city o f  Chickasha. A t 1819 CDT, N W S-Norm an  (OUN) 
issued a Severe W eather Statement (SV S) noting a tornado "on the north side o f  Chickasha, near the 
airport." N ote that TOR were already in effect for G rady County -  the point o f  orig in  fo r the OCT -  prior  
to initial tornado touchdown.
“ ‘ ' l O r w r
F ig u re  3.4: D opp ler R a d a r  P ic tu re  o f  K W T V  W hen th e  O C T  w as In M oore , O k. 
K W T V  Television. P h o to g rap h y  by M atthew  B iddle, C o p y righ t.
-48-
The first TOR specifically for the OCT was issued by NW S-Norman  at 1826 CDT (2326 U TC), ~10 min 
prior to the first OCT fatality in Bridge Creek (Figure 1.2). As NW S  TORs were continuously 
disseminated, TV showed live video o f  dram atic storm structure, as well as the dam age (Figure 3.4). Much 
was made in warning communiques from all forms o f  media about the "threat to life" the storm presented 
as it approached Chickasha, aimed toward OKC. It is im portant to note that owing to logistical param eters 
associated with current warning systems. Bridge Creek (being an unincorporated area) was not specifically 
listed in TOR text, as were some neighboring towns (e.g.. Amber, Newcastle). H owever, a TOR for Grady 
County (included the W illow Lake Estates, Southern Hills Edition, and Bridge Creek Estates in Bridge 
Creek where 12 deaths occurred), was officially  in place for more than 30 min prior to the OCT.
M cClain County was also included in a TOR issued at 1840 CDT (2340 UTC). A t -1 8 5 7  CDT, the OCT 
crossed the river (and entered the NEPA). It continued to be tracked by spotters in direct contact with the 
NW S. The tornado was shown on TV from multiple perspectives, including ground teams, two helicopters, 
and numerous tower cams. In addition, various radar depictions were presented showing a textbook "hook 
echo." W hile many viewers may not be fam iliar with a hook echo, a significant num ber are and either way, 
the discussion on-air by the broadcast meteorologists o f the dram atic radar returns acted to capture the 
m om ent and convey the ensuing reality that this was a serious storm and a real tornado w ith serious 
im plications. As the OCT progressed northeast, it rem ained in full view o f  an increasingly large population 
o f  viewers, many advised to turn on TV by friends or relatives. Thus, the OCT existed under TO R  until it 
dissipated at -1 9 4 9  CDT. The minimum  official (NWS) TOR lead time for OCT was 13 min and the mean 
lead time for the entire event a remarkable 32 min, with some areas in excess o f one hr (NO A A 1999).
3.3.4 - T h e  T o r n a d o  E m e r g e n c y  SVS
At 1657 CDT (2357 U TC ), NW S-Norman  issued a Special W eather Statement (SVS) with the header -  
"Tornado Em ergency in South-Central Oklahoma City M etro A rea."  W hile no precedent for this 
nom enclature is known, and there has been some speculative concern in its use as a sort o f  'augm ented 
w arning,' surveys indicated that this SVS had a m ajor  impact with the media. U pon receipt o f  this SVS,
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personnel at popular radio stations that did not normally broadcast warning information realized the gravity 
o f  the unfolding situation, and began relaying warning information in real time. A num ber o f radio stations 
picked up the audio feeds o f  local TV coverage. The result was near continuity  in broadcasts o f  warnings 
across the AM-FM dial, a factor that may have been critical in holding down the num ber o f  casualties 
among motorists. Included in the SVS was the statem ent "...a large dam aging tornado WILL enter the 
metro between 7:15 - 7:30 [0015 - 0030 UTC]. Persons in M oore and South Oklahoma City should take 
tornado precautions..! " (NOAA 1999). The interviews and surveys told o f many who took that to mean 
'turn on the TV,' and many called '3'^ parties' to warn that the tornado was coming. At least six o f those 
killed in the OCT had calls that warned them.
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You need la be below ground i f  you want to survive this tornado!
Gary England, KWTV -
I  got lost in a neighborhood I've driven around fo r  10 years because there’s no landmarks anymore
-  Del City Police Sargent Jody Suit -
I t ’s ju s t absolutely unprecedented. No one has ever heard o f  anything like this.
-  Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating -
4  -  E m e r g i n g  I s s u e s  o f  T o r n a d o  R i s k , B e h a v i o r , a n d  M i t i g a t i o n
4 .1  - F i e l d  M e t h o d s
Beginning 4 M ay 1999, perm ission was obtained from various EM A authorities to access disaster sites for 
field interviews and data collection. Goals were to collect geographical, dem ographical, behavioral, and 
attitudinal information from a sample population affected by the tornado. M ore than 200 households in or 
within ~3 km of the damage path were contacted. Questionnaires similar to those from other contem porary 
tornado disasters (e.g., Schmidlin and King 1995; Legates and Biddle 1999 -  see A ppendix A) were used to 
poll the actions o f  respondents and o f  those in their company. Surveys were conducted as convenience 
samples in a 'shotgun-like' manner, as logistical and physical obstacles precluded organized and consistent 
access to portions o f  the disaster area. This was the best option, given the perishable nature o f the 
recounted actions o f  traumatized and overwhelm ed survivors. A dditional data on fatalities were provided 
by the Oklahoma Office o f the C hief M edical Exam iner (OCM E), and the O klahom a State Departm ent o f 
Health, Office o f the State Epidem iologist (OSDH), gleaned from newspaper reports, and from interviews 
with local officials, NW S  personnel, and neighbors and relatives o f  decedents and survivors. Significant 
follow-up occurred interm ittently through the end o f 2000.
4 .2  - R e s e a r c h  O b j e c t i v e s
D ata were analyzed for patterns in warning access, source, lead time, and compliance, as well as for 
respondent locations, actions, and observations. Additionally, attitudes toward tornado risk and 
perform ance o f  the warning system for this event were sought. This work seeks to com plem ent rather than 
duplicate other research projects for the OCT that examined structural engineering and damage (e.g., 
D osw ell and Brooks 2002; FEM A 1999), warning performance (Andra et al. 2002), or detailed 
epidem iology (Brown et al. 2002; Daley et al. 2005), by attempting to focus on the OCT human-
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environment interface, or the warnscape. In addition, comparisons to another work that in part assessed 
warning response for this event (Hamm er and Schmidlin 2002) are examined. Presented below are findings 
about warning access and com pliance, with b rief comparisons to previous research o f other contem porary 
tornadoes.
4 .3  - N o t e s  o n  P r e v i o u s  S t u d i e s
It must be noted that, while similar surveys have been undertaken for a number o f  tornado disasters, they 
are all systematically and statistically distinct. This relegates cross-com parisons to largely-empirical 
domains. For the purposes o f data comparison to other studies o f tornado events and w arnings, unless 
otherwise noted, the following sources were used: Legates and Biddle (1999) for the 8 April 1998 tornado 
that killed 32 people in the Birm ingham , Alabama area (BHM ); Schmidlin (1998) for the 22-23 February 
'Central Florida Outbreak' (FLO) that killed 42; Schmidlin (1997) for the 1 M arch 1997 'Arkansas 
Outbreak' that killed 26 (ARO); Schmidlin and King (1995) for the 27 M arch 1994 'Second Palm Sunday 
Outbreak' in the Southeastern US that killed 40 (PSO ), Glass et al. (1980) for the W ichita Falls, Texas 
Tornado o f 10 April 1979 that killed 56 (W FT); Hammer and Schmidlin (2002); Brown, Archer, Kruger, 
and M alonee (2002); and, Daley, Brown, Archer, Kruger, Jordan, Batts, and M allonee (2005) for their 
study o f  the Oklahoma City Outbreak (o f 3 M ay 1999).
It should also be acknow ledged that there are limitations in comparing tornado disasters, aside from 
differing survey m ethodologies. There are significant differences in event character, and there are limits to 
the utility  o f comparing data from single tornado events with cumulative impacts o f outbreak events. 
Obviously, with outbreaks, time-lines overlap in some cases, and warning information tends to become 
logistically-com plex and cumbersome. In long-track violent events, persons along projected paths are often 
presented with higher-quality warning information, both temporally and spatially, and thus given better 
opportunity to make warning response decisions. Conversely, m edia-delivered warning information may 
be vague and confusing in outbreaks that occur among audiences in spatially-large areas (inter-regional).
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Some o f the events involve nocturnal storms, which are inherently more challenging to warn for, owing to 
darkness and higher percentages o f  sleeping populations.
4.4  - S a m p l e  P o p u l a t i o n s
The community dem ographics in central O klahom a the citizenry on average is white (75.4 %) and female 
(50.7 %). At the low end, there are 2.61 persons per household in (M cClain), and at the high end, there are
3.04 persons per household in Oklahoma City (Oklahoma). Median hom es w ere listed as $41,100 in 
Blanchard and $62,600 in N ewcastle (M cClain County), and $51,200 in M oore (Cleveland County) and 
$42,686 in Oklahoma City (Oklahoma County). The MM H were not listed in O klahom a County.
4.4.1 - C o m m u n i t y  D e m o g r a p h i c s
Table 4.1 - 1990 US Census Bureau listings for general population and housing characteristics -
Population % Female <5, 5 to 17, 18 to 44, 45 to 64, 65*
B l a n c h a r d 1922 51.77 159, 380, 724, 350, 316
PPH MMH Median (dollars)
2.61 45 41100
W hite Black NA Hisp Asian Other
1806 3 97 21 4 12
Population % Female <5, 5 to 17, 18 to 44, 45 to 64, 65*
N e w c a s t l e 4214 49.95 252, 984, 1671, 1006, 301
PPH Mobile Home Median (dollars)
2.87 231 62600
White Black NA Hisp Asian Other
3910 4 245 85 5 41
Population % Female <5, 5 to 17, 18 to 44, 45 to 64, 65*
M o o r e 40318 51.11 3354, 9723, 18468, 6744, 2029
PPH Mobile Home Median (dollars)
2.96 283 51200
White Black NA Hisp Asian Other
36362 719 2136 1353 516 585
Population % Female <5, 5 to 17 ,18  to 44, 45 to 64, 65*
O k l a h o m a  C i t y 506132 51.10 37194, 95579, 207661, 108603, 58098
PPH M obile Home Median (dollars)
3.04 N/A 42686
W hite Black NA Hisp Asian Other
362788 83034 29001 51368 20165 32184
Population % Female <5, 5 to 17, 18 to 44, 45 to 64, 65*
D e l  C i t y 22128 52.26 1636, 4494, 4494, 7995, 4705, 3240
PPH M obile Home Median (dollars)
2.96 N/A 51400
W hite Black NA Hisp Asian Other
17191 3315 1422 1043 511 579
NA = Native American Hisp = Hispanic PPH = Persons Per Household
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4.4.2 - W a r n i n g  D i s s e m i n a t i o n  AND A c c e s s
Respondents are contacts made during the survey (164 total) that lived through it (the OCT) that made 
themselves available to the survey parties which were "shotgunned" about the area the first week (there was 
some follow up). Respondent access to warnings^^ was evaluated, both for quantity and quality o f sources 
for potential warning reception. Those with 'specialized' access to prim ary warning information, such as 
police and fire radios, scanners, or weather pagers, or who were otherwise made aware o f the w eather 
situation as a function o f duty (e.g., storm spotters or TV personnel) received the highest ratings for 
warning access. Those that utilized multiple sources o f primary and secondary official warnings (e.g., TV, 
radio, NW R) were rated high, and those with access to only one o f these m edia were rated moderate. 
Persons relying on sirens or 3'''* party notification were rated low. Those with no access to m edia or remote 
systems or no information, were rated the lowest.
TABLE 4.2 - W ARNING SYSTEM RATINGS - (n=127/ 164)
Rating - Number - Percentage -
No Answer 37 /29 .1
0 - No W arning 0 1 /.7 8 7
1 - Poor 03 / 2.36
2 - Inadequate 03 / 2.36
3 - Adequate 1 0 /7 .8 7
4 -G o o d  5 1 /4 0 .1
5 - Excellent 59 / 46.4
M edian = 5 Mean = 4.23 4 + =  110 /8 6 .5  %
To the best o f the authors knowledge, warning response in the OCT w as the most successful in public 
warning reception, lead time, and overall compliance identified or docum ented in the history o f  organized 
w arning systems. D ata from 164 households indicated that TV played a m ajor role as it does in general 
nationally, but for the OCT, in the highest percentages known. Total warning reception was 76.8 % (99.2 % 
o f  the available people), with TV as the prim ary source at 69 %. Third-party notification was the primary 
source for 18 % (12 % via telephone). N early 40 % indicated they informed neighbors or relatives o f the 
approaching storm either in person or via the telephone.
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Sirens or N W R as a prim ary warning source together amounted to only 3 % each among those surveyed. 
Sirens only amounted to ~1 % o f those prim arily and 18.7 % o f those secondarily. Hammer and Schmidlin 
(2002) found similarly low N W R  usage for the OCT. In the BHM , NW R use was ~14 %, and <2 % in the 
FLO (Baker and Troutm an 2000). It is thought that in BHM , respondents were confused about what 
AM/FM radio and NW R radio is different. Even so, NW R remains seriously under-utilized. It is important 
to note that in the OCT, many o f the TOR broadcast over AM-FM radio were live broadcasts o f  NW R 
transm issions (Quoetone et al. 2000), so its overall value is not fully reflected in the survey. It is noted 
though that sirens as a secondary confirmation existed in OCT.
4.4.3 - T o r n a d o  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
The time-of-day o f  the OCT (-1800  CDT - 1930 CDT) may have played a significant role in holding down 
the death toll, as most residents were hom e from work or school, with ready access to TV and radio. Few 
were asleep or stuck in rush hour traffic, which had largely subsided. Since the tornado occurred during 
daylight°°, many were able to utilize sight as an environmental confirmation cue, because the storm 
structure allowed for relatively clear viewing o f  the tornado (Figure 1.2 and 3.4). Provided views to the 
horizon were not blocked by trees or buildings, the tornado was visible to both the naked eye and TV 
cameras along the entire path. It is suggested that environm ental cues were also m ajor factors in expediting 
the confirmation process, and in third-party warning relay, as well as in limiting vehicular deaths.
Additionally, OCT path orientation spared many populated neighborhoods, particularly to the east o f 1-35, 
and south o f 1-240. It is estim ated that had the storm followed the same heading but occurred only a few 
km north, -2 0  % more residences might have been struck, as well as a m ajor shopping center. H istorical 
records contain many examples o f violent long-track tornadoes, but these are spread sparsely over large 
regions and many decades (Grazulis 1993). Thus, comparing them is difficult and even more challenging 
because they have not been uniformly subjected to carefully-designed surveys. Serendipity and luck were 
param ount in the OCT as they have been historically (Grazulis et al. 1998). Both the OKC Blazers 
(hockey) and OKC Redhawks (baseball) m inor league team s were hosting games with >5000 persons (in
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two adjacent facilities) ~6 km w est o f  the path. M any  local schools, including some that were damaged, 
were hosting public assemblies associated with upcoming graduations and the end o f the school year. At 
least 1500 people took cover in numerous school buildings along the path -  especially at W estmoore and 
D el City High Schools.
4.4.3.1 - Watch U tility -
A surprising majority o f  respondents claim ed to be aware o f  a W W T prior to a TOR for their location 
(Legates and Biddle 1999). Still, many did not utilize the W W T as a time to prepare. This period o f  time -  
usually at least ha lf hr to as much as 6 hr in duration -  is especially important for those who m ust go to an 
alternative location for adequate shelter. It is also an im portant trigger in many emergency plans, such as at 
moving patients at hospitals away from windows, activating spotter networks, or calling in additional police 
and fire personnel. Reported 'watch awareness' was high for the OCT at -7 5  %, but less than for the BHM 
(86 %). It was m uch higher than for ARO where 61 % knew o f the tornado after hearing or seeing it, or 
FLO where 68 % knew o f  it. These figures are thought to be largely a function o f  the time-fram es o f  the 
events. W atches in the FLO were issued very late at night when most o f the public was asleep. The higher 
reported w atch awareness for BHM is not fully understood. It may be directly related to the shorter tim e­
frame between the W W T issuance and the first TOR, such that the information reception w as virtually 
concurrent. In other words, people were tuning in to the alert stage for the W W T and were still interfacing 
with the warning media when the first TOR was issued. Possible explanations are: survey bias or error; 
significant numbers o f respondent confusion o f  watch with warning; the fact that the tornado occurred later 
in the evening when more persons were home for the night watching 'prime time T V . In any case, the 
watch awareness can be considered very high for both the BHM and OCT events. Previous research has 
indicated that regardless o f  past usage, and despite common m isconceptions to the contrary, m ost o f  the 
public understands the meaning o f a tornado watch (Baker 1993; Legates and Biddle 1999). This appears 
exceptionally true in Oklahoma (see Biddle 1996) as shown in the OCT, and despite the short time period 
from W W T issuance to onset o f severe weather. Although it might have been better to have had the W W T 
in effect with more lead time, the elapsed time during which the severe w eather marched toward the OKC 
metro with its associated m edia coverage amounted to de fac to  watch preparation time.
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4.5 - W a r n i n g  R e c e p t i o n  a n d  M o d e
Respondents w ere polled regarding their self-identified primary warning sources, as w ell as for all ancillary 
sources for warnings. As noted, TV was the primary source for the majority (69% ). It was utilized as a 
inform ation source in some way by 89 % o f  respondent households.
4.5.1 - TElsy/SiOiv COyERACE
The experience and tenacity o f  the w eather coverage o f  the OKC TV  stations -  thought to be a source o f 
overactive annoyance to some residents -  was, in this case, param ount in the high percentage o f  those who 
received warning. All m ajor networks had multiple storm chase crews deployed, providing real-time 
inform ation on simultaneous tornadoes. Captivating live video, including some from news helicopters, 
quickened confirmation response and moved many to closely m onitor OCT progress. Interviews and 
surveys clearly indicated that, in addition to the dram atic video, the dem eanor o f  the on-air TV personalities 
succinctly conveyed the exceptional risk and motivated m itigation (Figure 4.1). It also m otivated many 
citizens to telephone others that they perceived to be in harm 's way. Thus, w arning inform ation was re- 
dissem inated in unofficial cascade-like networks.
Figure 4.1: OCT N orth o f  C hickasha, OK. KW TV Television, 
3 M ay 1999. M atthew Biddle, Copyright.
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Previous TV coverage o f tornadoes associated with the OCT supercell, began more than an hour before 
OCT touchdown. In fact, at least three TV stations provided live video o f  the birth o f the OCT near Amber 
(and actually the storm at M edicine Park). All major stations provided live feeds alm ost immediately 
thereafter, resulting in what became 'wall-to-wall' continuous broadcasts o f warnings and storm information 
that continued through, and well after, the tornado. At one point midway through the event, CNN  picked up 
the feed o f  one o f  the OKC TV stations, providing live national coverage o f the tornado entering OKC. 
One aspect o f  the TV warning dissemination was the preponderance o f confirm ation activity exhibited by 
respondents, who continuously changed stations seeking information that was very viewer-specific. 
Approxim ately half o f  the respondents indicated they continuously changed channels while monitoring the 
OCT. O f the remaining half, one TV station was reported as the source o f information by ~25 % o f 
viewers, with two other m ajor affiliates accounting for the remaining -2 2  % o f those who monitored a sole 
station for the event. Only 3 % reported using 'other' TV sources such as The Weather Channel or CNN  for 
warnings.
TV was a key ingredient used by most o f the respondents (89 %) to make decisions; notably, the decision to 
flee or to seek shelter in place. Thus 37.2 % o f  the respondents listing TV as a warning source fled, leaving 
62.8 % who did not. A ll the people who fled, sometimes prior to any official w arning (N W S  warning) 
having been issued for them, listed TV as either the primary or a secondary warning source. For 
respondents using TV as a warning source, those accompanied by juveniles within their group were more 
likely to flee (41.3 % ) than average. On the other hand, respondents using TV as a warning source 
accom panied by the elderly (age 65+) within their group were less likely to flee (9.6 % fled). Figure 4.2 is 
the map o f  evacuation by households and Figure 4.3 is the map o f juveniles and o f elderly households. 
Chi-square goodness o f fit tests were perform ed on the survey data to analyze the hypotheses discussed 
above. The critical value for each question with a 95 % confidence level is 3.84. The observed chi-square 
value for each hypothesis was above this threshold -  4.1, 24.3, and 8.8 -  respectively.
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There are two different uses for the term "lead time" used here. In the official sense, as used by the NWS, 
lead time refers to the time interval betw een the time their official warning is issued for the w arning area, 
and the time the w arned-for event begins to affect the warning area. The N W S  determ ines its own official 
warning lead tim es, but these have not been used in this study. Another type o f  lead time is used here 
(which m ight be called an effective lead time); the time that elapses betw een w hen the official w arning was 
issued for the area in w hich the respondent was, and the time when the tornado struck the respondent's 
location (or was at its point o f  closest approach). The method for determ ining the effective lead time is 
described in the text and represents an approxim ate value, based on some simplifying assum ptions, because 
it is not known precisely  w hen the respondent's location was struck (o r the tornado was at its point o f  
closest approach). The response time is the time that elapsed between when a respondent first heard about 
the tornado and some action was taken to either flee or shelter-in-place. This information was part o f  the 
survey and was obtained only as rough estim ates. Since someone might have heard about the tornado via 
TV  well before the official warning was issued for their area, it is possible to have the seeming paradox o f  a 
long response time and a short lead time (the grouping indicated with an otange oval on the uppet left side 
o f  Figure 4.4). There w ere 50 respondents with a lead time o f  less than 60 min and a response time o f  more 
than 30 rain. These respondents are distributed all along the track (Figure 4,2). The gap in lead times seen 
in the m iddle o f  Figure 4.4, between about 60 min and around 100 min, is ju s t a reflection o f  the order in 
which official warnings were issued.
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This is partly an artifact o f the way the official warnings are issued -  sometimes, warned areas are done 
individually as a storm approaches, whereas other times, several different areas are warned for at the same 
time. The long lead times generally result from the fact that the first tornado warning, issued at 1647 CDT 
included Grady County (in which the OCT began), was well downstream at the time o f  the first tornado in 
Comanche County that prom pted the first warnings. In Grady County, tornado warnings were re-issued 
several times after that, lasting at least until 1930 CDT. There were 18 respondents with lead times o f  more 
than 100 min and response times o f less than 30 min (indicated with the green oval on the lower right side 
o f  Figure 4.4). All o f  them but one were in Grady County, early in the OCT life cycle. Since this was a 
Monday, m any people were just getting home from work and school and might not have tuned in their TV 
until they got home. Thus, the response times o f 30 min or less for these long lead times are 
understandable.
Currently there is little literature regarding tem poral and spatial details and scales that make warning 
products most useful to the public. According to survey accounts for this event, the NW S  did an 
exceptional jo b  in providing needed geographical and 'call-to-action' information in the warnings. TV 
stations likewise provided adequate detail, allowing most users to com prehend the magnitude o f the risk 
and consider mitigative actions. M any respondents indicated that TV presentations o f  radar storm details -  
identified as subject to user error and presenter embellishm ent for marketing reasons (AMS 2001) -  were 
not as im portant as path projections and verbal descriptions o f  local geography. A m ajor research gap 
remains the delineation o f  the cognitive thresholds in play related to the comprehension o f storm-related 
graphics, such as detailed D oppler radar. In spite o f modern technologies and graphics, little more is 
understood about the geographical and spatial skill o f  various user groups identified long ago as critical to 
framing warning com pliance and response (Haas 1973). In fact, public com prehension o f  m ost forms o f 
warning information rem ains ill-defined, and presentations vary between networks, regions, and events.
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4.5.2 - O t h e r  W a r n i n g  P a t h w a y s
N ot much was relayed under warning systems that were 'other warning pathways.' Only 3 % used NWR, 
which is not that much, and they then switched to TV and radio. The via scanner group -  which is 4 % -  
also led to TV and radio. The Internet was silent on my surveys, but the author thinks there would be more 
com puterized warning in 2007 because the Internet has aged eight years and more citizens have the W orld 
W ide W eb on all the time during severe w eather (NOAA 2003). The NW S  has 24-hr information available 
under Hazardous W eather Outlooks, watches, and warnings (www.weather.gov), with the public w arning in 
one min or less. W atches and warning are also available through certain vendors like the TV stations. Cell 
phones and pagers were not used like they are in 2007. In 1999, there were 86 047 003 cell phone users in 
the U nited States. In 2005, there w ere 207 896 198 in the US (The W ireless A ssociation c.2007 - 
www.infoplease.com /ipa/A 0933563/htm l). There are now ways to get weather warning and local radar on 
your cell phone if  interested, and this num ber is more accessible now.
4.5.2.1 - Third Party Notification -
N eighborly behavior (third party notification) -  especially the use o f telephones to disseminate w arnings -  
was the 2"“* m ost im portant mode o f  w arning transfer in the OCT, after TV. The im portance to the w arning 
system o f  stakeholder im plemented ad hoc warning cascade networks, where warning information flows 
from the N W S  to media to the public, and then to still more o f the public, needs to be em braced by system 
policies. Significant numbers (~15 %) o f  people receiving telephone warnings were also noted in BHM . In 
both BHM and OCT, third-party notifications obviously saved lives. In fact, in the OCT, at least six 
decedents are known to have received phone notifications (all subsequently turned on TV), and at least two 
decedents were known to have telephoned relatives and neighbors to warn them o f the approaching storm, 
acknowledging their awareness o f  the threat. Combinations o f situational factors and tornado intensity 
made the notifications ineffective for survival.
4.5.2.2 - Sirens -
In the SW PA, sirens were not used extensively. There were sirens in Chickasha, Am ber, B lanchard, Tuttle, 
and Bridge Creek, but they were local and only warned people within ~2 mi away. There could have been 
w arning sirens at the W illow Lake A ddition, Southern Hills Addition, and Bridge Creek Estates, but there
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were none because there is not a Bridge Creek siren system. There were sirens in the NEPA, but they were 
down on the list o f  warning sources, if  and when they could be heard (they were unheard ~1 mi away). 
Basically, the residents were kept up to date by TV long before the warnings were issued for their counties, 
and evacuees were in their car, or even out o f  their car and in a position to deal with the tornado long before 
a siren sounded. Greater M oore knew about the tornado via TV, radio, and third party notification, but 
Gayland K itch -  M oore EM A -  says "a siren speaks loudly when someone has 10 minutes or less to be 
ready." For the OCT population,, sirens were the 2"“* m ost prom inent source among my surveys. But, this 
study the sirens were at 3 % o f the prim ary warning source, and the 3 % turned on the TV. That did not do 
it justice , because it was a secondary or tertiary source. Brown et al. (2002) surveyed the OCT sirens and 
they were at 8 % o f the warnings. Based on this study and Brown, sirens are for warning among those 
outside only, even though respondents said they were critical.
4.5.2.3 - NOAA Weather Radio  -
For reasons not entirely clear, obstacles to presenting and marketing N W R  have been persistent. In the 
OCT, NW R was a prim ary warning source for only ~3 %, with only ~12 % reporting owning a NW R in 
their homes. It is obvious that since the event, NW R ownership has gone up, partially due to m ajor NW S 
and m edia-sponsored campaigns subsequent to the OCT. There can be few negatives in this, but in order 
for NW R to approach its full potential, many more need to use the service regularly, especially to access 
watch information and in situations where TV is not accessible. NW R is also o f  high value and utility in its 
ability to wake sleeping populations. There is little evidence that NW R use has risen as hoped, with the 
offering o f  Specific A rea M essage Encoding (SAM E) technology, the prim ary aim o f  which is to allow 
warning more discrete populations based on geographical aspects o f  the warned event. H owever, this 
feature is o f  little value if  few people use NW R in the first place. Confounding assessm ents o f  SAME are 
the undefined thresholds o f geographic perception and spatial cognition, lead time issues, and confirmation 
behavior o f  stakeholders as related to warning compliance. In fact, any post-OCT increases in use o f  or 
attention to NW R by area residents, might be short-term responses (albeit positive) to the publicity 
surrounding the disaster and the subsequent marketing o f NW R receivers by large discount departm ent 
stores (e.g., W alM art, Target). However, by the Spring o f 2001 it seemed that N W R  was again by the
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wayside (NOAA 2003). Primary interest in NW R seems to be among those who cannot get a signal (and 
thus feel neglected by civil authorities). The controversy is 'we have no NW R' rather than 'we have no 
w eather w arning plan' or 'we need more w eather information.' Once a transm itter is placed, there is no 
evidence that use rises above the 5 % level.
M ileti (1999) noted that the areal extent o f  warnings present significant logistical hurdles for the systems to 
overcom e. In general, threats to larger areas require warning more people and working through more media 
and organizations. Similar threats to smaller areas facilitate more localized warning efforts that are more 
readily coordinated. However, akin to the impact o f increasing spatial and tem poral w arning precision, the 
response spectrum to such products and m ajor changes in procedure are purely speculative. It is unlikely 
that com pliance continues to increase past certain time and space precision thresholds.
4.6 - W a r n i n g  L e a d  T i m e s
W arning lead time for survivors was exceptional, and respondent self-assessments o f  the perform ance o f
the overall warning system reflect this (Table 4.3).
T a b l e  4.3 - OCT W ARNING LEAD TIM ES  
Range Primary (100) Secondary (56) Fatality (21)
l h r +  12 0 0
1 hr 47 3 1
14 hr to > 1 hr 32 10 6
15 min to >14 hr 6 18 7
5 min to >15 min 2 19 4
> 5 min 1 6 1
No W arning — — 1
Some — — 1
In BHM , 50 % o f the respondents said they took 10 min to respond. In ARC, 50 % had little or no
w arning, while in PSO ~60 % they had little or no warning. This compares to FLA, when 68 % o f  those
surveyed said they took cover "only by seeing/hearing". O ther OCT surveys found similarly long TOR lead
times as about a 14 hr or more, and hr or more.
As difficult as it is to comprehend, numerous respondents indicated that they felt that there could be such a 
thing as "too much warning" (Gruntfest 2002). At first perplexing, such feelings are possible when
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considering the decision-m aking thresholds o f  confirmation behavior that determ ine when to undertake 
mitigative action (e.g., seek shelter; flee). Survivors suggest that lead times in exeess o f  15 min p lay  little 
role in motivations to undertake mitigative action (excluding telephone use), compared to detailed spatial 
information. There are many logistical and technological issues that need to be solved before more site- 
specific warnings may be technologically-feasible (M ileti and Sorensen 1990). Additional research 
regarding warning information content and graphical details versus lead time thresholds is warranted.
4.7  -  W a r n i n g  C o m p l i a n c e
All indications are that the percentages o f  those who received warnings, both among survivors and 
decedents, were at unprecedented and unforeseen high levels. No forensic studies in the literature present 
percentages for those who received warnings at levels approaching those found here. As previously noted, 
live video o f  the OCT and its upstream destruction, as well as the tenor o f  on-air TV personality  advice ("if 
you are in X neighborhood take cover now"), played major roles in w arning compliance. It is echoed in 
other literature that the 'wall-to-wall' TV coverage was a major factor in the decision-m aking behavior in all 
aspects o f  the warning system (Quoetone et al. 2000; Hammer and Schmidlin 2000).
4.7.1 - F a t a l i t y  D e m o  g r a  p h i c s
Little o f the morbidity data from this disaster is different from what would be projected for a violent 
tornado that encountered a major metropolitan area, with the possible exception o f  total deaths. The 
epidem iological 'footprint' closely followed the historical norm (G razulis et al. 1998). Fatalities were 
clustered among the elderly, poor, handicapped, and inexperienced^^, as well as skewed tow ard M M H or 
other structurally-weak dwellings. The recom mended environmental response (not M M H) is not to attempt 
evacuation, but rather to shelter in the home (FEMA 2005b). H ow ever, in m obile home occupants, it is to 
find out w hether a tornado watch (or warning) has been issued and move to a shelter in time. Among 
decedents, 60 % (24) were female. Decedent age ranged from Imo to 94 yr, w ith a median age o f  47 yr. 
M ore than half (52 %) were over 50 while 12 (30 %) were over 65, and five (12.5 %) were over 80 years o f 
age. The deaths are cataloged in Daley et al. (2005) and Brown et al. (2002).
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It is noted that no children betw een the ages o f  four and 18 were among the fatalities (OCME 1999). It 
certainly appears likely that the both the educational efforts o f the N W S  and local media, centered toward 
the elem entary schools, have been effective (Brooks and Doswell 2002). And more acutely, warning 
messages directed specifically to "children home alone" that have been comm on on OKC TV (England 
1996) might have contributed to low death tolls among school-aged children, and high levels o f  w arning 
compliance among respondents with children in their company. Although England (K W TV -9) was 
adamant that you had to be below ground to live (in the OCT), many people above ground were not killed 
by the tornado. But even so, Daley et al. (2005) reported that "people who were in m otor vehicles that were 
struck by tornado were at lower risk o f  death or injury than were outdoors or in mobile homes; 
differentiated in these risk estimates were striking, and most reached statistical significance," . . . [but] . . . 
"even when we combined all o f  these victims with those who were clearly fleeing the area, the risk o f  
directly-related death and injury was higher am ong people remaining in homes." I f  you had to leave in a 
m otor vehicle, perhaps 5 min or more to get to shelter was the minimum. I f  the roads are not congested and 
you can get clear o f  the tornado path or in a shelter w ithout difficultly, you should go without hesitation.
Generally, the elderly are less likely to heed warnings, owing to com prom ised m obility and comm unication 
factors (G runtfest 1987). M ost victims over 65 suffered from some degree o f  com prom ised m obility or 
com prehension; one was legally blind, one used a walker to ambulate, two were recovering cardiac patients, 
one was wheelchair-bound, and one was hooked to renal dialysis machine at some point concurrent with the 
w arning tim e-line. Similarly, three decedents were young children (two infants and one pre-schooler). 
M ost victims were in their homes, with seven deaths outdoors and two were in a comm ercial building.
Among fatalities (insofar as can be reliably determined) at least 19 (47.5 %) had 'significant' w arning o f  >5 
min, and eight (20 %) o f them had a Vi hr or more, and six (15 %) o f them had 15 min to prepare. B ut the 
Bridge Creek victim s had less time to get to shelter (which unfortunately w as in M M H or outside), and all 
were in M M H. W arning details were unavailable for eight victims, although it was not determ ined that 
there were any decedents completely unaware o f  the tornado. Thus, at least 75 % o f  those k illed were
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aware o f  the approaching tornado for some time before impact. Many decedents had time to speak to 
others in person or via telephone prior to tornado impact. Thus, survivor interviews indicated a third o f 
decedents received TV warnings, 25 % were alerted by a neighbor, 20 % via telephone, and 12 % only by 
seeing or hearing the tornado w ithout enough time to react. M ost o f the literature regarding past events 
with low warning reception involved rural locations or nocturnal events, factors not at issue for the majority 
in this study.
4.7.1.1 - F light and Vehicle Occupants -
Perhaps the most significant exception in the OCT to currently understood 'norms' o f  contem porary tornado 
epidem iology involved the small number (two) o f  motorists killed, especially given the high num ber o f 
potential vehicle-tornado encounters. The tornado crossed Interstates no less than four times, and spent at 
least a third o f its life in densely-populated areas. Finding and surveying motorists that were in the OCT 
path who were not killed or seriously injured would be quite challenging, as their identities are elusive. 
Comparisons with other tornado events where significant numbers o f vehicle fatalities have occurred are 
also problematic. Thus, comparing the OCT to the W ichita Falls, Texas tornado o f  1979 (W FT) that killed 
26 people in cars (Glass et al. 1980), or the Catoosa, O klahom a tornado o f 1993 where six o f  seven deaths 
were in vehicles (Biddle 1996), result in many difficulties related to vehicle engineering, warning 
technology, and even seat belt usage (Ham m er and Schmidlin 2000). Tornado-related vehicle risk may be 
less related to the engineering, than to tornado time-of-day, traffic patterns, warning characteristics, and 
simple geography (e.g., hills, trees, urban, etc.). Schmidlin et al. (1998) reported that 15 % o f  all tornado 
fatalities from 1975-1995 were in vehicles. W FT yielded percentages o f  more than 60 % dead from 
vehicular fatalities.
In the OCT, four deaths were vehicle-related, though none were killed in vehicles. Four w ere killed outside 
their vehicles in the driveway o f their residence, in belated attempts to flee (two each in a rural area and Del 
City). The rem aining two (separate cases) died seeking shelter under highway overpasses. N either were in 
vehicles with the intention o f  fleeing, but was simply traveling on an Interstate. It is not clear how or why 
either victim chose the overpass as shelter, nor on what sort o f warning they were acting. Indications are
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that both decedents took cover at the suggestions or observations o f  other m otorists doing the same. 
Likewise, it rem ains unclear w hat options o r restrictions o f  options decedents had, nor how in either case 
only these two o f  the many seeking shelter under overpasses were killed. T hat m ore w ere no t killed in 
these locations (there were numerous serious injuries) is fortuitous. In recent years, A'W'S and severe 
w eather researchers have noted the increasing choice o f  highway overpasses (Figure 4.5) as shelters with 
significant concern (M iller 2001).
■ -A W
F ig u re  4.5 • A C a r  H it by th e  3 M ay  1999 T o rn ad o  (O C T ).
T he c a r  w as n o t occupied  and  w as th ro w n  a b o u t 1 mile.
M . B idd le . 4 M ay 1999. C o p y righ t.
W ith regard to vulnerability, it is im portant to note that for the average citizen at their residence or place of 
work, and not in some increased risk situation (e.g., M M H, vehicle, outside, w ide-span roofed structure, 
etc.), the risk o f  tornado injury can be mitigated even in direct im pact scenarios (B rooks and Doswell 
2002). This is because violent tornadoes -  those that cause about -7 0  % o f  the deaths -  are rare and when 
they do occur the actual violent tornado wind speed exposure is a fraction o f  the tornado path area (Grazulis 
2001). This means that shelter-in-place in substantial structures (e.g., interior room , bath, etc.) results in 
significant protection. Decisions about when to undertake shelter-in-place versus evacuating to an 
im proved shelter cannot be made at the last second, for the risk o f  fleeing is substantial in its own right.
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There were 24 injured in m otor vehicle crashes in the OCT, but it is unknown if  the storm was part o f the 
accidents (Brown et al. 2005). Fleeing in a motor vehicle exposes one to not only a direct tornado 
encounter, but also to traffic accidents amid what may be panicked or snarled traffic in high winds and 
torrential rainfall, with no guarantees o f arrival at shelter in time. Flight on foot exposes one to significant 
danger from flying debris, lightning, and other physical hazards. However, m odern post-event surveys 
indicate as much as 70 % o f the M M H has driven away from their homes in past tornado situations 
(Hamm er and Schmidlin 2002). Something o f a controversy has emerged regarding the mitigation actions 
that the M M H should take, including notions that, in many cases, a motor vehicle may be safer than an 
mobile home (Schmidlin et al. 2002). There is also increasing information that much o f  the non-M M H has 
or w ill 'evacuate' the path by car in future events. Those who must make shelter-in-place or flight decisions 
might benefit immensely from w arning products that specifically include inform ation required for such 
urgent decisions. Probability-based warnings could provide the added information required via decision 
thresholds -  dependent on accuracy and lead time dynamics -  or could alter the w arning ecology in 
negative and unforeseen ways.
At least two people (Bridge Creek) were killed outside attempting to reach their vehicles to flee the tornado. 
Others were injured attempting to do the same. However, perhaps many more than ever measured 
successfully fled the tornado path in vehicles. Surveys indicated 61 (48 %) o f  respondents fled, and 54 
used a vehicle (the ones on foot w ent to a neighbors). This compares to 45 % from a sim ilar survey lim ited 
to those in the F4/F5 damage areas in the OCT (Hamm er and Schmidlin 2002). A side from concerns 
regarding shelter availability, traffic hazards, and a risk o f  a tornado encounter in the open, it is 
inconceivable under current warning system capabilities that evacuating large sectors o f  a population is a 
logistically-feasible scenario. Conversely, it is im possible to ignore the fact that significant numbers o f 
people (approaching 25 % o f  all those in and near the path) fled from the tornado, and that a sizeable 
num ber could have been casualties. N either the N W S  nor EM A advocate vehicular flight in a tornado 
w arning because o f the im precision o f  path forecasts, risks o f chaotic and panicked traffic (G razulis 2001), 
and the potential to find poor shelter options as a function o f tornado-highway encounters. Flight, which is
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essentially an evacuation, appears to be a viable option only under conditions which are very situational and 
not always obvious to those facing the decision to flee or not. Only when there is enough time to clear the 
storm ’s path or get to shelter is it prudent. Incorporating traffic issues, including the potential for traffic 
jam s and accidents, as well as downed trees and pow er lines, can make the prospect o f flight something o f a 
gamble. Even with increased warning lead times becoming more common, there appear to be tendencies 
among many stakeholders to spend significant amount o f  this time in the confirmation process, deciding 
what action to take. Thus, much o f  the lead time is lost. The value o f tornado watches and the importance 
o f  understanding one’s geographic location relative to the severe w eather and warning products must be 
emphasized as critical to decision-m aking regarding flight.
There is no new research contradicting previous findings that have suggested persons attem pting to flee 
tornadoes in vehicles are at higher risk (e.g. Glass 1980), or new er studies that suggest there may be limited 
protection afforded by vehicles in certain tornado scenarios (Schmidlin et al. 2000). Something o f  a 
challenging EM A dilemm a is emerging as the EMA comm unity stresses 'shelter-in-place.' This concept 
seems contradictory to other common advice given in current warning 'call-to-action' statements to NOT 
stay in mobile homes or in unhardened locations w ithout shelters. The survey formats and warning 
landscapes o f  the different events (OCT and W FT) are too separate in time to make m ajor policy 
conclusions. W hat is certain is that a significant population indicated that they fled the OCT. M ost people 
returned to find their hom es undam aged. However, some had m ajor damage and it can be conservatively 
surmised that som e, perhaps hundreds, escaped death or serious injury by fleeing (Sundav Oklahoman, 18 
Septem ber 2005). It is unclear if  the high numbers o f  those who fled the path is a behavioral phenom enon 
that is particular to this event or this region, perhaps as a result o f  the regional TV coverage and the overall 
attention to severe w eather, or if  it is some major behavioral shift that has occurred in other areas also as a 
function o f the more general advancements in forecasting and increased warning lead times. There were 
numerous stories o f  fam ilies driving to and getting under overpasses and viaducts at least 30 min prior to 
OCT passage. Interviewees reported that they ventured down to N orm an or up to Edm ond to eat dinner at 
restaurants and wait out the storm. This behavior, concom itant with the lead times, does not fit previous or
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current models for flight behavior or warning compliance. It is premature and unwise to advocate in any 
sort o f  broad sense, evacuations by anyone, save the MM H. M ost survivors who fled implicated real-time 
TV coverage as their confirmation that the situation was serious enough to induce them to flee. Some 
indicated that they do so on a regular basis when a tornado warning is issued. M any said they did not have 
a plan in place, did not have a particular shelter location in mind, and had never undertaken such action 
before. A few stated that they simply got in their cars and started driving in attempts to rem ove themselves 
from the storm's path! This poses something o f a paradox in that countless stories o f  flight should have 
resulted in higher vehicle-related mortality. To this paradox, two explanations are offered. First, previous 
studies have failed to characterize those persons who successfully fled p ost hoc, by focusing on those who 
were casualties in the attempt. Second, the character o f the live media coverage (and the explicit tornado 
video), the unusually-long lead tim es o f NW S  warnings, the diurnal time-frame, and the high visibility o f 
the tornado were a unique combination o f  occurrences that combined to allow many people to flee. Flight 
seemed not to be part o f m ost people's response plans (if  they had any) and becam e more viable as a 
consequence o f  o f  the long warning lead times. The lead times allowed "contemplative" rather than 
"spontaneous" evacuations (see Hammer and Schmidlin 2000). The significant advance warning led to 
more flight, and in turn more survivors who fled. This illustrates the major rift that exists in our 
understanding o f the impact o f  warning dissemination and lead time, versus warning behavior and warning 
message content.
4.7.1.2 - Special Needs Demographics -
As m entioned, certain demographic sectors consistently present more vulnerability to tornadoes. Among 
them the poor, elderly, very young, and disabled. The human ecology o f  risk for these groups may be 
traced in part to warning issues. The poor are less likely to have access to m ultiple m edia or certain 
technologies inhibiting reception o f  warnings. It is surmised that the elderly have tendencies to dismiss 
warnings in cognitive processes framed by situational factors, such as com prom ised mobility and media 
access (G runtfest 1987). In the OCT, all fatalities over 65 yr o f age suffered some degree o f com prom ised 
mobility, comm unication, comprehension, or other compliance impairments (again, one was partially blind; 
one used a w alker to ambulate; one each were recovering cardiac and stroke patients; one w heelchair
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bound; and one was evidently hooked to renal dialysis machine at the time o f tornado impact). Similarly, 
three decedents were young children; two infants, and one pre-school age. D isabled persons tend to suffer 
from situational impediments to warning compliance. Some are not able to physically respond to warnings 
when received. In other cases they fail to perceive risk correctly even when warnings are received. 
Caregivers responsible for disabled persons may require more time to comply with warnings, or are p re­
occupied with other life support issues to properly monitor weather news. O ften these special needs groups 
are inter-related. Both the elderly and disabled are disproportionally poor, the elderly often disabled, and 
vice versa. There are costs involved with all mitigative responses to a warning for all users. Usually the 
costs are intangible and inconsequential (e.g. time, interruptions o f  activities). Costs tend to be higher 
among special needs groups, especially those with m edical problem s. Stress, even for false alarms is more 
dangerous, as are the physical demands o f  getting to shelter. An example is an indirect fatality that 
occurred in OCT. A w heelchair-bound elderly man was killed from a fall attempting to get to underground 
shelter, his home ultim ately untouched by the tornado. In 2005, there were ~676 000 Oklahoman disabled 
persons (1999 population was ~3M ). So, it's up to 25 % (the disabled in the OCT) from about 22 % 
statewide, and that 25% figure is severely disabled and not the walking partially-disabled that blends into 
the data. Future warning program s might be designed with these populations in mind, providing additional 
or tailored inform ation to enhance mitigation.
4.7.1.3 - M obile H omes as a Risk F actor  -
Over the last two decades, as much as 70 % o f  all fatalities have been in the M M H in certain years 
(Grazulis 2001). MM H fatalities in the OCT were high (31% ), though slightly less than the national 
aggregate average (-50% ) in recent years (Brooks and D osw ell 2002). All M M H deaths occurred in the 
early stages o f  the event in Bridge Creek (o f the SW PA). Compounding the risks inherent to the M M H, 
rural SW PA victim s had less potential warning lead time than those impacted downstream . W hile there 
was still considerable warning available, varying in the tens o f  minutes, residents o f Bridge Creek had less 
time to notice sky, wind, or other environmental cues, as well as to receive telephone relays or notifications 
from neighbors or other third parties. And the bulk o f the people were just getting home from work. M ost 
importantly, they were less likely to receive TV warnings (SW PA) than the Cleveland and Oklahoma
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County residents (NEPA). All these variables add up to less time to complete the confirmation process 
(which varies with each person and situation). This confirmation process has been identified in the 
literature in numerous studies from numerous eras and it appears to have been common and critical to OCT 
survivors in that most had a w ealth o f  information and long lead times. Though likely related to the NEPA 
geography (i.e., luck) it is important to note that only a few o f the -6 5 0 0  'mobile homes' in O klahom a 
County were destroyed (OCTA 2001).
The rural nature o f SWPA locations (and the bulk o f the M M H) reduced the probability o f the reception o f 
siren alerts. Though many technological and societal factors reduce siren efficacy, a siren in these sm all but 
densely-settled mobile home plats may have saved some lives. As mentioned, terrain in this area limited 
storm viewing via naked eye to the west and southwest. According to survivors, it was difficult to see the 
tornado or gauge its movem ent until it was <1 km away. However, field investigations indicated that 
tornado visibility played limited roles in these fatalities. None  o f  those killed in the W illow Lake Addition, 
Southern Hills Addition, and the Bridge Creek Estates in Bridge Creek had ready access to im proved 
shelter.
4.7.1.4 - Shelter as a Risk Factor  -
Interviews and epidem iological data (Brown et al. 2002) indicated that nearly all OCT deaths occurred 
among those with no im proved shelter onsite or nearby. Only one victim died where underground shelter 
was available, which they failed to utilize. Twenty-four (61 %) deaths occurred in residences where no 
significant shelter was available (Figure 4.6). Fifteen victims (38 %) were killed in the best available 
shelter o f  their homes, such as in a closet, bathtub, or under a staircase. W hile such above ground shelter 
options are no match for F4/F5 wind speeds, the actual area o f  violent tornado damage is a small fraction o f 
the total damage and m any survivors did endure m ajor damage while sheltered in baths or interior 
bedroom s to emerge with minor or no injuries. However, at least four fatalities in w ell-constructed homes 
occurred when large missiles (such as automobiles) were thrown onto residences where people had sought 
shelter in baths or closets. The three apartment fatalities involved occupants in upstream  exposures
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(southern and w estern) o f  the outerm ost units o f  apartm ent com plexes, with one on the ground and two on 
second floors. Four (possibly 6) people w ere killed outside in belated attem pts to flee o r reach shelter too 
late.
Shelter availability, especially for low income residents, rural populations, elderly, handicapped, and the 
M M H continue to be the most prom inent emergent risk issue. W hile opinions regarding the feasibility o f  
comm unity shelters are quite varied, where they existed, many respondents indicated that they did not 
regularly  utilize them , nor even knew their locations. A lthough the popularity o f  hom e-based shelters has 
increased substantially since the disaster, costs (usually >$2000) are beyond the m eans o f  many lower 
incom e residents. Studies on options to address these issues are needed to craft appropriate legislation (e.g., 
shelter tax credits, mandated shelters for M M H), building codes, o r public  education campaigns. 
M oreover, there are concerns about substandard shelter proliferation by companies that prey  on the fears o f  
survivors. There w ere nine contractors listed under 'storm shelters' in the 1996 O K C  Yellow Pages, 
whereas there w ere 38 in the 2000 phone book that m anufactured shelters. There is 12 in the 2007 phone 
book.
F igure  4.6 - 4  M ay 1999 in M oore , O k lahom a. 
M atthew  B iddle, C o p y righ t.
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Similar concerns about reconstruction were noted in the quality o f construction amid rebuilt housing 
developm ents (M arshall 2000). Structural policies (such as mandated building codes) are emphasized after 
a disaster seemingly at the expense o f  non-structural policies, such as EMA programs to identify vulnerable 
individuals or research to determine future warning, shelter, and evacuation trends. 'Shelter-in-place' 
concepts, currently common in EMA doctrines, provide a response framework for much o f  the public, with 
little erosion o f  EMA budgets. Such policies have little foreseeable negative impacts, but there appear to be 
broad assumptions that people: a) have a shelter to go to and know where it is; and b) choose to 'gamble' on 
survivability because o f unawareness o f  the potential risks and in spite o f publicized mitigative guidance 
(Figure 4.6).
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The recommended public health response is to shelter in situ, rather than attempt evacuation.
-  R. Dawn Comstock and Sue M allonee- 
DISASTERS 2005, 29 (3): 277-287.
Although the manufactured housing industry would have you believe that tornado disasters are the product o f  
freak natural acts - equal opportunity killers roaring willy-nilly across the landscape - the figures suggest a less 
democratic, more class-based pattern.
- Ted Steinberg -
ACTS OF GOD: THE UNNATURAL HISTORY OF NATURAL DISASTER IN AMERICA
5  -  P o l i c y  I s s u e s  a n d  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s
5 .1  - O u t s t a n d i n g  I s s u e s
Outstanding issues that need to be addressed are standardized post-event surveys, the 'Tornado Emergency', 
public assemblies, high-vulnerable populations, future o f  probability-based warnings, and the future o f 
ISIWS programs. A ddressing weaknesses in these areas could improve compliance and the overall safety o f 
the general public.
5.1.1 - S t a n d a r d i z e d  P o s t - E v e n t  S u r  v e y s
W hile there has been an increase in the number o f  tornado disasters forensically-studied, particularly by 
Schmidlin et al., m any efforts (including this study) suffer from logistical and scale limitations. 
Cross-com parisons between disciplinary specialties are statistically and subjectively problem atic. Research 
is piecem eal and episodic, and a much-larger percentage o f events needs to be surveyed to expand the body 
o f  statistically-significant data. Better coordination is needed between epidem iologists, geographers, 
engineers, EM A, and the m eteorological community. However, this seems to be a "broken record", as 
every major policy directive regarding tornado risk since the 1970s has advocated such collaborations. 
Such policy initiatives have not filtered down to the day-to-day activities at the local levels. The NW S  
should redouble efforts to become more involved in the "human factors" aspects o f  warning system policy. 
One o f the m ajor obstacles to characterizing warning response and storm impacts adequately is simply the 
perishable nature o f  the data. Response and clean up begins im mediately and recovery soon after the 
event. Survivors and responders tend to scatter quickly and lose memory o f  certain details in the days 
following the event. Getting into the field immediately as a routine part o f  post-event assessm ents (such as 
N W S  Service Assessments and FEMA  Im pact Reports) with experienced survey team s and standardized 
survey instruments would be a good start on building a foundation o f human ecology data for tornadoes.
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The NfFS diversifying administrative 'Service Assessments' to include emergency managers, college 
professors, city managers, health professionals and other involved people would help (Speheger et al. 
2002.) Currently the service assessments are self-maintained within the NfVS. It should not be standard 
protocol for an agency to be in charge o f its own quality assessment and standards compliance. The current 
setup does not allow for objective analysis. A lack o f  cross-jurisdictional comm itment to emergency 
preparedness and w arning was noted in surveying this disaster, though it is by no means unusual anywhere. 
Oklahoma C ounty and the City o f  M oore appear to have benefitted from progressive and prepared EMA 
offices. Other nearby localities with identical tornado risk give EMA piecemeal or inadequate attention. 
M any comm unities have personnel with EMA authority, but provide essentially no resources or appreciable 
funding. Consistency o f  approach in EMA is im portant in achieving public preparedness and in 
maximizing the efficacy o f the NJVS FOS. Stakeholders benefit from uniform approaches and products in 
this era o f  the highly-m obile society, where people travel extensively, and live and work in different 
communities.
5.1.2 - T h e  T o r n a d o  E m e r g e n c y
It is appropriate to use 'Tornado Emergency' (an SVS from the local NW S-O UN) in cases w here a large 
tornado is known  to be on the ground and threatening a significantly populated area, as in the OCT. Since 
this event, however, the phrase has been used in rural areas in warnings disseminated for weak and brief 
tornadoes (e.g., Texas Panhandle). M uch like the terminology confusion regarding PDS w atches, the 
im pact o f  such 'special' products remain largely conjecture. For the OCT, this innovative approach seems 
to have been quite beneficial in this CTA. However, NW S  should consider a standard protocol (not 
necessarily a m andate) for the future use o f such statements to avoid overuse and subsequent dilution o f  its 
meaning. Future warning system improvements must incorporate the fact that the identical term inology 
carries different meanings among stakeholders, especially when such term inology is new and usage not 
standardized. Until the warning system defines such terms and consistently dictates their meaning, their 
im pact will likely be less than optimal. Conversely, it is very clear that the use o f  the phrase represents a 
sort o f  de fa c to  increase in warning certainty. Thus, it anecdotally implies that the public does indeed
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respond to levels o f  (un)certainty in warning messages, and furthers the idea that cataloging different ways 
to express (un)certainty is critical.
'Tornado Emergency' was subsequently observed using a 'non-severe' tornado in the sparsely-populated 
Texas Panhandle in 2000 (B iddle 2000), and in what could have been a more obvious scenario in 
Indianapolis in 2002. In the former example, a small, brief, and weak tornado -  well observed, reported, 
and tracked by spotters and research team s -  lum bered outside a rural town (2000 population -23 0 0 ) in 
broad daylight. It is arguable w hether a Tornado Emergency can exist in the connotation intended in that 
particular scenario. In the second exam ple, a tornado was known to be on the ground in an urban area, and 
the words 'Tornado Emergency' were used (M itchem 2003), but the phrase was buried in the text o f a 
standard warning, and appeared to have little im pact in and o f itself. Tornado Em ergency was again used in 
Oklahoma City for a damaging nocturnal tornado on the city's northern fringes (8 M ay 2003). But the 
tornado was not violent and the im pact o f the statement in this case is difficult to measure, given the intense 
media coverage afforded all tornadoes in the area since 3 M ay 1999. Is every tornado warning situation 
that occurs in greater Oklahoma City to prom pt the use o f Tornado Emergency? Is its use dictated by 
population densities, path length and persistence, or predicted or detected intensity? U ntil the warning 
program  defines such terms and consistently dictates their meaning, their im pact will likely be less than 
optimal.
5.1.3 - P u b l i c  A s s e m b l y
W hile many facilities were well-prepared, numerous reports o f certain school officials -  "ushering children 
and assembly attendees to shelter as the storm began to hit the building" -  were recounted. These are not 
stories o f safe behavior, but rather, good luck. A 'Tornado W atch' had been in effect for some time and 
warnings had been ongoing upstream  o f these locations for tens o f  minutes. Organizers o f  mass assem bly -  
particularly in a public school -  should never carry on such activities w ithout direct lines to warning 
information or designating someone to monitor the outside conditions, or preferably, both\ In several 
instances, mass casualties were narrowly avoided by minutes or meters, which could have easily and
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dram atically increased the death toll (Grazulis et al. 1998; Edwards and Lemon 2002). M ore emphasis 
m ust be placed on the im portance o f weather watches with more training given to school, church, and 
public venue officials on planning for such instances.
The EMA comm unity should consider m andatory minimum compliance standards for severe w eather plans 
and shelter procedures for public facilities and other places o f  mass assembly (e.g., churches, malls, 
schools, etc.). Such standards could easily and econom ically be incorporated into the Life Safety Codes 
(prom ulgated by the N ational Fire Protection Association) and be administered locally by EMA or fire 
departm ent personnel. Such standards might include NW R as an alert device, and could be seen as 
com parable to smoke detector regulations in basic fire codes (as is presently part o f  N W S  Storm ready 
certification). This is not to suggest one way or another, that shelters themselves be mandated, bu t that 
plans and postings be made available to the public regarding the severe w eather plan for the facility, and 
that personnel at such locations be trained regarding the best available practice in the event o f  w arnings or 
severe weather.
5 .1 .4 -  S i r e n  E f f i c a  c y
The siren system can only reach people in a certain radius and the competing noise factor is difficult to 
control. A nother variable with a siren system is varying rules o f  regulation by each municipality 
controlling the sirens. The skill level o f  the individual sounding the sirens (or automatic systems) is not 
going to be uniform . You might be able to hear a tornado warning siren one time, and then the next time 
you will not be able to hear it because o f wind patterns, environm ental noise, etc. It is an outdoor warning 
system o n l y .  The civil defense system o f the 1950s warned the public o f air raids (and there w as less 
environm ental noise) and they stayed around until the present. This variability makes the system 
ineffectual. The cost o f NW R for all households is less than a working siren system. A siren system  is not 
only more expensive, but reaches significantly fewer people. The NW R is more cost effective and has the 
capability to reach rural areas more reliably.
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According to Comstock and M allonee (2005) in the OCT the two most comm on warnings were television 
(92.8 %) and sirens (72.9 %). However, when you allow for multiple w arning m edia, you are not doing 
justice to the prim ary source. For instance, that more people could hear the sirens does not mean they were 
moved by them or first alerted by them. The author stresses that the siren totals are only beneficial as an 
imminent danger alert sound at the warning for the county or city in reference. The TOR in live time on the 
TV allows for tim ely decision-making. This coverage was responsible for the prevention o f additional 
injuries and fatalities and m oved many to evacuate.
5 .1 .5 - H i g h l  y- V u l n e r a b l e  P o p u l a  t i o n s
The most vulnerable populations were the poor, the disabled, and elderly. Statistically, the poor respond 
less well to natural hazards, and with it w eather reports, than the w hole population does (Gruntfest 2002). 
The poor are too busy trying to survive from day-to-day. Their priorities do not include storm warnings 
when the stresses o f  everyday living are so great. The disabled presented with obvious navigation 
difficulties for getting to a safe place, especially those living alone w ithout caregiver assistance. Caregivers 
are too busy assisting the patients with personal care issues to attend to w eather warnings. D uties o f 
caregivers need to include watching for w eather warnings. Possibly the provision o f  N W R  (where there are 
adequate radio signals) as basic safety equipm ent for the disabled and the caregivers w ould prevent 
isolation from warnings and give time to seek shelter. The elderly alike are the most-vulnerable because 
they are disabled, poor, or both among the population. The factors that interfere with w arning recognition 
are poor hearing, vision, and cognitive skills (memory and problem solving). In addition to these possible 
deficits, they may also have physical limitations that prevent fast movements needed for seeking shelter or 
fleeing. I f  they’re even aware o f the need to act quickly, they might realize their lim itations and take their 
chances by doing nothing. M any o f  the elderly do not drive and rely on others for transportation.
Safety o f  the young (< 1 6  yr) is directly related to the competency o f  the adults in charge o f  their care or the 
lessons learned in school. There were no deaths in the OCT betw een the ages o f five and 23 yrs (OCM E 
1999). The decision thresholds crafted in response to probability-based warnings could aid such subgroups
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in warning response, given that they should not be subjected to as many warnings requiring mitigation 
com pliance as is common under current categorical formats, and allow in theory. It is speculated that 
custom ized planning thresholds for activities that involved more complicated decisions and actions will be 
needed. We need to explore the 'push' concept where information is sent to certain receivers/com puters 
based on need, locations, and risk, the cell phones would be a good start.
5 .2  - T h e  S u r v e y  I n s t r u m e n t
The survey was developed hurriedly on the day o f  the field work (4 M ay 1999), but it w as loosely based on 
sim ilar post-tornado surveys by Schmidlin (1997) and Legates and Biddle (1999). This is not necessarily 
the ideal way to develop a survey instrument, and several inadequacies became apparent during data 
analysis (Appendix A). Thus, the survey was done with some pre-conceived issues in mind, based on 
previous experience by the author and on other surveys. There are two distinct issues associated with this 
survey: (1) If  it were possible to redo the survey, w hat changes to the instrum ent would be beneficial? (2) 
I f  a survey were to be developed that would becom e a standard survey for tornadoes in the future, what 
elem ents should that survey contain?
It is felt that this survey, suitably m odified as described in what follows, can serve as a prototype for survey 
instrum ents in future tornado:
1) R e s p o n s e  T i m e s . These were estim ated by the respondents and then sorted into categories 
(e.g., 60 min, 30 min, 15 min, etc.). Retrospectively, the original uncategorized estimates should 
have been saved or elicited.
2)  R e s p o n d e n t  In f o r m a t i o n . After reviewing the data, it was felt that it m ight be appropriate 
to go back and re-interview some o f  the respondents. However, there was not enough detailed 
information about their location and address (the two might be different) to go back to all o f  the 
respondents. In many cases, their location at the time o f the tornado is known only approxim ately 
(within a few blocks). Having specific information would have made the analysis easier.
3 )  D e m o g r a p h i c s . It is unclear w hat value knowing m arital status and ethnicity had in this 
study, because responses may not always be truthful or can be questionable (m ixed racial 
ethnicity, for example).
4. U n a s k e d  Q u e s t i o n s .
a. Do they have a plan for what to do in case o f  ( I )  tornado watch, (2) tornado w arning, (3) severe 
thunderstorm watch, (4) severe thunderstorm warning?
b. I f  yes, was their actual response consistent with that plan?
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c. If  not, why not?
d. How far away (estimated) was the tornado when you first heard about it?
e. How far away (estimated) was the tornado when you took action regarding it?
f. The question "W hat would have made the warning better?" That w as on the instrum ent, but 
actually was not asked o f all the respondents. This question should have been asked o f all
respondents. Among those who were asked, it was observed that those who actually were hit by
the tornado generally responded to this negatively (d idn’t suggest any way to improve the 
warning), while those who were not actually hit, offered suggestions. Rather than recording 
’shorthand’ descriptions o f  the responses to this question, detailed responses should have been 
documented.
The survey needs to be short enough that it can be completed within 10 min -15 min, since the contact with 
respondents typically occurs while they are in the process o f cleaning up or otherwise dealing with the 
situation caused by the tornado. The respondents were selected in a "shotgun" manner w ithin 3 km (1.9 mi) 
o f  the OCT. No doorbells were rung. W ith exceptions, respondents were dealt with in three days o f  the 
OCT. Respondents can be called after one month or so and asked further questions, if  the need arises.
5 .3  -  F u t u r e  o f  N a t i o n a l  W e a t h e r  S e r v i c e  W a r n i n g  P r o g r a m s
W ernly and U cellini (2002; p. 71) note that NW S WFOs have "the ultim ate warning and forecast 
responsibility [that] includes producing and issuing all o f  the traditional critical information products, as 
w ell as working with all NW S  partners in the warning process to coordinate preparedness planning efforts 
and hazard awareness activities." Still, there is very little in the literature, including from N W S  sponsored 
w orks, that does much to specifically design 'critical information products.' There appear to be a num ber o f 
forces, some o f  them seem ingly in opposition, about what directions that society in general, and the NW S  
specifically, should develop with regard to severe local storm warning systems. Among the issues are the 
increasing advancem ents in technology, the evolution o f  the roles o f  private forecasting services versus 
public service aspects o f data ownership and 'right-to-know' issues, and intra-NIF5 issues related to 
autom ation, centralization, and public outreach. It is very difficult to project w hat sort o f institutional 
environment will exist in the next couple decades, making hypotheses about forecast and warning product 
evolution that much more challenging. According to the NRC (1999; p .55): "the principal future roles o f 
the NW S  in providing environmental information will be extensions o f  its current roles ... public forecasts 
and severe w eather warnings will continue to be a government responsibility. The N W S  w ill retain the lead
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role for issuing warnings and ensuring their dissemination. NW S  will have to focus on saving their primary 
customers, defined as whomever immediately received their products. The prim ary customers o f the NW S  
will often be other information providers, not end users."
There is reason to believe that continued advancements in IT, MOS performance, and other technological 
advancem ents w ill increasingly 'usurp the traditional role o f  weather forecasters' (Brooks et al. 1996; p. 1), 
and that competition for access to data could involve the public competing w ith various other governmental 
or corporate entities. Such organizational and manpower developments, coupled with the predicted 
expenditures for w eather forecasting and warning programs that will fall (relative to inflation), must be 
cause for reflection about ultim ate N W S  motivations to increase the use o f probability-based products. 
Currently, liability issues make it problem atic for private and com m ercial sources to issue warnings (Klein 
and Pielke 2002), and public entities usually cannot finance duplicate services o f  those offered by NW S  
(NSTC 2000). However, as private vendor and subscriber warning services becom e increasingly common, 
warning programs could suffer if  centralization and privatization o f  NW S  responsibilities dilute local 
interactions and connections to stakeholders.
If  private or local jurisdictions attempt to fill certain roles exclusively, the discontinuities that could emerge 
could likely doom any imagined 'seamlessness' in services. Services might become piecem eal, inconsistent, 
and lack the standardization and authority that has proven to be important to warning program  access and 
compliance. N W S  has professed (NRC 1999, p. 47) that "customers in 2025 w ill be considerably more 
knowledgeable about w eather and environmental forces than their counterparts in 1998, and they w ill be 
more sophisticated in using this information in their professional and personal lives." Aside, the fact that it 
is unclear how knowledge is assessed here, it appears that to the 'agents-of-change', knowledge is 
synonym ous with data access. However, research regarding such conclusions and examinations o f  the 
im plications to the design and utility o f  future N W S  products is curiously absent. N W S  policy tends to 
reflect a mind set where technologies are solutions to problem s, whereas the problem s them selves have not 
been formally defined nor sufficiently studied (Brooks et al. 1996). N W S  has a poor track record in this
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area, and its organizational propensity to institute programmatic policies and program revisions (such as 
m ajor revisions o f the watch-warning program) blindly must be moderated by customer research and policy 
discourse if  change is ultimately to benefit both the N W S  and its stakeholders alike (Doswell c.2003b).
5.3.1 - W a r n i n g  P o l i c i e s
Advances in low cost computer graphics and increasingly common access to Internet-based 
comm unications have given stakeholders a hand in the generation o f misleading symbols and inappropriate 
projections (M onmonier 1996). The implications o f this rem ain speculative, but as it stands, when w eather 
information is disseminated via computer graphics, there are no assurances that the information is being 
projected as generated, transmitted as intended, nor comm unicated as designed (AMS 2001). There has 
been some research on how users understand graphical weather warning information, particularly that 
which has been disseminated via TV. M roz and Raven (1993, p .426) concluded that televised w eather 
information is "poorly understood, often m isinterpreted, and at times, even m anipulated by the public." 
Effectively utilizing graphic displays o f w eather data require knowledge o f  user's 'mental maps' o f  space 
and place, and how such representations are spatially, culturally, and environm entally situated (Curry 
1996). And the urgency and available time to process spatial / graphic warning information m entally is a 
learned experience subject to breakdown under stress. An illustration is an incident (witnessed by the 
author) where a governm ent tornado intercept team was directed by highly-qualified and experienced 
now caster support to make numerous wrong turns, such that the mission was compromised (by at least 50 
km). The cause was misreading radar data overlain on county-base maps in the heat o f battle (Rasm ussen 
pc.2000).
Em pirical reviews o f TV w eather radar in warning situations reveal a com plex blend o f useful technical 
inform ation, and presentation-oriented 'eye candy' that often provides little useful information (M roz and 
Raven 1993; M cCarthy 2002). Survey data from OCT indicates that the com bination o f video im ages, 
statem ents made by on air m eteorologists -  and o f  critical im portance, the tenor and emotion conveyed in 
these statem ents -  were more im portant in stimulating response or achieving compliance than radar
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presentations. Surveys o f radar comprehension and spatial cognition o f w eather radar displays are few and 
have proven difficult (Drabek 1986; England 1996; Biddle 1996; Golden and Adams 2000). Self- 
assessments and comments gleaned from survey respondents are problem atic because there tends to be a 
large magnitude o f biases in the responses. In other words, the fact that people claim  to want radar images, 
or say they understand weather radar imagery, is not necessarily indicative o f  the role it plays in response 
nor indicative o f  what people really comprehend from such presentations. Considerable research in this 
area w ould be very beneficial to the overall warning ecology library, as well as to the media and vendors 
involved in crafting graphical warning products. The media can provide detailed information about the 
track o f  the tornado (NOTE: this does NOT include street names). This allows the public to make more 
informed decisions about evacuating. Many people evacuated in the OCT needlessly.
H owever, people process risk information primarily through a filter o f existing experience and knowledge. 
Given this, the most efficient means to communicate short-fuse risk is to characterize and integrate what 
people already know (and do), and then develop warning strategies accordingly (M organ 1993). Although 
many are fam iliar with certain aspects o f  a hazard risk impact, magnitude, or frequency, m ost are not fluent 
on statistical probabilities. This makes comm unication o f  uncertainty very challenging. Partially because 
o f  these common heuristics, and partially because o f the evolution o f  the W W P -  m ost warning products 
are dichotomous and applied at the county size. This dilutes a considerable amount o f  the forecaster's detail 
regarding uncertainty or confidence. Even when we are scientifically able to define the uncertainty 
quantitatively, perceptions o f  the uncertainty are often 'socially am plified' or attenuated, and redueed to 
biased qualitative attributes (Kasperson et al. 1988).
W hat, if  anything, would have been different with more advanced technologies and even greater lead times? 
M ost o f the evidence suggests that very little would have been different absent significantly more lead time 
eoupled with highly-accurate and reliable path forecasts (Lindell 1987; Legates and B iddle 1999; Hammer 
and Schm idlin 2002). Consistency in warning system procedures, and more uniform ity in alternative media 
messages would provide more effective safety measures. Alternative warning modes are currently not
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controlled by any one vendor and are in need o f consistency o f warning systems procedures and more 
uniformity in alternate media messages. Pagers and cell phones, GIS systems, siren systems, reverse 911, 
and outdoor and highway signals are some o f the alternative warning dissemination systems used.
5.3.2 - P o l i c y , S e r v i c e , M a r k e t i n g , a n d  T r a n s i t i o n
M ost o f  the lim ited human ecology research that has gone into NW S  policy and product developm ent has 
been through 'focus group' methods (e.g., NOAA c.2003; UCAR c.2003). Judgments and summaries o f  
stakeholder attitudes via 'focus group' methods are wrought with accuracy and bias problems. Focus groups 
are often biased tow ard the motives o f the investigators (either consciously or unconsciously). Conclusions 
about the focus o f  the group are often grossly simplified, smoothed toward the mean, and summarized in 
ways that do not reflect the diversity o f behaviors or im portant notions regarding use o f the given 
information. Survey data are equally prone to mishandling as self-assessm ents o f  user com prehension o f 
graphical w eather information for instance, can be highly-skewed owing to combinations o f two forces: 
many people use such information with partial efficacy, and thus think they understand the information 
m uch better than they actually do; and, many people are loath to admit to survey adm inistrators (or 
them selves) that there are technical issues in the information that they do not understand. Q uestions are 
often leading and discussions are often steered in specific directions. The more complicated and time- 
consum ing the survey, the more likely that the population o f  those willing to com plete it are those w ith 
either an enhanced personal interest in the survey topic, a personal interest in the agency or product being 
surveyed, or are otherw ise 'cornered' in such a way as to not be typical o f an unbiased sample population. 
The result is that we know little about how w eather information is really used, and new products often come 
on-line and old ones are retired w ithout it ever being w ell-established how they were used, and by whom.
M ileti (1975) suggests that many public education efforts to change w arning response need im provem ent 
and that some portion o f  a population fails to take appropriate action regardless o f  the warning. Only with 
greater understanding o f  the likely responses o f  individuals and groups under disaster threat would it be 
possible to make beneficial refinements. In situations where warning systems can function to a large-scale
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loss-of-life and movable property, an integrated sociological and psychological all hazard project could 
refine present knowledge and expand on it. Community vulnerability is not only a function o f  the 
probability o f impact, but also the degree to which the community can endure the impact.
5.3.3 - P r i v a t i z a t i o n : C o m m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  Wa r n i n g s
The comm odification o f w eather information -  or the transformation o f knowledge, observations, or data 
into products for sale -  has revolutionized both governm ent and private sector m eteorology, particularly in 
areas related to technology transfer. Similar evolution has been observed in other environmental fields such 
as agriculture (R ivera 2000) and energy (Levin and Espeland 2001). The comm odification o f all types o f 
w eather information, including data critical to warning programs and in certain cases actual warning 
information itself, is a complex emerging issue that cannot be debated to any significant degree in this 
work. However, it bears noting that as more probability-based products becom e possible (largely because 
they are them selves comm odities) via the IT revolution, increased privatization o f w eather warning 
information -  traditionally the domain o f governm ent -  is o f  relative concern. The research and 
developm ent o f investments, the body o f intellectual and operational expertise, and the physical and 
technological infrastructure o f  the N W S  is 'fruit from the publicly-subsidized tree.' Are prospects that the 
more basic and valued aspects o f current warning programs and products becom e paid 'subscriber only' 
services segregated econom ically from large sectors o f lower income society, and that the technological 
devices needed to receive modernized or value-added work annually, solely available to certain upper 
sections o f socioeconomic strata?
5.3.4 - I n f o r m a t i o n  A c c e s s  AND T h e  'D i g i t a l  D i v i d e '
Although the use o f  the Internet is increasing rapidly, as are the use o f Internet platform s (e.g., NW S  sites or 
weather.com ) to receive w eather information -  including warnings -  there rem ains a sizeable portion o f  the 
population without regular access to computers (Dimaggio et al. 2001). As o f  2003, the Pew Research 
Center (PRC) found that ~59 % o f  all adults in the US had 'regular access' to the Internet, w ith variability 
within regions from a high o f  -6 7  % in the M iddle Atlantic States to -4 8  % in the Southern States (PRC
C.2006). Also o f  note is the uneven Internet 'penetration' to certain community types (e.g., urban, suburban, 
rural, etc.) and stratification o f  access among various groups based on age, family size, ethnicity, education 
level, and income. PRC has specifically and thoroughly assessed these dem ographics and further note; 
"Anxiety about the divide centers on arguments that those who do not have access to the Internet are 
disadvantaged compared to Internet users for a number o f reasons. The concern is that Internet non-users 
will have, among other things, less pow er as consumers and fewer economic opportunities, less access to 
high-quality health information, fewer options for dealing with governm ent agencies, no chance to learn 
about their world from the millions o f organizations and learning centers that have posted their material on 
the W orld W ide W eb, and less opportunity to interact with others through email and instant messaging" 
(PRC c.2006; http://w ww .pewinternet.org/reports/reports.asp ). It is a natural extension o f these concerns 
to w onder what will be the implications to various societal groups if  the Internet becomes either a primary 
sole-source for warning information, a source o f  warning information that scientifically or technologically 
o f  higher value, or that is be tter than other forms o f public warning information. These are not questions to 
be answered in this research, but merely questions that those involved in any sort o f  warning product design 
in this era need to consider.
5.3.5 - I n f o r m a  t i o n  O  v e r l  o a  d
From the early onset o f the 'Electronics Age' (Broadherst 1958), concerns over increased data processing 
duties and volumes and their lim itations on human logistical and cognitive capacities, emerged in w hat was 
colloquially called 'Fighter P ilot Syndrome'. This mental 'separating o f the w heat from the chaff with 
regard to human information processing is o f  most importance when the decision-m aking stakes are the 
highest and the time frames are the shortest. As noted by W allace (1990; p. 265), "technological 
capabilities do not ensure more effective decision-making, particularly in disaster management. In fact, 
they seem to ensure the delivery o f more data than can be processed effectively in crisis situations. We 
need to utilize technology to help alleviate the potential for information overload and, in addition, provide 
support for the cognitive processes o f  both individuals and groups involved in disaster m anagement." Thus,
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'Information Overload' concerns are applicable not only to the F-15 pilot in a dogfight, but to a Greyhound 
Bus driver monitoring w eather warnings while driving through a thunderstorm on the Interstate.
5.3.6 - S o c i a l  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  T e c h n o l o g y
W hile the new technological capabilities that make probabilities possible, and their tremendous potential 
applications have made for much positive speculation regarding an era o f'p red ictive warnings' (W ernly and 
U ccellini 2000), the 'push' for such technologies from scientists, engineers, or policymakers, must be in 
response to a 'puli' from potential users and stakeholders (W alter and Q uarantelli 1996). New systems 
require tangible relevance, economic gain (often profit), and societal benefit if  innovations are to be 
adopted. Steinberg (2000) notes an interesting aspect o f American policy culture and how it addresses (or 
fails to) hazard vulnerability; an affinity for 'clinical diagnoses' has becom e politically pervasive in attempts 
to impose scientific and technological ideas tow ard solving the 'natural hazard problem '. This mind set 
tends to drive policy further down the road toward the 'technofix' and away from humanistic mitigation 
policies and institutionally empathetic responses, drifting toward stratified, capricious, or spurious societal 
and environmental impacts. Technological 'fixes' do not always work.
G iven that a significant reason for the decrease in tornado morbidity and mortality -  in light o f  increasing 
population has been demonstrated to be the im pact o f  warning program s already in place -  it is a fair 
question to ask why (or should) we as a society continue to expend resources on tornado warning systems 
when there are so many other public health threats in the environm ent that pose greater risk? The most 
basic answ er to this is that politically, most people in American society perceive tornado risk as significant 
and worthy o f institutional engagement (Riebsame et al. 1986). M ost w ant warning program s, are 
accustomed to them, expect them, and are willing to see at least some o f  their tax revenues allocated to 
developing and maintaining them (Steinberg 2000). Relatively speaking, the technology and scientific 
know-how exists at levels that enable significant mitigation o f  m any risks with little cost and infrastructure. 
Often, this infrastructure exists for other purposes and serves multiple roles in various other areas o f  public 
service. The prim ary reason tornado warning programs exist then is largely due to their evolution as
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political and institutional responses to public demand (Steinberg 2000). However, it goes deeper than this. 
Social science research (A lexander 2002) has indicated that the public has substantially-m ore concern with 
(and more dread of) involuntary risks (e.g., nuclear accidents, tornadoes), as opposed to assumed risks (e.g., 
smoking, driving). W hile tornadoes remain relatively rare events, media coverage o f them, coupled with 
the occasional significant tornado in one's own neighborhood are enough to convince most o f  the potential 
value o f warning programs. It is also enough to result in public outcry when systems fail or discussions o f 
cutbacks in service occur (Steinberg 2000).
There is a need for response studies to assess the importance o f  lead tim e and confidence and accuracy in 
relation to myriad response and mitigation needs. As detection and warning capabilities increase, response 
spectra eventually change to reflect this. The result can be that activities never before possible or practical 
are taken in response to certain types o f warning products under certain lead time param eters. In theory, a 
person living in northeast Oklahoma City on 3 M ay 1999 would have had time to hand-dig a hole in the 
ground that would offer substantial protection, if  they would have started digging when the first warning 
was issued for Oklahoma County. A lthough it is arguable as to how much protection such a foxhole would 
afford, it is conceivably more than that o f a mobile home, those choosing to flee could have put many miles 
between them selves and the tornado. However, there were numerous dangerous storms ongoing, making 
options problematic on spontaneous determinations o f routes and shelter available. This suggests that 
increasing lead times are resulting in the contem plation o f a variety o f  forms o f shelter decision-making. 
This is behavior that the current warning programs were never designed to address.
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6 -  C o n c l u s io n s
W arning technology is dynamic, changing with time and circumstance. There is a significant gap in our 
understandings o f  the use o f this technology. M any assumptions are made about the use o f  increased 
technological capabilities o f detection and dissemination, and why they do not serve the use param eters o f 
general society. There are limitations in comparing individual tornado disasters, aside from  differing 
survey methodologies. There are significant differences in event character, and there are limits to the utility 
o f  comparing data from single tornado events with cumulative impacts o f outbreak events. Obviously, with 
outbreaks, tim e-lines overlap in some cases and warning information tends to become logistically complex 
and cumbersome. In long-track violent events, persons along projected paths are often presented with 
good-quality warning information -  both tem porally and spatially -  and thus given ample opportunity to 
make warning response decisions. Conversely, media delivered warning inform ation m ay be vague and 
confusing in outbreaks that occur among audiences in spatially-large areas (inter-regional). The OCT 
outbreak was epic in TV coverage and warning, which was responsible for the prevention o f  additional 
injuries and fatalities and moved many to seek shelter or evacuate.
6.1 - V u l n e r a b i l i t y  a n d  R i s k  I s s u e s
Issues o f vulnerability, both at individual and societal levels, are fundamental to both the public risk and its 
ability to utilize mitigation services or technologies to confront hazards. The disabled, elderly, dependent 
juveniles and MM H residents have shown disproportionate levels o f vulnerability. W hile the details 
change through time and space relative to scientific knowledge, structural controls, or w arning program s, 
the outcom e generally stays the same. D isadvantaged or disenfranchised peoples are at inherently greater 
risk from all manner o f  direct and indirect effects o f  disasters, including tornadoes. In terms o f  equal access 
to mitigation program s and services (including warning systems), the poor are systematically displaced by 
societal pressures in the name o f advancing developm ent, capital benefits, or for political advantage. The 
social dynamics center on the accum ulation o f  w ealth (including warning technologies, shelter, etc.) and 
barriers to program s (including warning services, health care, etc.). This often deprives the poor o f 
opportunity to utilize traditional common services, including warning systems that may be essential for
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survival. In short, people that are preoccupied with the basic aspects o f survival on a daily basis (e.g., food, 
water, shelter, poor health, crime) are not likely to give much thought to low probability risks, no matter 
how catastrophic their potential impact.
W arnings that say that it is safer to stay in your home (unless it is M M H) need to be contested because o f 
the uncertainty o f the strength o f tornadoes at any given time. Probability-based warnings would give the 
strength and they would be sm aller than the contem porary warning systems now. Also instructions to flee 
are risky because o f varying traffic conditions. So probability-based systems could fix this because they 
would significantly reduce the numbers o f  individuals on any given road related to fleeing a tornado.
The electronic media -  a vital com ponent o f a warning system -  are conversely major players in systematic 
misperception o f risk frequency and magnitude. This matters on both tails o f  the response curve: at one 
end, hyper-vigilance causes undue stress on both the system and the public and, at the other end, 
complacency emerges among those overwhelm ed by the messages, choosing to 'tune out' or deny the risk 
they are hearing o f incessantly , amid the background noise o f other risks competing for media attention. 
The survey responses on OCT were positive for warnings, and compliance was maximized by response 
time that allowed for adequate planning.
The percentage o f respondents who received some warning for the OCT was am azingly high (< than 1 %), 
implicating to a large part, the violent nature o f the tornado and the general lack o f im proved shelter 
available to m ost killed. W hile data collected in this work may not fully characterize the event, it seems 
logical to conclude that the high percentage o f  the population warned, the exceptional lead tim e o f the 
warnings, and the extent o f  the media coverage for this event were critical in keeping casualties low relative 
to the num ber o f  residences destroyed. Today people know more about tornadoes and receive more 
exposure to warnings than ever before, but: 1) too often have no plan and no im proved shelter to access, 
and; 2) still little is understood about what warning data and time-fram es are required within the scope o f 
the new technologies (that allow for warnings that are tem porally and spatially becom ing m ore-specific).
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Still, there remains those w ith increased risk factors -  most notably poverty, education levels, and disability 
-  which greatly alter abilities to access the warning products that are available. A dditional challenges exist 
to serve appropriately the very young and the very old, the mobility, sight, or hearing im paired, and those in 
substandard housing such as mobile homes and apartments. The 'fight or flight' issue -  the newly-identified 
propensity for evacuation under tornado warnings and the way such affects both the warning system and the 
overall risk -  has moved to the forefront.
Until these issues are fully addressed, simply decreasing false alarms and increasing lead times may be 
diluted advancem ents, with benefits that exist only on paper. In the 'Digital Age', social param eters appear 
even more elusive and in a state-of-flux. Thus, much o f what little research there is on the human ecology 
o f  warnings and the tornado risk is seriously antiquated and o f  uncertain value. Finally, it is im portant to 
convey, that while the human ecology o f  the OCT event fits the current hazard models o f w hat would be 
projected for such an event, the truth is we are no closer to defining the variability that itself defines p re ­
event warning landscapes, nor in maximizing the efficacy o f  our investments in warning systems. 
Increasing exposure o f  infrastructure and the costs o f  protecting, insuring, and rebuilding, has fostered 
added interest from all levels o f governm ent and the private sector in mitigation program s o f  all manner, 
including warning systems. Currently, the country has no comprehensive national warning policy or 
strategy that covers all hazards or all places. Efforts to develop such are gaining mom entum , spurred on by 
increasing concerns over terrorism and weapons o f mass destruction (NRC 2002). N ot only are 
technological hazards a concern in their own right, but with their potential come prospects for 'hybrid 
hazard' or 'na-tech' events, large-scale incidents involving elem ents or com binations o f both natural and 
technological agents. M any threats posed by natural and technological hazards are similar with regard to 
potential warning strategies. This is especially true with short-fuse hazards, and planning has ensued in 
earnest to design modern communications networks (using digitally codified 'Common Alerting Protocols') 
for a comprehensive and universal national 'All Hazards W arning System'.
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6 .2  -  K e y  P o i n t s
The background investigation for this proposal indicates a dearth o f contem porary studies in the human 
ecology o f  environm ental warnings as defined by information processing in general, and assessments o f 
short-fuse w eather phenomena. A wide gulf exists between the physical science community (e.g., 
meteorology, physics) and the social science community (e.g., geography, sociology) for communicating 
about and understanding relationships o f human ecology and weather hazards. These issues continue to 
impede m ulti-disciplinary initiatives to construct research dialogues. A prime directive o f this work is to 
initiate efforts to find a common language that both sides are comfortable w ith and capable o f  fully 
exploiting. Continued improvem ents in warning processes and severe weather mitigation policy implore 
that the design and im plem entation o f modernized warning systems include both the technological and 
human ends o f  the spectrum. Furthermore, in this age o f  rapidly changing emergency management 
priorities, it is w orth noting that the products o f this research -  in particular, that which further delineates 
the human ecology o f risk communication and warning procedures -  may prove invaluable to all m anner o f 
emergency planning, risk behavior, and warning policy. The following are conclusions. The first five are 
backed w ith statistics from this study;
1) O f those who responded to TV warnings, 37.2 % chose to evacuate. Although it is not possible 
herein to compare this figure from the OCT to other events, it is likely that this fraction is not 
typical in m ost m ajor tornado events. During tornado events o f  the future, people will attem pt 
evacuation more so as tornado warnings lead times increase (Figure 4.2). Even though many 
evacuated needlessly, it is likely that without that evacuation some percentage would have been 
killed.
2)  For those who had TV as a source o f  warning inform ation, the presence o f  juveniles had a 
positive effect on their decision to flee or not, w hereas the presence o f  elderly people had a 
negative effect. It is possible, but cannot be shown herein, that the elderly were reluctant to leave 
their location owing to mobility issues, whereas parents o f  juveniles w ished to reduce the threat to 
their children by leaving their location (Figure 4.3 and 4.4).
3) TV was the prim ary warning source for 69 % o f  the respondents, and 88 % listed TV as either 
their prim ary or secondary warning source (Figure 4.3). Third party warnings were 40 % (primary 
and secondary) for the OCT, which is second to TV among warning sources. NW R is not a 
significant factor as a warning source for this tornado).
4)  O f those who evacuated their location, apparently m ost were successful in not being harm ed by 
the tornado, but it is not known what percentage, becam e casualties. Three people were killed on 
this date (two in the OCT) in underpasses, but they were not respondents, for obvious reasons -  
what information about them was available was included in the survey.
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5) This study makes it very clear that the official lead time (as determined by the NWS) and the 
effective lead time (as observed by the respondents) can be very different. The source o f this 
difference is directly attributable to TV. That is, even though respondents may have lived in 
counties far enough away from the tornado not to be included in an official warning, they were 
receiving TV-based information about events in other counties well in advance o f the time when 
they finally were included in an official warning. M oreover, in some instances, a warning for a 
county was issued for an early tornado, but that county remained in tornado warnings more or less 
continuously for more than two hr, before the tornado affected some o f the respondents (Chapter 
5.2).
6) A lthough the term "Tornado Emergency" as a SVS was apparently effective in conveying the 
gravity o f  the threat associated with the OCT, its use in subsequent events is questionable, since it 
is not an officially-defined term, and criteria for its use have not been determined.
7) For public assemblies -  such as the student event being held in Westmoore High School -  those 
responsible should take steps to be prepared for tornadoes, such as designating spotters when the 
threat o f severe w eather is present. Had the tornado hit Westmoore High School directly instead o f  
peripherally, more casualties likely would have resulted as they waited until 2 min before the OCT 
hit to tell the students and parents to take cover in the halls.
8) In the survey, ~1 % listed siren as a prim ary source, and 18.7 % listed it as a secondary source. 
There remain many concerns for the use o f sirens -  for example -  increasing noise pollution 
makes them difficult to hear, they are generally not effective except for people outdoors. Sirens 
don't always w ork when needed and occasional testing may not reveal how they w ill perform  
when needed. A fter a tornado has occurred, it is common for a public outcry to install more sirens 
or for them to be fixed, and so on. This is understandable, but may not reflect the best use o f 
limited resources.
9) D isabled persons constituted 25 % o f the fatalities in the OCT. It is evident that the disabled 
need special assistance or facilities (such as shelters on-site). Know where they are and assist 
them! Elderly people need assistance too (check on them) and beware o f  the tornado watch 
because one can get them situated, as opposed to a tornado warning when there might not be 
enough time.
10) As has been demonstrated many times, mobile homes (m anufactured hom es, or homes that are 
ill-suited for sheltering) are unsuitable on location in the absence o f  a tornado shelter. Either 
shelters must be provided or plans made to evacuate to a suitable shelter in time (AMS 2004). 
Those living in mobile homes will necessarily have to take action at a lower perceived threat level, 
since sheltering on location is rarely a viable option. The tornado watch is critical for choosing 
your location for the storm, and getting there.
M ileti (1975, p. ) w rote that: "evidence suggests that many public education efforts to change warning 
responses need im provem ent and that some portion o f  a population fails to take appropriate protection 
actions regardless o f  the warning." Only with greater understanding o f the likely responses o f  individuals 
and groups under disaster threat would it be possible to make precise and beneficial refinem ents. In 
situations where warning systems can function to avert a large-scale loss-of-life and movable property, an 
integrated sociological and psychological all hazard project could refine present knowledge and expand
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upon it. D ramatic technological, environmental, and societal changes have rendered previous conceptions 
o f  the relationships between hazard warning systems and behavior inadequate. As noted, risk perception is 
inherently human and often described as irrational, skewed toward the exotic, dram atic, and intimate. This 
makes positivistic studies o f  risk and scientific formulation o f mitigation policies difficult to synchronize in 
a dynamic society. The m ulti-organizational complexities o f  warning programs make assessments subject 
to po st hoc fallacies regarding success. The most difficult aspects o f warning program appraisal involve 
societal response. There are two basic hurdles that impede assessments o f short-fuse products that are 
intended to produce actions or behaviors, especially if  they involve significant risk to life and limb. First, 
opposed to most other sorts o f  forecasts that can be measured with regard to their economic impacts (e.g., 
crop yields, gate attendance), w eather warnings are not easily characterized in degrees o f  value. This is 
because many o f  the 'pay offs' that exist among a vast array o f potential responses are somewhat intangible. 
Secondly, warning behavior is difficult to m odel or predict. Surveys regarding user assessments o f warning 
product performance are wrought with limitations and errors, tending to over-represent respondent 
perceptions o f  value, rather than their actual value. W hat people say they do, and w hat they actually do, 
can be very different and often not highly-correlated. Product designs that rely on surveys or focus groups 
tend to prom ote systems based on what stakeholders think they need, rather that what they m ost likely 
actually need. Regardless, in a general sense response surveys continue to form the bulk o f 'stakeholder 
needs' assessm ents for warning program design.
We keep getting better on the technology, but some specific groups o f  people are still getting killed by 
tornadoes, especially in the last twenty years. The reduction o f  tornado casualties is dependent upon 
several variables that constitute the warning system: early and accurate detection o f  tornadoes by 
m eteorologists; efficient and clear com m unication o f  warnings to the public via multiple media; and 
expedient and successful mitigation reactions among the warned community. Probability-based products 
are increasingly becoming technologically and organizationally plausible. They have immense potential to
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stabilize m itigation response curves for a variety o f  stakeholders. The author would like to test this among 
his studies next. For this to become a reality, details regarding efficacy and efficiency must be 
characterized, and the certain educational and marketing program s that will be required for the 'probability 
revolution' o f the warning program will require a foundation o f  research that currently does not exist. 
Consequently, this research aims to provide insight on the nature o f  the relationship between human 
behavior and warning system characteristics that affect the capability, utility, and efficacy o f  warnings. A 
secondary im pact will hopefully be the establishment o f a foundation for routine investigations and 
dialogues o f forecast and warning products that emphasize human ecology to be undertaken here in 
N orman, O klahom a under the umbrella o f  the so-called N ational Weather Center.
In general terms, this study has demonstrated the crucial importance o f  the hum an ecology o f warnings. 
A lthough prim arily  concerned with the findings from a very specific event (the OCT), this research has 
shown that the landscape o f  tornado warnings (the w arnscape) from the human side is every b it as dynamic 
and com plex as the scientific and technical sides, if  not more so. Research into human risk perception, 
decision-m aking, and behavior is not something that likely ever will be considered complete. N or can we 
conclude that comm unication o f  information is static, so that some ideal system can be determined once 
and for all time. The recipients o f  warning information are not some monolithic block, but represent the 
entire spectrum within any particular location, and that spectrum changes as the larger society outside 
changes. In addition, people move into and out o f  that particular location (or are traveling) and the 
infrastructure for producing effective tornado warnings might have to change as the population changes in 
order to rem ain effective. As we learn more about who becomes casualties and who does not, then 
procedures can be developed to target those particularly vulnerable, presum ably w ithout disrupting the 
processes shown to be effective for groups which are less vulnerable.
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As the scientific and technical aspects o f tornado w arnings change, and they inevitably will, it is likely that 
the accuracy and specificity o f  tornado warnings will continue to improve. H owever, it is not likely that 
warning uncertainties will disappear any time soon -  in fact -  there is reason to believe that some 
uncertainty in tornado warnings is virtually inevitable. This implies that vulnerabilities will rem ain present 
and developing ways to address that changing pattern o f  vulnerability w ill have to evolve, both from the 
physical ecology (i.e., the science and technology), and from the human ecology. I f  warning technology is 
dynamic, changing with time and circumstance, then this results in significant gaps in our understanding o f 
the use o f this technology.
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G l o s s a r y
* Long-Track Violent Tornado is violent on the Fujita Scale (F4/F5) and while it has no separate distance (Grazulis 1993, p. 56) it is about 
20 miles long or more.
® Tornado Alley is a vernacular region with no set boundaries. It generally includes many portions of the central third of the US. For our 
purposes, we mean the Southern Plains - home o f the largest contiguous area o f Significant Tornado frequency (See Grazulis 1996 and 
2001). Figure. 1.1 shows a contemporary version of Tornado Alley from a map courtesy of NSSL. Note that the Tornado Alley o f 
frequency is not necessarily highly-correlated to the areas of the highest fatality rates -  which depending on the data base utilized would 
clearly include the Mississippi and Ohio Valleys -  especially the states of Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, and Tennessee.
 ^ Warning Systems are ALL components o f the warning process, both human and technological, from NW S to stakeholders (users). It 
includes, but is not limited to -  Doppler Radar, NWR, TV and radio, sirens, storm spotters, elements o f EMA and public safety agencies, 
and third party (public or business) -  actions that encompass the entire spectmm of the warning process, for a given event or agent. They 
are generally formalized at least in part, however, many aspects may be informal, unofficial, and emergent (see Mileti and Sorensen 1990).
° Public Awareness implies general knowledge regarding tornado risk and safety, familiarity with warning processes, and attempts to 
secure 'warning access.' Public awareness may be gained through one's own perceptions, previous experience, via the attitudes o f others, 
or by means o f information, including public education campaigns and media exposure (See Doswell et al. 1999).
Official Period refers to the period of data recording under NWS warning programs (1953) to the present (see Doswell et al. 1999). 
Modem era refers to the Post-Doppler Period of the last two decades.
 ^ Emergency Management Agencies (EMA) -  there is no set definition -  it includes different sized agencies and organizations from 
place-to-place, but generally-those organizations charged with planning for, warning for, responding to, and mitigating potential disasters 
and mass casualty events. This may include federal, state, tribal, local, or private emergency management departments, civil defense 
authorities, public safety or police and fire departments, health or environmental departments, public works authorities, and para-military 
(e.g., American Red Cross, US Coast Guard Auxiliary, Civil A ir Patrol), or military bodies such as National Guard. A modem EMA 
operates within the aegis of an lEMS - a State Emergency Response Plan, and/or The Federal Response Plan (FEMA c.2003). While size, 
manpower, and resources all vary widely, key characteristics o f EMA are missions to plan for, and respond to, extreme events outside 
the scope of other normal day-to-day emergency services of the given jurisdiction (cf. Drabek and Hoetmer 1991).
“ Warnscape is used to denote the association o f agents and environments -  both physical and cultural -  that dictate human ecological 
circumstances and relationships o f the specific event. They including warning systems and behavioral response in relation to 
environmental and situational factors such as tomado intensity and path, shelter, time-of-day, communications infrastructures, and 
population densities, as well as other aspects of the environment.
" Warning Compliance is the public reception o f waming with subsequent attempts to undertake defensive action, within an array o f 
mitigative intentions of a waming system. More simply, it is a person’s attempt to seek shelter or lessen injury upon receipt of a valid 
official waming (see Mileti and Sorensen 1990).
' Cry W olf Effect to a waming is a phrase from Aesop’s Fable “The Shepherd Bov Who Cries Wolf,” (Gmntfest and Carsell 2000) and 
is used to describe a lack o f reception o f wamings or efforts to comply with them owing to a desensitization from too many previous false 
alarms (See Breznitz 1984; Drabek 1986; Burnham 1992; Dow and Cutter 1998; Gruntfest and Carsell 2000).
' Confirmation Behavior is the cognitive heuristics employed in response to wamings that: overcome other ongoing activities and demands 
for attention; assess the credibility o f the waming source(s); confirm a hazard exists; personalize the risk and determine others are heeding 
the waming; determine what mitigative actions to undertake (see Mileti 1999).
False Alarms are instances when a waming for an event or hazard is issued and disseminated and said event or hazard does not occur 
at all, does not occur in the wamed area, does not occur within the time frame of the waming, or does not occur to the magnitude predicted 
(Mileti and Sorensen 1990; Gruntfest and Carsell 2000).
 ^ Close Call Event is a waming situation where the wamed event did occur, only it failed to occur in the magnitude, location, or time 
specified in the waming. Example: a tomado waming for the northem half o f county-X, whereas no tomado occurs in county-X, but a 
tomado does occur in the southem portion o f county-Y immediately north o f county-X. Technically this is a ‘false alarm’ for county-X, 
though research (Gruntfest and Carsell 2000) shows that such situations are not sociologically the same as a standard false alarm where 
no event whatsoever occurs.
“ Near-Miss Event is a hazard event that occurs with no waming, very near a given location that does have a vahd waming, or, very close 
in time to a valid waming for the same or an adjacent jurisdiction; or and event that does occur but o f a magnitude much less than 
predicted in any wamings (Gruntfest and Carsell 2000).
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Tomado Watch is issued by the SPC  when conditions are especially favorable for tornadoes. Watches encourage the general public to 
stay alert for changing weather conditions and possible wamings. For EMA, storm spotters, and the broadcast media, watches provide 
valuable lead time to gear up operations and increase staffing. Watch (one, two, three... at the beginning of each year), and have a duration 
of about four to six hours, but may be canceled, replaced, or re-issued as required. A watch is not a waming, and should not be interpreted 
as a guarantee that there will be severe weather (SPC c.2003).
° Tornado Disaster - There is no set definition with regard to death tolls or damage figures. A tomado that damages one’s neighborhood 
certainly constitutes a disaster to them. However, it is interesting to note that what is considered a tomado disaster today -  whether the 
threshold is 10 deaths or 100 million dollars -  is much lower in terms of deaths over the past century, and much higher in damages (even 
when corrected for inflation) than past eras (cf. Grazulis et al. 1998). For example, in 1925 deaths per million persons from tomadoes was 
6.95. In 2000 with an approximate population o f 300 million -  we could expect to see 2085 tomado fatalities per year! A 100 death 
tomado event, in 1925 would be the equivalent of a 800 death event today, without the declines noted in historical death rate, and as a 
partial response to waming systems (cf. Brooks and Doswell 2002).
’’ Lifetime Odds (comparative relative to tomadoes) - For reference under the same formula, consider that lifetime odds are: 1:24 for all 
forms o f extemal cause; 1:77 for any form of transportation accident; 1:328 for murder by firearm, 1:1008 for accidental drowning; 1:1062 
for exposure to smoke, fire, or flames; and 1:2503 for falling down the stairs (NSC c.2003). It is easy to see, all things considered, the 
risk for death by storm generally, and death by tomado specifically, is relatively low and may be modified considerably by choice and 
behavior.
Recurrence Interval (RI) is the period o f time elapsed (based on the mean historical data) at a given spot between tomado strikes. Or, 
the amount of time to completely cover a given area with a given RI value with tomado paths. For comparison, consider the RI o f Kansas 
(2220 yrs), Dlinois (3420), Texas (6990), and Califomia (508000). The RI for the entire state of Oklahoma is -2220 yrs (Grazulis 2001).
 ^ Significant Tomado is a significant tomado is a tomado that rates F-2 of higher on the Fujita Scale-, or has caused at least one fatality; 
or both. By eliminating weak tomadoes from the data base, much of the population bias and inaccuracies o f the climatological data base 
are smoothed or removed (Grazulis 1993).
® Skywarn Program is a storm spotter program that “is a concept developed in the early 1970s that was intended to promote a 
cooperative effort between the National Weather Service and communities. The emphasis o f  the effort is often focused on the storm  
spotter, an individual who takes a position near their community and reports wind gusts, hail size, rainfall, and cloud formations that 
could signal a developing tornado. Another part o f  SKYWARN is the receipt and effective distribution o f  National Weather Service 
information." (NWS c.2007).
 ^ Stormready Community is a joint venture o f NW S  and various local NWS  ‘certified’ communities where NW S "''helps arm America's 
communities with the communication and safety skills needed to save lives and property -  before, during and after the event. Stormready 
helps community leaders and emergency managers strengthen local safety programs" (NWS c.2007).
" Pervasive as the state tourism magazine proclaimed " Will Rogers, Tomadoes, and Phillips 6 6 -it  doesn 'tget anymore Oklahoman than 
that. " {O k l a h o m a  T o d a y  5\{\y. 45). The Oklahoma State Board of Tourism promoted the premier o f the movie T w is t e r  -  set in, and 
largely filmed in -  the State. It is likely that this movie, with its many inaccuracies and unscientific liberties, heightened public awareness 
toward the end of the 1990s, as the W iz a r d  o f  O z  was speculated to have done by in the mid-20th Century by Grazulis (2001). Richard 
Felton, in his best selling book. Th e  W o r l d 's  M o s t  D a n g e r o u s  P l a c e s  f?€ \X on  1999, p. 933), cites a study that indicated the OCT was 
the seventh most-closely followed news story in the US in 1999.
'' Weather Industry in Oklahoma refers to the concentration o f weather reporting media in the OKC Metro and, businesses, research 
institutions, and state and federal weather and climate agencies located in Norman. Among them are the WFO, the NWS Operational 
Support Facility, NSSL, SPC, Oklahoma Climate Survey, the Cooperative Institute o f  Mesoscale Meteorological Studies, and a School 
o f  Meteorology, Department o f  Geography, and the Centerfor Spatial Analysis at the University o f  Oklahoma; and the private companies 
{Weathemews, Weather Detection Systems, Qtc. {cf. Biddle 2004).
NWS Family o f  Services (FOS) refers to services and products distributed by the in the fulfillment o f its mission which is... "[to] 
provide weather, hydrologie, and climate forecasts and wamings fo r  the US, its territories, adjacent waters and ocean areas, fo r  the 
protection o f  life and property and the enhancement o f  the national economy. NWS data and products form  a national information 
database and infrastmcture which can be used by other govemmental agencies, the private sector, the public, and the global community" 
(Golden and Adams 2002).
 ^ National Weather Service (NWS) Mission - "[to] provide weather, hydrologie, and climate forecasts and wamings fo r  the US, its 
territories, adjacent waters and ocean areas, fo r  the protection o f  life and property and the enhancement ofthe national economy. NWS 
data and products form  a national information database and infrastmcture which can be used by other governmental agencies, the 
private sector, the public, and the global community" (NWS 2001).
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Fujita Scale is a damage scale named after one of its developers -  TT Fujita, University o f  Chicago — to classify tomado damage by 
inferred wind speeds. The NWS accepted the scale for use in 1973. Anything F2 or stronger, or causes one or more deaths, is' Significant’ 
(Grazulis 1993):
F-0. Light damage. Wind up to 72 mph -  “Weak”
F-1. Moderate damage. Wind 73 to 112 mph -  “Weak”
F-2. Considerable damage. Wind 113 to 157 mph -  “Strong”
F-3. Severe damage. Wind 158 to 206 mph -  “Strong”
F-4. Devastating damage. Wind 207 to 260 mph -  “Violent”
F-5. Incredible damage. Wind above 261 mph -  “Violent”
 ^ Bridge Creek is an unincorporated rural community in northem Grady County that includes a school district and volunteer fire 
department. Most residents have post office addresses in Blanchard, Newcastle, or Tuttle, and work in the OKC metropolitan area or 
Chickasha.
** Major Trauma Center as defined by OSDH (Brown et al. 2002). A “Level Three Trauma Center” is a certification from the American 
College o f Emergency Physicians and used (in 1999) for University Hospital in OKC. There is NO Level One Trauma Center in 
Oklahoma (as of 2007) and the nearest one is Parkland Hospital in Dallas, Texas.
Convective Outlook has severe weather forecasted (in Day 1,2, and 3 formats) containing the area(s) o f expected thunderstorm 
occurrence, and expected severity over the contiguous US, issued several times daily by the SPC. The terms slight risk, moderate risk, 
and high risk, are used to describe severe thunderstorm potential o f 2 to 5, 5 to 10, and >10 % of the area (SPC c.2003).
W aming for reference, the A m e r ic a n  H e r i t a g e  D ic t io n a r y  o f  t h e  E n g l is h  L a n g u a g e  (Houghton-Mifflin 2000) summarized 
definition is that a waming is "‘An intimation, threat, or sign o f  impending danger or evil; Advice to beware; A cautionary or deterrent 
example; Something,such as a signal, that warns." In the NWS and severe weather context, it refers to the products issued by a WFO 
for a threatening phenomena (e.g., tomado (TOR) or severe thimderstorm (SVR) when the phenomena is observed to be occurring, has 
been detected, or is expected to occur. They are intended to save lives and protect property and are usually valid for a county or portion 
o f a county, and for 30 min to 60 min (NWS c.2003c).
°° Sunset for Moore (near the path mid-point) on 3 May 1999 was at 0017 UTC 4 May 1999 (2017 CDT 3 May 1999). The entire life 
o f the OCT was during aftemoon and evening daylight.
Inexperienced means that “the uninformed, misinformed, unconcemed, very young, very old, hearing-impaired, sight-impaired, 
immobile, inebriated, preoccupied and foolish will always be with us.” (Grazulis et al. 1998)
-102-
A c r o n y m s
X B -  X billion 
X M -  X million
AGOG -  Association o f Central Oklahoma Governments 
ALT -  Average Lead Time (NW S)
AMS -  American M eteorology Society
ARC -  ARkansas O utbreak
BHM -  BirmingHaM  outbreak
CDT -  Central Daylight Time
CRH -  Central Region Headquarters (NW S)
CTA -  Call-To-Action (NW S)
DOC -  D epartm ent O f Commerce 
DOD -  Departm ent O f Defense 
EAS -  Emergency Alert Systems 
EMA -  Emergency M anagem ent Agencies 
FAR -  False Alarm Ratio (NW S)
FEM A -  Federal Emergency M anagem ent Agency 
FLO -  central FLorida Outbreak 
FOS -  Family O f Services (NW S)
GIS -  Geographic Information System
GPS -  Global Positioning System
HW O -  H azardous W am ing Outlook (NW S)
IT -  Information Technology
lEM S -  Integrated Emergency M anagem ent System
IWS -  Integrated W arning System
KW TV -  KW TV channel 9, (OKC, OK).
MAR -  M odernization And Restructuring (NW S)
MM H -  M obile and M anufactured Homes
MOS - M odel Output Statistics
NAW AS -  N Ational W Arning System
NSC -  National Safety Council
N EPA  -  N orthEast Path Area
NEXRAD -  N EX t generation RAD ar (NW S)
NOAA -  N ational Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NRC -  N ational Research Council
NSSL -  National Severe Storms Laboratory
NSTC -  National Science and Technology Council
NW R -  NOAA W eather Radio (NW S)
NW S -  N ational W eather Service (NW S)
OCCVB -  Oklahoma City Convention and Visitors Bureau
OCFD -  Oklahoma City Fire Departm ent
OCM E -  Office o f the C hief M edical Examiner
OCS -  Oklahoma Climatological Survey
OCT -  Oklahoma City Tornado
OCT A -  Oklahoma City Tax A ssessor’s office
ODOT -  Oklahoma Departm ent O f Transportation
OKC -  O Klahoma City
OSDH -  O klahom a State D epartm ent o f Health 
OUN -  N orm an W eather Forecast Office (NW S)
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PDS -  Potentially Damaging Situation (SPC/NW S)
POD -  Probability O f Detection (NW S)
PPW  -  Partnership for Public W arning
PRC -  Pew Research Center
PSO -  (2"^) Palm Sunday Outbreak
RI -  Recurrence Interval
ROC -  Radar Operational Center (NW S)
RV -  Recreational Vehicle
SAME -  Specific Area M essage Encoding
SELS -  SEvere Local Storm unit (NW S)
SPC -  Storm Prediction Center (NW S)
SYS -  Severe W eather Statement (NW S)
SWO -  Severe W eather O utlook (SPC/NW S)
SWPA -  S outhw est Path Area 
TV -  Television 
TAFB -  Tinker A ir Force Base 
TOR -  TORnado w am ing (NW S)
UCAR -  University Corporation o f Atmospheric Research
US -  U nited States
USAF -  United States A ir Force
USBC -  U nited States Bureau o f the Census
USD A -  United States Departm ent o f Agriculture
UTC -  U niversal Time Corrected
W FO -  W eather Forecast Office (NW S)
W FT -  W ichita Falls, Texas outbreak
W SR-88D -  W eather Service Radar 1988 D series (NW S)
W W T -  Tornado W atch (SPC/NW S)
W W P -  W atch and W am ing Program (NW S)
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A p p e n d i x  A  -  T h e  S u r v e y  I n s t r u m e n t




SURVEY FORM - 1999.0KLA OUTBREAK
Date % - Interviewer . CODE
PERSON INTERVIEWED 
LOCATION
STORM LOCATION (Address/^///ni Business/Schooi/Other?)
o F s " PHONE
Alternate Address/Contact
O CC U PA N TS ON IM PACT (Race/Age/Sex/Namc)
BRIEF SU M M A RY  OF ACTIONS
Location on impact:  _________________________
S T R U C T U R E  T Y P E  (Style/Floors/Roof7Construction/ShcIter)
In juries N / Y /  U /  Fatalities N /  Y (info)_____________________________ D A M A G E I - none 12 -
m issiles or shingles /  3 - m inor ro o f o r garage /  4 - m ajor roo f /  S • roof gone /  6 - wall dam age /  7  - m ajor wall damage
/  8 - collapsed /  9  - blown away /  0 - O ther /  U - unknown or c le a re d  Est F - S c â l c ____________
WARNING INFO____________________________________________
W ARNING Y /  N / SO ' ! ^ E :  (CIRCt E O NE W ACCESS TO) 0 - none /  1 - heard/saw H .  siren 
■*/3 ' ■adlo / 4 - N W R /'5 ^ ÿ 7 an n e r •21'  ^p e r s o n '^  phone /  8 - com p./pager>9 T V  /  0 - other
' PRIMARY WARNING So Cr CE _________  TIME________
SECONDARY WARNING SOURCE___________ TIME____________
A W A R E OF W A TCH ? Y /  N - SELF ASSESSED WX AW ARENESS (1-5)__________________
SELF A SSESSED  W ARNING 9 (1-5)________________WHAT WOULD HAVE M ADE WRN
B IT T E R '’
100 Easl BoyO. SEC Norman. Oklahoma 73019 1007 PHONE, (405) 325-5325 PAX, (405) 325-6090
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A p p e n d i x  B  - I R B  L e t t e r  -
The University o f Oklahoma
OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PARTICIPANT PROTECTION
IRB Num ber; 11012 
C ategory: 4 




100 E. Boyd Street. SEC 684D 
Norman, OK 73019
Dear Mr Biddle;
RE: W arning R ecep tion , R esp o n se , and  Risk in th e  3 May 1999 O klahom a City Long- 
T rack  V iolent T o rnado : A s se s s m e n t from  a H istorical P ersp ec tiv e  an d  Im plications fo r 
F u tu re  D isa s te rs  a n d  M itigation P ro g ram s
On behalf of the Institutional Review Board (IRB), I have reviewed the above-referenced 
research project and determined that it meets the criteria in 45 CFR 46, as amended, for 
exemption from IRB review You may proceed with the research as proposed. Please note 
that any changes in the protocol will need to be submitted to the IRB for review as changes 
could affect this determination of exempt status. Also note that you should notify the IRB 
office when this project is completed, so we can remove it from our files
If you have any questions or need additional information, please do not hesitate to call the 
IRB office at (405) 325-8110 or send an email to irbtgou edu.
Conjially
E Laurette Taylor, Ph,[
Chair, Institutional Review Board
L tr_ P ro t_ F a p p v _ X
660 Parhngton O val. Suite 3 t6 , N o rn ian . O k la h o m a  73019-3085 PHONE (405) 325-8110 FAX (4051325-2373
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A p p e n d i x  C  -  T o r n a d o  W a y p o i n t  A n a l y s i s  -
The beginning and ending points along the track are given by )
is given by
. The equation o f the straight line connecting them
which can be rearranged to give
Z Z l ± =
X-X i ,
/  \  
y  à - y é
m
\ X ^  -  X f J _
= f z i Z
U j -
= m x + b
~ U .
x^
b = - m x ^ + y ^
We will use the latitude and longitude of the points as Cartesian coordinates -  a fairly good approximation over the distances 
involved along this tornado traek, but we’ll move the “origin” o f  our Cartesian coordinate to the beginning point o f  the track. Hence, 
we will use the transformed coordinates:
such that
x'i = X i -  Xf =0, j f$ = y i - y »  = 0 
From here on, we’ll drop the 0 ’ notation, but it will be understood that this is the transformed Cartesian coordinate system.
As shown in Fig. A l, the points along the actual track can depart some distance from the simple straight line track connecting the 
beginning and end points. But if the point is to determine the approximate time when the tornado was closest to that survey participant’s 
location, this simplified scheme should not be too much in error (no more than a few minutes), even in absolute terms. In relative terms 







X' c o o r d i n a t e
0.4 0.5 0.6
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Figure A l. A plot of the survey participant locations in the coordinate system. The dashed line is connects the beginning
and ending points; the thin line is perpendicular to the track, passing through one o f the waypoints, and the red circle locates the 
intersection, representing the time when the tornado was closest to that waypoint.
Assume that the tornado moves at a constant speed along the line connecting the beginning and ending points. That would be the 
average speed given by the distance traveled divided by the time to move from the beginning of the track to the end, C, which is 
given by
so the position as a function o f time along the straight-line path is given by
X ( f ) = X ( f , ) - F C ( f - f , )
W e’re given locations for the survey participants (our points) that do not generally lie along the line connecting the beginning and ending 
points -  the actual tornado track was not a  straight line. A detailed analysis o f the actual tornado arrival times along the complicated track 
is not possible, so we’re making some approximations, but as noted above, this method is sufficient for our purposes. Moreover, the points 
are not all within the damage path and many of them are known only approximately.
Given a particular waypoint )  ,a  line perpendicular to the simple line (our approximate track) connecting the beginning and ending
points of the tornado, has a slope m given by the negative reciprocal of the approximate track’s s lo j-1 /m  ). The equation of a line
with this slope passing through the point in question is
y  = m ( x -  = m x + Q r j -m X j )=  mx + b
where b = y j - m X j  . The point at which those two lines intersect must simultaneously satisfy the following:
y = m x + b  and  y  = m x + b
Therefore, substitution from the first into the second gives
mx +b= mx +b
Solving for the x-coordinate gives
(  b - b ^ -
X  = j
and they-coordinate can be obtained by back-substitution into y  = mx + 6  . This is the point on the approximate track that is "closest”
to the location o f  the siuvey participant. However, for our purposes, we don’t need both the coordinates. We can use only thex-coordinate 
average velocity to find the time to that point on the track according to the following procedure: given the coordinates o f the point in
question and knowing the equation for the line in J? = BIAT+& , we can del , J '  ^  ^  e coordinates
where the line is closest to the point in question, using the formulae above. Using either of these coordinates, say x ; , we can find the
time by solving the equation , which means that
7^!
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P P E N D
IX D-
C l e v e
Cleveland County 
Survey Points
L A N D
COUN
SURVE
P o i n t
0 0,5 1 2 Km
'  t  n  I  I  I  ]  .  1
0 0 .9 ,11  2 Mi





May 3rd Path - F-Scale
Cleveland County
À
Map of Cleveland County Survey Points. Map by D. Howard, B. 
McPherson, M. Biddle, and M. Scott-Brown. Copyright.
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Map of Oklahoma County Survey Points. Map by D. Howard, B. 
McPherson, M. Biddle, and M. Scott-Brown. Copyright.
-118-
A p p e n d i x  F - SPC a n d  NWS -OCN B u l l e t i n s  -
ZCZC MKCSHOOYl 0 0 0  
A CUSl KHKC 0 2 1 2 4 8  
OMKC AC 0 2 ) 2 4 7
CONVECTIVE O U TLO O K .. .R E F  AFOS NMCGFH940.
VALID  0 2 1 3 0 0 E  •  0 3 1 2 0 0 E
THERE I S  A SLOT R IS K  OF 8VR TSTMS TO THE RIGHT OF A L IN E  FROM 
2 5  CSE CRP 3 5  MNM LRD . . . C O N T . . .  ORT CS NH ABI 6 0  SSM GAG
4 0  HNM GAG 4 0  NNH GCK 30  ENE GLD 2 5  SH MCK 3 5  NHM HLC 4 5  ENE HLC
3 5  NH HUT 10  ENE END 3 0  N ADM 30 SN FTH 3 0  HNH TPL 2 5  SSH T P L
4 0  S CLL 3 0  HSN HOU 3 5  ENE PSX 25  ESE PSX .
GEN TSTMS ARE FCST TO THE RIGHT OF A L IN E  FROM 40 NNH IN L  4 5  E BRO 
2 5  SE  C ID  35 E J E F  10  ENE UNO 5 0  SSM 7R4 . . .C O N T .. .  3 5  NH ORT 
4 0  MNM CDS 5 5  NE AMA 2 5  W LBL 15 S 4 L J  4 5  SM PUB 4 5  HE ORO 
3 5  E 4HV 15 SH OPG 6 0  N ENV 15  SSE SUN 35  S S E  2?U  35 HNH OLN 
3 5  SE  HLN 2 5  ENE 3HT 1 0  SSH GGN 25  SE  OLF 4 0  NH tS N  6 5  NNH IS N .
- - -  SY N O PSIS - - -
OMEGA BLOCK M ILL CONTINUE TO ERODE. W ELL-DEFINED CYCLONE ALOFT AND 
ASSOCIATED SHORTWAVE TROUGH NOW MOVING ACROSS ERN CO/WRN OK/NW TX 
W ILL DEAMPLIFY AS IT  L IF T S  NNEWD ACROSS CENTRAL PLA IN S TODAY. 
S T IL L .. .B A N D  OF LARGE-SCALE D ESTA B ILIZA TIO N  TO IT S  ENE W ILL RESULT 
IN  SOMEWHAT STEEPENED LAPSE RATES AMD ENHANCED SUPPORT FOR 
CONVECTION. SECONDARY SHORTWAVE TROUGH - -  INDICATED BY MOISTURE 
CHANNEL IMAGERY OVER NWRN N H . . APPEARS TO BE BEST RESOLVED BY AVN 
BUT IS  ALSO EVIDENT IN  ETA. T H IS TROUGH IS  FORECAST TO MOVE END 
ACROSS TX PANHANDLE AND PORTIONS NW T X ...A G A IN  INCREASING LARGE- 
SCALE ASCENT T H IS  AFTERNOON/EVENING OVER NW TX AND WRN OK.
AT SU R FA C E .. ORYLINE I S  NOW ANALYZED FROM SERN CO SEND TO NERN TX 
PANHANDLE. . .  THEN GENERALLY SSHWD ALONG CAPROCK TO E O F MAF AND H OF 
S J T .  D IFFU SE  WARN FRONT EXTENDS FROM JU ST S S JT  ESEWD TOWARD UPPER 
TX C O A S T .. -WHOSE B A R O C LIN IC ITY  AND IN S T A B IL IT Y  GRADIENT ARE BEING 
AT LEAST TEMPORARILY REINFORCED BY SRN PORTION OF CONVECTIVE ARC 
ASSOCIATED WITH LEAD SHORTWAVE TROUGH. ORYLINE SHOULD MIX EHD 
SOMEWHAT OFF CAPROCK TOWARD lO O W ...W H IL E  FRONT MOVES NWD FASTER 
OVER CENTRAL TX THAN S E  TX .
.. .S E V E R E  THUNDERSTORM FORECAST D IS C U S S IO N ...
- - -  S-CENTRAL PLA IN S TO S TX - - -
NARROW HEDGE OF RELATIVELY HIGH BOUNDARY LAYER THETAE IS  IN D ICA TED  
INVOF A M ERIDIONAL A X IS  S O F S J T .  THETAE SHOULD ADVECT NWD TODAY 
ACROSS OUTLOOK AREA IN  WAKE O F EARLY HORNING CONVECTION. . .  HELPING 
TO D E S T A B IL IZ E  A IR  MASS IN  A NARROW CORRIDOR FROM NW TX AT LEAST 
IN TO  SH O K .. .A N D  P O SS IB L Y  IN T O  H-CEHTRAL K S. RICHER M OISTURE 
RETURN AND ASSOCIATED HIGH MLCAPE BECOME LESS PROBABLE WITH NWD 
E X T E N T .. .BECAUSE O F IN F IL T R A T IO N  OF COOLER TR A JEC TO R IES WITH LOWER 
M IXING RA TIO S FROM ERN O K /ER N  KS. CONVECTIVE DEBRIS CLOUDS SHOULD 
MOVE EHD ENOUGH SUCH THAT BOUNDARY LAYER SHOULD HAVE TIM E TO HEAT 
WELL THROUGHOUT DAY OVER MOST OF SAME CORRIDOR.
- 1 1 9 -
THERE W ILL BE SOME CAPPING AND SUBSIDENCE IN WAKE OF EARLY SHORT 
WAVE. HOW EVER.. .C IN  IS  NOT EXPECTED TO BE REINFORCED MUCH BY 
ELEVATED M IXED-LAYER A IR  FROM THE HIGH P L A IN S . . .  S IN C E  THE SOURCE 
REGION HAS BEEN MOIST AND POORLY HEATED THE PAST COUPLE DAYS. 1 2 Z  
MAF/AMA RAOBS SUPPORT T H IS  SCENARIO.
AFTERNOON SUPERCELL DEVELOPMENT PO SSIB L E  NEAR ORYLINE E S PE C IA L L Y  
ACROSS O K /T X ...M I T H  ORGANIZED MULTICELL HAILSTORM FORMATION 
EXPECTED FARTHER N. DAMAGING HAIL AND SEVERE GUSTS L IK E L Y  WITH 
hO ST  SU PE R C E L L S. EXPECT MANY STORMS TO BECOME H EA V Y -PR E C IP IN  
CHARACTER AND OUTFLOW-DOMINANT RELATIVELY SOON IN  T H E IR  L IF E  CYCLES 
OWING TO WEAKNESSES IN  SR A N V IL-LEV EL FLOW AND PO TEN TIA L FOR 
SEED IN G  BY UPSTREAM A C T IV IT Y . HOWEVER.. .THERE MAY BE A B R IE F  
WINDOW OF TORNAOIC POTENTIAL WITH A FEW OF THE SU PE R C E L L S. . . 
PARTICULARLY INVOF DRYLINE/OUTFLOW OR DRYLINE/WARM FRONT 
IN T E R S E C T IO N S .
LATEST SURFACE ANALYSES AND S E R IE S  OF FORECAST HODOGRAPHS IN D IC A T E S 
RELATIVE MAXIMUM IN  TORNADO THREAT MAY DEVELOP OVER PO RTION S W- 
CENTRAL AND MW T X ...B U T  THERE ARE S T IL L  TOO MANY MESOSCALE 
UN CER TA IN TIES AND L IM IT S  TO PROGGED SR MID LEVEL FLOW FOR A MDT 
R IS K . PROGGED LOW-MID LEVEL SR FLOW IS  MAXIMIZED OVER T H IS  AREA N 
1 8 Z - 0 0 Z  TIM E FR A M E ...A N D  LOW LEVEL C O NV ERG EN CE/IN FLO W /V O RTICITY  MAY 
BE AUGMENTED BY FRONT/OUTFLOW.
A T T M .. . I T  APPEARS THAT CONVECTION MAY EVOLVE AFTER DARK INTO TWO 
MAIN AREAS - -  ONE MOVING EHD-NEHD ACROSS K S/O K /N -C EN T R A L T X . . AND 
ANOTHER ESEWD INVOF FRONT TOWARD TX COAST.
..E D W A R D S .. 0 5 / 0 2 / 9 9
NNNN
0
ZCZC MKCSW0DY2 0 0 0  
ACUS2 KHKC 0 2 1 7 0 4  
CMKC AC 0 2 1 7 0 4
2ND DAY CONVECTIVE OUTLOOK. . .  REF AFOS NMCGPH980.
V A LID  0 3 1 2 0 0 Z  -  0 4 1 2 0 0 Z
THERE IS  A SLGT R ISK  OF SVR TSTMS TO THE RIGHT OF A L IN E  FROM 3 5  NW 
HDO 45 N ORT 3 0  ESE BCS 2 0  WNW CSM 2 0  E SE RSL 35 SSH B IE  10  NW FLV 
2 0  SE JLN  2 5  N TYR 30 E AUS 35  NW HDO.
GEN TSTMS ARE FCST TO THE RIGHT OF A L IN E  FROM 3 5  ESE IN L  20  NNE
M LI 2 5  NNE ALN 4 0  W UOX 35  SW HUM . . . C O N T . . .  2 0  E CRP 3 0  NW LRD 
. . . C O N T . . .  7 0  SW P07 3 5  NNW BGS 2 5  NNW CDS 2 0  ESE LBL 3 5  N CAO 30 
S E  4SL 50  ESE PGA 25  NE U24 4 5  WNW P IN  3 5  NW BKE 10  NW A ST .
U PPER LEVEL SHORTWAVE TROUGH CURRENTLY OVER THE SOUTHERN AND 
CENTRAL PLA IN S WILL CONTINUE TO L IF T  NORTHEASTWARD TO D A Y .. .W HILE 
ANOTHER TROUGH OVER THE P A C IF IC  NORTHWEST COAST D IGS SOUTHEAST INTO
THE INTERMOUNTAIN REGION DURING THE DAY 2 PERIOD. A LONGWAVE
TROUGH PATTERN IS  FORECAST TO DEVELOP ACROSS THE WESTERN TW O-THIRDS
- 1 2 0 -
OF THE NATION BY LATE MONDAY AFTERNOON. . .  WHI LE A MAIN SHORTWAVE 
TROUGH I S  EXPECTED TO MOVE THROUGH THE MEAN TROUGH INTO THE ROCKIES 
DURING THE LATTER HALF OF THE PERIOD. AT THE S U R F A C E ... A WEAK AREA 
OF LOW PRESSURE IS  EXPECTED TO REMAIN OVER PORTIONS OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
DURING THE ENTIRE PE R IO D .
. . .SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL P L A IN S .. .
A ORYLINE W ILL LIKELY BECONE ESTABLISHED ACROSS THE PLA IN S STA TES 
FROM WESTERN NEBRASKA SOUTHWARD INTO THE B IG  BEND REGION O f  TEX A S. 
IN  THE ABSENCE OF A STRONG SHORTWAVE TROUGH MOVING THROUGH THE 
P L A I N S . . .T H E  DRYLINE SHOULD MIX EASTWARD DURING THE D A Y .. .TH EN  
RETREAT WESTWARD AT N IG H T. H ID  LEVEL FLOW I S  EXPECTED TO BE 
SOMEWHAT WEAKER THAN THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS AS THE LOW THAT HAD BEEN 
OVER THE SOUTHWESTERN STATES MOVES INTO THE GREAT LAKES R EG IO N . 
HOWEVER.. .FORECAST SOUNDINGS CONTINUE TO SHOW STRONGLY VEERING 
WINDS D E S P IT E  THE SLIGHTLY WEAKER WINDS AT H ID  LE V EL S. THE 
RESULTING WINDS SHOULD S T IL L  BE FAVORABLE FOR SOME ROTATION AS 
STORMS DEVELOP DURING THE AFTERNOON HOURS.
THE GULF SHOULD BEGIN TO OPEN UP LATER T O N IG H T ...A L L O W IN G  M OISTURE 
TO RETURN ACROSS THE SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL P L A IN S . DEWPOINTS ARE 
LIKELY TO CLIMB INTO THE 6 0 S  POSSIBLY AS FAR NORTH AS SOUTHERN 
KANSAS BY LATE AFTERNOON. DEPENDING ON THE AMOUNT OF CLOUD D EBR IS 
FROM OVERNIGHT CONVECTION. . .  SURFACE BASED CAPE VALUES W ILL LIK ELY  
REACH 3 0 0 0  TO 3 5 0 0  J /K G  ACROSS SOUTHERN PORTIONS OF THE OUTLOOK 
AREA TO PERHAPS 2 0 0 0  TO 3 0 0 0  J /K G  IN THE NORTH. THUNDERSTORMS W ILL 
REDEVELOP IN  THE V IC IN IT Y  OF THE ADVANCING ORYLINE ACROSS WEST 
TEXAS. . -WESTERN OKLAHOMA. . .  AND WESTERN KANSAS. THESE STORMS SHOULD 
MOVE EASTWARD OFF THE DRYLINE INTO CENTRAL AND PERHAPS EASTERN 
PORTIONS OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED STA TES. WIND FIE L D S SUGGEST THERE 
IS  A LIKELIHOOD FOR ISOLATED SUPERCELLS FROM KANSAS INTO OKLAHOMA 
. . .A N D  SCATTERED SUPERCELLS ACROSS TEXAS. LARGE H A IL . . .  DAMAGING 
G U S T S .. AND ISOLATED TORNADOES ARE ALL PO SS IB L E  WITH SOME O F THESE 
STORMS .
. . R E H B E I N . . 0 5 / 0 2 / 9 9
NNNN
0
ECZC HKCSHODYl 0 0 0  
A CUSl KMKC 0 2 1 9 3 3  
OMKC AC 0 2 1 9 3 3
CONVECTIVE OUTLOOK. . .  REF AFOS NMCGPH940.
VALID 0 2 2 0 0 0 Z  - 0 3 1 2 0 0 Z
THERE I S  A SLGT R ISK  OF SVR TSTMS TO THE RIGHT OF A LINE FROM 4 0  W
END 2 5  SW DDC 50  NNE GCK 30 NE HLC 25  SW CNK 2 5  SW EMP 25  SN BVO 40
W END.
THERE I S  A SLGT R ISK  OF SVR TSTMS TO THE RIGHT OF A LINE FROM 35  S
SAT 5 0  SSW JC T  4 0  SW ABI 30  S LTS 45 WSW ADM 35  SSE DAL 30  E S E  AUS
3 5  9  SA T .
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GEN TSTMS ARE FCST TO THE RIGHT OF A L IN E  FROM 4 0 WNW IN L 2 5 SE  C ID  
10 ENE UNO 2 0  SW 1R4 . .  .CONT. . .  35 ENE CRP 35 NW LRD . . .CO N T. . . DRT
15 NNW CDS 3 0  SE LBL 15 SW LHX 45 NE ORO 35 E 4HV 15  SW DPG 6 0  N
ENV 35 SS E  21U  25  E LWT 5 0  NNW IS N .
EARLY AfTCRNOON SURFACE ANALYSIS SHOWS A DRYLINE EXTENDING ACROSS 
PORTIONS O F WESTERN KANSAS. . .  THROUGH EXTREME WESTERN O K LA H O M A ... 
INTO THE B IG  BEND AREA OF TEXAS. LATEST V IS IB L E  IMAGERY SHOWS 
EXTENSIVE CLOUDINESS WELL AHEAD OF THE DRYLINE FROM CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN KANSAS THROUGH EASTERN OKLAHOMA INTO CENTRAL TEXAS. T H IS  
CLOUD COVER HAS SEVERELY L IM ITED  SURFACE HEATING AND 
D EST A B IL IZ A T IO N  THROUGH EARLY AFTERNOON. S K IE S  BECOME PARTLY TO 
MOSTLY CLOUDY ACROSS WESTERN KANSAS AND WESTERN OKLAHOMA.. . AND 
NEARLY CLEAR ACROSS NORTHWEST TEXAS. SURFACE DEW POINTS HAVE 
REMAINED IN  THE LOW 6 0 S  ACROSS WESTERN AND CENTRAL OKLAHOMA AND 
TEXAS. WHERE THERE HAS BEEN C L E A R IN G .. THE ATMOSPHERE HAS BECOME 
VERY UNSTABLE. HOW EVER.. .T H IS  HAS BEEN A RATHER NARROW A X IS  FROM 
THE BIG BEND AREA OF TEXAS TO NEAR ALTUS OKLAHOMA. SURFACE BASED 
CAPE VALUES IN  T H IS  AREA ARE CURRENTLY RUNNING IN  THE 1 5 0 0  TO 3 0 0 0  
J /K G  RANGE.
CUMULUS HAS BEGUN TO DEVELOP ALONG AND JU S T  AHEAD OF THE DRYLINE 
ACROSS SOUTHWEST KANSAS AND WESTERN OKLAHOMA. HOW EVER.. . THE 
DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN RATHER SHALLOW .. .SU G G ESTIN G  THE AIRMASS IS  
S T IL L  C A PPE D . EARLY AFTERNOON SOUNDING FROM NORMAN CONFIRMS THE 
PRESENCE OF A CAPPING IN V ER SIO N . A D D ITIO N A LLY . . .  CONVERGENCE ALONG 
THE DRYLINE REMAINS RATHER LIM ITED  ACROSS THE SOUTHERN OUTLOOK 
A R E A ...B U T  THE CAP I S  SOMEWHAT WEAKER IN T H IS  AREA. IT  APPEARS 
THAT THE GREATEST CONVERGENCE ALONG THE DRYLINE HAS BEEN CONFINED 
TO THE KANSAS AREA. AT T H IS  T I M E . . . I T  APPEARS THE GREATEST 
POTENTIAL FOR SEVERE THUNDERSTORM DEVELOPMENT W ILL REMAIN ACROSS 
WESTERN AND CENTRAL KANSAS/NORTH CENTRAL AND NORTHWEST OKLAHOMA AS 
WELL AS PARTS OF WEST AND CENTRAL TEXAS. THE KANSAS AREA HAS THE 
GREATEST LOW TO MID LEVEL FORCING WHILE THE TEXAS AREA IS  LESS 
CAPPED AND HAS GREATER IN S T A B IL IT Y . IT  APPEARS THE PRIMARY THREAT 
ACROSS KANSAS WILL LIKELY BE FROM LARGE H A IL .  WIND F IE L D S ACROSS 
THE TEXAS AREA E X H IB IT  STRONG VEERING P R O F IL E S ...F A V O R A B L E  FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT O F SU PE R C E LL S. FOR THAT R E A S O N ...T H E  SOUTHERN AREA HAS 
POTENTIAL FOR LARGE H A IL . . .  DAMAGING G U S T S .. .A N D  PERHAPS ISOLA TED  
TORNADOES.
. .R E H B E I N . . 0 5 / 0 2 / 9 9
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0
- 1 2 2 -
I C I Z  MKCSWODYl 0 0 0  
ACUSl KMKC 0 ) 0 0 4  5 
OMKC AC 0 3 0 0 4  5
CONVECTIVE O U TLOO K .. .R E F  AFOS NMCGPH940.
VA LID  0 3 0 1 0 0 2  -  0 3 1 2 0 0 2
THERE I S  A SLGT R ISK  OF SVR TSTMS TO THE RIGHT O F A L IN E  FROM 
2 5  HE LNK 30  ENE MHK 15 E IC T 2 5  SE P29 5 0  S DDC 2 0  SN DDC 
3 5  S RSL 2 5  N CNK BBH 3 0  E ANN 50  N YKN 3 0  NE OFK 2 5  HE LNK.
GEN TSTMS ARE FCST TO THE RIGHT OF A LIN E FROM 3 5  SSW PSX 10  SH DAL 
4 0  N ADM 15  ENE LBL PUB 15 E CAG 15 MSN COD LWT 6 0  NNE GGH 
. . .C O N T .. .  60  NNW DVL 30  W STC 25  SW OTH 15 NNE L I T  3 0  NNE E S F  
2 0  SW 7 R 4 .
. . .S E V E R E  THUNDERSTORM FORECAST D IS C U S S IO N ...
WEAKENING UPPER SYSTEM MOVING ACROSS NEB AT T H IS  TIM E W ILL CONTINUE 
L IF T IN G  NWD ACROSS THE NRN PLAINS TONIGHT. . WHILE ANOTHER STRONGER 
SYSTEM D IG S SEND INTO THE 1 NTERMOUNTAIN WEST. WEAKENING SYSTEM HAS 
M AINTAINED SEVERE STORMS INCLUDING A FEW TORNAOIC SUPERCELLS INTO 
S-CEN TRA L NEB OVER THE PAST FEW H O U R S .. W ITHIN MARGINALLY UNSTABLE 
A IR  H A SS. HOWEVER AS THE SUN SETS AND THE LOW LEVEL A IR  MASS 
S T A B I L I Z E S . . .EXPECT SEVERE THREAT TO GRADUALLY END. U N T IL  
T H E N .. .EV EN IN G  SOUNDINGS AND VHPS YIELD S U F F IC IE N T  DEEP LAYER SHEAR 
AND LOW LEVEL VEERING FOR ISOLATED SUPERCELLS AND PO SSIB LY  ANOTHER 
TORNADO OR TWO INTO PARTS OF CENTRAL NEB.
T A IL  END OF T H IS  SHORTWAVE TROUGH APPEARED TO BE SUPPORTING 
ISO LA TED  THUNDERSTORMS INTO SWRM KS R EC EN T LY .. AND T H IS  FORCING 
W ILL S H IF T  ENEWD INTO MID 5 0 F  SURFACE DEW PO IN T S OVER CENTRAL KS 
OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF HOURS. THEREFORE. . .  ISOLATED SEVERE 
H A IL/W IN D  MAY ACCOMPANY ANY STORMS WHICH DEVELOP INVOF DRY L IN E / 
SURFACE TROUGH INTO CENTRAL K S .
. .  GENERAL THUNDERSTORM FORECAST D IS C U S S IO N .. .
E L SE W H E RE .. .ISO L A T E D  CONVECTION SHOULD CONTINUE THROUGH THE PERIOD 
W ITH IN  REGION O F COLD H ID  LEVEL TEMPERATURES FROM THE ROCKIES INTO 
THE NRN PL A IN S . AS LOW LEVEL J E T  DEVELOPS ACROSS THE SRN P L A IN S . . 
CONVECTION MAY ALSO FORM INTO PARTS OF ERN OK/M O/KS/W RN AR LATER 
TO N IG H T. CONVERGENCE ALONG DRY LIN E HAS BEEN WEAK AND SHOULD 
REMAIN WEAK OVERNIGHT WITH SLOW WWD MOVEMENT . WHICH W ILL L IM IT  
PO TEN TIA L FOR THUNDERSTORMS ALONG IT  TONIGHT.




Z C Z C  HKCSHODYl 0 0 0  
ACUSl KMKC 0 3 0 5 5 5  
OMKC AC 0 3 0 5 5 5
CONVECTIVE O U T L O O K .. .R E F  AFOS NM CGPH940.
V ALID  0 3 1 2 0 0 Z  -  0 4 1 2 0 0 Z
THERE I S  A SLGT R ISK  OF SVR TSTMS TO THE RIGHT O F A L IN E  FROM SAT 
4 0  WSW S J T  1 5  H CDS 2 0  NH DDC 40  NH CNK 20  NNH FNB 35 NE MKC 
5 0  SSH SZ L FSM GGG SAT.
THERE I S  A SLGT R IS K  OF SVR TSTMS TO THE RIGHT OF A L IN E  FROM
4 0  SH 9V 9 2 0  NH MHN 30  SE  CDR 25  ENE RAP 2 0  ESE Y22 2 5  S B IS
4 0  HNH ABB 4 0  SW 9V 9:
GEN TSTMS ARE FCST TO THE RIGHT O F A L IN E  FROM 3 5  ESE INL
2 0  NNE M LI 2 5  NNE ALN 4 0  H UOX 35  SH HUM . . .C O N T .. .  2 0  E CRP
30  NH LRD . . .C O N T .. .  50  ESE POT 2 0  ENE MAF 15  SS E  PVW 25 NNE AMA
5 0  NW TCC 15  ENE ABO 50 ESE PGA 10 WSW U24 35 SSE THF 65 W 27U
90  ENE 6 3 S .
. . .S E V E R E  THUNDERSTORM FORECAST D IS C U S S IO N .. .
WEAKENING U PPE R  LOW H IL L  CONTINUE L IF T IN G  NWD ACROSS THE NRN PL A IN S 
EARLY IN  THE P E R I O D .. . A S  DEEP TROUGHI NG ACROSS THE ROCKIES BECOMES 
THE DOMINANT FEATURE THROUGH THE P E R IO D .  MODELS CONSISTENT IN 
S H IF T IN G  NOSE OF MID LEVEL SPEED MAX AND ASSOCIATED TROUGH AXIS 
INTO THE SRN PL AINS BY LATE IN THE P E R I O D . . .WITH FAIRLY IL L -D E F IN E D  
SURFACE FEATURES THROUGH MUCH OF THE AFTERNOON.
. . .SR N  P L A IN S . . .
DRY LIN E WAS ALREADY RETREATING WWD INTO WRN KS/E RN TX PANHANDLE.. .  
WITH DEEP BOUNDARY LAYER MOISTURE EAST OF T H IS  FROM TX INTO PARTS 
OF KS AT T H I S  TIM E .  GIVEN HEIGHT FALLS REMAINING OVER THE ROCKIES 
AHEAD OF UPPER TROUGH . . .  THERE SHOULD BE LIT T L E  EHD MOVEMENT TO DRY 
L IN E  DURING THE AFTERNOON. PRIMARY CONVECTIVE POTENTIAL ACROSS 
MUCH OF THE SRN PLA IN S SHOULD BE THROUGH THE EVENING/OVERNIGHT AS 
U PPER SYSTEM L IF T S  E H D ...A N D  LOW LEVEL CONVERGENCE INCREASES AS 
SURFACE TROUGH/DRY L IN E  MOVES INTO CENTRAL O K /T X . ISOLATED 
THUNDERSTORMS SHOULD B EG IN  DEVELOPING TOWARDS O O Z /04  OVER FAR WRN 
O K /^H RN  TX W IT H IN  VERY UNSTABLE A IR  M A S S .. .WHERE SURFACE-BASED 
CA PES MAY APPROACH 3 0 0 0  J /K G .  IN IT IA L  A C T IV IT Y  SHOULD BE 
SUPERCELLULAR GIVEN DEGREE OF CAPE AND INCREASING DEEP LAYER SHEAR 
...T H O U G H  A C T IV IT Y  H IL L  LIK ELY  EVOLVE INTO A SQUALL L IN E  LATER IN  
THE EVENING ACROSS CENTRAL/ERN K S . . . O K . . .CENTRAL/NERN TX.
. . . S D . .  .
COLD FRONT A SSO C IA TED  WITH STRENGTHENING WRN U .S .  TROUGH H IL L  MOVE 
SEND INTO THE NRN HIGH P L A IN S  DURING THE D A Y .. .  IN  THE HAKE OF U PPE R  
LOW MOVING ACROSS THE DAKOTAS AT T H IS  T IM E . LOW CENTER H IL L  LIK E L Y  
DEVELOP IN V O F IN T ER SEC T IO N  OF COLD FRONT AND LEE TROUGH INVOF SHRN 
SD /H RN  NEB AND INCREASE CONVERGENCE INTO T H IS  AREA. DEW POINTS IN  
THE LOWER TO M ID 50 S  AND TEMPERATURES IN  THE LOWER 7 0 S . . . SHOULD 
SUPPORT SURFACE-BASED CA PES FROM 1 0 0 0 - 1 5 0 0  J /K G  AND M AINTAIN A 
THREAT O F ISOLA TED  SEVERE H A IL WITH T H IS  A C TIV IT Y  INTO THE EARLY 
EVENING.
. .E V A N S .. 0 5 / 0 3 / 9 9
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A C U S l KMKC O J 1 2 4 6  
OMKC AC 0 3 1 2 4 6
C O NV ECTIV E O U TL O O K .. . r e f  AFOS NMCGPH940.
V A L ID  0 3 1 2 0 0 Z  -  0 4 1 2 0 0 Z
2 0  E GUP 5 5  E PGA 20  WNW OPG 35 NNW THF 50 SW 23U  SO NW 27U
2 5  SE  3TH 1 0 0  NE 6 3 S  .
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T H IS  M ORNING. . .AND SUGGEST M ID /U PPE R  LEVEL FLOW MAY BE STRONGER 
t h a n  f o r e c a s t  by  e t a  o v e r  SRN PL A IN S T H IS  EVENING. TROUGH SHOULD
r e m a i n  p r o g r e s s i v e  b u t  c o u l d  b e  s l i g h t l y  m o re  a m p l i f i e d  t h a n
PROGGED AS IT  MOVES ACROSS NERN AZ AND NM, . .REACHING TX PANHANDLE
T H IS  E V E N IN G . SURFACE LOW N GCC SHOULD MOVE EHD ACROSS S D .. .W H I L E
LEE TROUGH FARTHER S OVER SRN HIGH PLAINS STRENGTHENS T H IS EVENING.
• ■ . SE V ER E THUNDERSTORM FORECAST DISCUSSION .
- - -  CENTRAL/SOUTHERN PLA IN S - - -
EXPECT G REA TEST CONVECTIVE THREAT AFTER ABOUT 2 3 Z ...W H E H  LARGE- 
SCALE A SC EN T ASSOCIATED WITH AZ SHORTWAVE TROUGH BEG IN S TO IM PIN G E  
UPON O R Y L IN E  REGION. SUBSIDENCE ASSOCIATED WITH FOREGOING 
SHORTWAVE R ID G E  SHOULD HELP TO REMOVE BOTH CLOUD COVER AND 
CO NV ECTIV E THREAT IN  THE MEANTIME. . .W HILE A ID IN G  0 IA 8 A T IC  SURFACE 
H EA T IN G . ETA D E STA B ILIZA TIO N  N O F BED RIVER THRU EARLY 
AFTERNOON. . .HOWEVER. . I S  OVERDONE BECAUSE OF HIGH DEW POINT  
FO R EC A ST S. LARGEST BUOYANCY SHOULD BE OVER N-CENTRAL/NWRN TX WHERE 
m i d / u p p e r  6 0 S  DEW PO IN TS AND TEMPS MID 8 0 S  F  W ILL CONTRIBUTE TO 
MLCAPE APPROACHING 3 0 0 0  J /K G .  . .SBCA PE TO 4 5 0 0  J /K G .  ZONE O F UPPER  
l e v e l  D IV E R G E N C E / U W  IN  ETA. . ASSOCIATED WITH LEFT EX IT REGION OF 
C tC L O N IC A L L Y  CURVED SUBTROPICAL SPEED MAX OVER M EX/S T X . . .  SHOULD 
r e m a i n  b r o a d  AND WEAK —  NOT WITH SUDDEN IN TEN SIFY IN G  EVIDENTLY  
a s s o c i a t e d  W ITH ETA CONVECTIVE FEEDBACK.
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UPPER LEVEL FLOW I S  EXPECTED TO BACK DURING LATE AFTERNOON AND 
EVENING AS AZ SHORTWAVE TROUGH APPROACHES. THIS SHOULD HELP TO 
TREND STORM EVOLUTION TOWARD HP THEN LINEAR VIA TWO PRIMARY EFFEC T S 
AT ANVIL LEVEL. THOUGH SR FLOW W ILL NOT BE AS WEAK AS ETA 
P R O G S . . . I T  S T IL L  SHOULD BE GENERALLY AOB 40  KT WITH P R E C IP  PA R TIC L E 
R E C Y C L IN G .. .AND FLOW D IR EC TIO N  SUGGESTS SEEDING FROM M ER ID IO N A L 
COALESCENCE OF ANVILS UP AND DOWN CONVECTIVE ZONE. B R IE F  WINDOW OF 
TORNADO POTENTIAL MAY E X IS T  WITH A FEW STORMS BETWEEN ABOUT AN HOUR 
AFTER I N I T I A T I O N .. .AND FULLY OUTFLOW-DOMINANT HP T R A N S IT IO N . 
HOW EVER.. .MAIN THREAT SHOULD BE LARGE HA IL F IR S T  FEW HOURS AFTER 
I N I T I A T I O N . . .T R A N S IT IO N IN G  TO DAMAGING WIND.
L IN E  OF STRONG-SEVERE THUNDERSTORMS IS  EXPECTED TO FORM FROM 
AFTERNOON/EARLY EVENING DEVELOPMENT. . .  THEN MOVE EWO ACROSS MUCH OF 
CENTRAL/ERN K S . . .CENTRAL/ERN OK AND N-CENTRAL TX AFTER 6 2 .  EXPECT 
SOME LEWPS/BOWS WITH DAMAGING W IN D .. .AND A MARGINAL THREAT OF 
EMBEDDED TORNADOES. SRN END O F BACKBUILDING L IN E  SOMEWHERE OVER 
CENTRAL TX W ILL BE DICTATED BY CA PPIN G  AT BASE O F ELEVATED M IXED 
LAYER ADVECTED O FF HIGH MEX P L A T E A U .. .WHICH I S  ALREADY EVIDENT 
ABOVE IS O  MB IN  12Z DRT SOUNDING.
  N-CENTRAL PLA IN S - - -
FOR MOST OF TO D A Y .. .SHORTWAVE RID G IN G  BEHIND CURRENT E JE C T IN G  SD 
SHORTWAVE TROUGH WILL SU PPRE SS CONVECTION AND A ID  IN  IN SO L A T IO N .
BY M ID /LA T E AFTERNOON. . .  ISA L LO B A RIC  FORCING INVOF LOW LEVEL CYCLONE 
W ILL RESULT IN  BACKED BOUNDARY LAYER FLOW AND ENHANCED 
CONVERGENCE/L IFT ON MESO ALPHA SCALE. ETA PFC SOUNDINGS SHOW SMALL 
HODOGRAPHS WITH SRH AOB 1 0 0  J / K G . . . B U T  REGIONAL ISAL LO B A RIC FORCING 
SHOULD STRENGTHEN NEAR-SURFACE FLOW MORE THAN PROGGED.. . IN C R EA SIN G  
SR  LOW LEVEL INFLOW.
EXPECT MLCAPE NEAR 1 0 0 0  J / K G . . . SUPPORTING DEVELOPMENT OF WIDELY 
SCATTERED STRONG-SEVERE THUNDERSTORMS NEAR LOW AND ATTACHED SURFACE 
TROUGHS AND DRYLINE. A FEW STORMS SHOULD R O T A T E . . .B U T  WEAKNESSES 
IN  LOW-MID LEVEL SR FLOW ABOVE THAT SUGGEST MAIN THREAT W ILL BE 
LARGE H A IL .. .W IT H  ISOLATED DAMAGING WIND P O S S IB L E . IN SO L A TIO N  I S  
SUCH A MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR TO CAPE IN  M ODIFIED FORECAST SOUNDINGS 
THAT THREAT SHOULD DECREASE GREATLY AFTER DARK.
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GEN TSTMS ARE FCST TO THE RIGHT OF A L IN E  FROM 3 0  NNH ELO 
2 5  NNE OBO 10  ESE STL 20  WNH MEM 30 WNW MEI 30  WSW GFT 3 0  W HUM 
2 0  HE GLS 35  WNW VCT 30 NM LRD 3 5  NW ORT 30 SSC IK S  40  ENE 4 L J  
2 5  E 8E TAD 1 5  M LVS 2 0  NW GUP 30  SSW U l l  35  H ENV 30 W SUN 
4 5  NNW 27U  7 0  WNW FCA.
. . .S E V E R E  THUNDERSTORM FORECAST D IS C U S S IO N ...
. . .S Y N O P S I S . . .
NEGATIVELY T IL T E D  LONGWAVE TROUGH W ILL PIVO T ENEWD THROUGH THE 
ROCKY MOUNTAINS INTO THE HIGH PL A IN S THROUGH PE R IO D . SHORT WAVE 
TROUGH. . .EV ID E N T  ON WATER VAPOR IM AGES. . .  FORECASTED BY MODELS TO 
MOVE ACROSS TX PANHANDLE INTO WRN OK LATE T H IS  AFTERNOON AND L I F T  
NEWO INTO CENTRAL OK/SERH KS DURING THE EVENING. STRONGER VORT 
CENTER W ILL MOVE ACROSS SRN ROCKIES INTO NWRN TX O VERNIGHT.
SURFACE TROUGH/DRY L IN E  EXTENDED FROM WRN ND TO WRN TX AT 1 4 2  W HILE 
COLD FRONT TR A IL ED  SWWD THROUGH WY INTO UT. TROUGH P O S IT IO N  W IL L  
REMAIN ALMOST STATIONARY THROUGH LATE AFTERNOON BUT A X IS  SHOULD 
S H IF T  SLOWLY EHD TONIGHT AS COLD FRONT ADVANCES IN TO  CEN TRA L/SRN  
HIGH P L A IN S . 40  TO 5 0  KT LOW LEVEL JE T  A X IS WILL MEANWHILE EXTEND 
FROM N CENTRAL TX THROUGH OK INTO CENTRAL/ERN KS AND ERN NEB T H IS  
AFTERNOON AND TONIGHT WITH CONTINUED ADVECTIOH/INFLOW  O F HIGHER 
THETAE A IR  MASS THROUGH THE PL A IN S .
. .N  CENTRAL T X /O K /S RN  K S . .
LOW l e v e l  j e t  WILL MAINTAIN SIG N IF IC A N T  INFLOW OF LOW LEVEL 
M OISTURE WITH SURFACE DEWPOINTS AROUND 65  F .  CLEARING S K IE S  EV IDEN T 
ON V IS IB L E  IMAGES W ILL FURTHER CONTRIBUTE TO STRONG D E S T A B IL IZ A T IO N  
OVER REGION WITH LATE AFTCRNOON MUCAPES FORECASTED FROM 3 5 0 0  TO 
4 5 0 0  J /K G  OVER MDT R IS K  AREA. AS SHORT WAVE APPROACHES WRN O K /T X  
B O R D E R .. . L IF T IN G  W ILL DEEPEN NEAR/ALONG DRY LIN E WITH THUNDERSTORMS 
INCREASING AS THEY MOVE END INTO IN ST A B IL IT Y  A X IS . 50  KT MID LEVEL 
SWLY FLOW SPREADING OVER LOW LEVEL JE T  AXIS WILL PROVIDE S U F F I C I E N T  
SHEAR FOB A FEW STRONG OR VIOLENT TORNAOIC SUPERCELLS t l V E N  THE 
ABUNDANT LOW LEVEL MOISTURE AND THE HIGH IN S T A B IL IT Y . WET BULB ZERO 
HEIGHTS NEAR 8 0 0 0  FT AND DRY A IR  AT MID LEVELS ALSO IN D ICA TE 
PO TEN TIAL FOR SCATTERED TO NUMEROUS HAIL AND WIND EVENTS.
. . .S D . . .N E B . . .NRN K S. . .
NRN PORTIONS OP tn w  LEVEL J E T  W ILL 8RING INCREASING MOISTURE TO 
REGION W ITH SURFACE DEWPOINTS POSSIBLY EXCEEDING 60  F AS FAR N AS 
NRN NEB BY LATE AFTERNOON. BREAKS IN  CLOUD COVER W ILL ALLOW 
AFTCRNOON HIGHS NEAR 75  TO 8 0  RESULTING IN  MUCAPES CLIM BING TO 
AROUND 2 0 0 0  TO 3 0 0 0  J /K G . TIM ING  O F CONVECTIVE IN IT IA T IO N  MAIN 
UNCERTAINTY BUT EXPECT CONVERGENCE ALONG SURFACE TROUGH AND 
IN C R EA SIN G  UPWARD NOTION ALOFT AHEAD O F UPPER TROUGH W ILL IN IT IA T E  
CONVECTION LATE T H IS  AFTERNOON AND T H IS  EVENING. WET BULB EERO 
H EIGH TS NEAR 7 0 0 0  FT AND DRY A IR  AT H ID  LEVELS IN D IC A TE AT LEA ST 
SCATTERED WIND AND HA IL EV EN TS. WHILE WEAKNESS IN  THE MID LEVEL 
WIND SPEEDS ARE NOT FAVORABLE FOR TORNADOES. . .  THE STRONG LOW LEVEL 
SHEAR NEAR LOW LEVEL JE T  A X IS MAY SUPPORT ISOLATED SU PERCELLS.




ZCZC MKCSWOMCD A L L ; 3 3 4 , 0 9 9 6  3 3 3 , 0 9 3 9  3 5 3 , 0 9 3  9 3 1 4 , 0 9 9 6 ;
ACUS3 KMKC 0 3 2 0 2 3  
OMKC MCD 0 3 2 0 2 3  
TXZOOO-OKZOOO-0 32 3 0 0 -
S P C  MESOSCALE D ISC U SS IO N  1 0 3 4 5  F O R . . .S H  OK/NW T X . . .
CONCERNING. . .  SEVERE THUNDERSTORM P O T E N T IA L .. .
WATER VAPOR IMAGERY SHOWS A LEAD MID LEVEL SHORTWAVE TROUGH 
MOVING ENEWD OVER E /N E  NM T H IS  AFTERNOON. . .  AND T H IS  IS  CONFIRM ED BY 
PR O FIL ER  T IM E  S E R IE S  FROM A ÏC /G D A /T C C /JT N . M ID /U PPE R  6 0  DEW POINTS 
AND TEMPERATURES NEAR 6 0  ARE CONTRIBUTING TO SURFACE-BASED CAPE 
VALUES OF 3 5 0 0 - 5 0 0 0  J /K G  OVER WRN OK AND NW TX TO THE E O F  THE 
DRYLINE. CONVERGENCE ON THE DRYLINE I S  NOT STRONG AND A C IR R U S 
SH IE L D  OVER THE TX PANNANDLE/NW TX/WRN OK SHOULD L IM IT  A D D ITIO N A L 
SURFACE H E A T IN G .. .BUT V IS IB L E /R A D A R  IMAGERY HAS SHOWN THE F IR S T  
ATTEMPTS AT TCU OVER F W  NW TX AS OF 2 0 1  W ITHIN A BREAK IN  THE 
C IR R U S . H ID  LEVEL FLOW AND VERTICAL SHEAR W ILL INCREASE OVER NW TX 
AND WRN OK THROUGH LATE A F T E R N O O N ... WITH AN INCREA SIN G  THREAT OF 
SUPERCELLS NEAR THE DRYLINE FROM 0 0 - 0 3 Z .  T H IS  AREA I S  BEING 
MONITORED FOR A PO SS IB L E  TORNADO HATCH LATER T H IS  AFTERNOON.
. .TH O M PSO N .. 0 5 / 0 3 / 9 9
. . .P L E A S E  SE E W W W .SPC.NOAA.GOV/ FOR GRAPHIC P R O D U C T ...
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ZCZC MKCSHOOYl OOO 
A C U S l KMKC 0 3 2 0 4  9 
OMKC AC 0 3 2 0 4  9
CONVECTIVE OUTLOOK .RE F AFOS NMCGPH940.
VALID  0 3 2 0 0 0 2  - 0 4 1 2 0 0 2
THERE IS  A HIGH R ISK  OF SVR TSTMS TONIGHT ACROSS PARTS OF SRN 
K S . . WRN AND CENTRAL O K ...A N D  PARTS OF N CENTRAL AND NWRN T X . THE 
HIGHT R ISK  I S  TO THE RIGHT OF A L IN E  FROM 2 0  W CDS 4 0  M GAG 2 5  S 
DDC 4 0  SSW R SL I S  ENE SLN 10  NW EMP 30  NE BVO 2 5  ENE MLC 4 0  SSH  PRX 
3 5  SE DAL S E P  25  SSH  ABI 65  WNW ABI 2 0  W CDS.
THERE IS  A SLGT R ISK  OF SVR TSTMS TO THE RIGHT OF A L IN E  FROM
4 5  W Y26 25  ENE Y26 2 0  ENE HON 10  S SUX 10  SE FLV 15 W UMN 
3 0  ESE PGO 10  E GGG CLL 40  SE JC T  3 0  SSW S J T  65  SSW CDS 3 5  S S E  LBL 
2 5  W MCK 60  ENE CDR 45  W Y 2 6 .
GEN TSTMS ARE FCST TO THE RIGHT OF A LIN E FROM 3 5  E PSX 2 0  NNW N IR  
3 0  NW LRD 4 0  E P 0 3  2 0  E DHT 2 5  ESE 4 L J  25  ESE TAD 15 W LVS 
2 0  NH GUP 2 0  SW CDC 3 0  NE BAM 5 5  ESE BKE 10 E PUW 8 5  WNW FCA.
GEN TSTMS ARE FCST TO THE RIGHT OF A LINE FROM 4 0  E IN L 5 5  SE  OLH
3 0  E DBO 20  ESE 6LV 45  ENE GHO 30  S LUL 45  SW HUM.
12 8-
. . .S E V E R E  THUNDERSTORM FORECAST D IS C U S S IO N ...
LATEST SURFACE DATA SHOWS SURFACE DRYLINE EXTENDS FROM WRN KS SWD 
INTO WRN SECTIONS OF CENTRAL TX. LATEST ETA MODEL SHOWS E X IT  
REGION OF H ID  LEVEL WIND MAX W ILL HOVE INTO THE SRN H I PL A IN S  WHICH 
M IL L  ENHANCE U W S  ALONG THE DRY L IN E . STRONG LOW LEVEL W IND MAX OF 
6 0  KT W ILL EXTEND NWD ACROSS ERN TX INTO CRN OK WHICH W ILL IN C R EA SE 
DEEP LAYER SHEAR ACROSS THE CENTRAL AND SRN P L A IN S .
STORM RELATIVE INFLOW ID  FORECAST TO INCREASE T H IS  EVENING ACROSS 
OK WITH SO KT FORECAST IN TO  THE DRY L IN E  AFTER 0 0 % . T H IS  I S  
EXPECTED TO ENHANCE H E L IC IT Y  IN  THE V IC IN IT Y  O F THE SQUALL L I N E . 
T H U S .. .ISO L A T E D  TORNADOES ARE EXPECTED WITH THE A C T IV IT Y  T H IS  
EVENING WITH THE MAIN THREAT BEING LARGE H A IL . RUC2 SOUNDINGS FROM 
10% RUN SHOWS MUCAPE BETWEEN 3 0 0 0  AND < 000  J /K G  ACROSS THE AREA 
WITH H E L IC IT IE S  BETWEEN 3 0 0  AMD 4 0 0  H 2 /S 2 .
..M C C A R T H Y .. 0 5 / 0 3 / 9 9
NNNN
a
%C%C MKCWWAMKC ALL 0 4 0 3 0 0 ; 3 3 5 , 0 9 9 3  3 6 0 ,0 9 9 3  3 6 0 , 0 9 6 3  3 3 5 , 0 9 6 2 ;
WWUSa KMKC 0 3 2 3 3 3  
CMKC HW-A 0 3 2 3 3 3  
O K Z O O O -0 4 0 2 0 0 -
STATUS REPORT ON WW NUMBER 195
CLUSTER OF INTENSE THUNDERSTORMS. . .  INCLUDING STRONG TORNAOIC 
SUPERCELLS WEST/SOUTHWEST OF OKLAHOMA C ITY  AREA IS  ONGOING. STRONG 
AND IN T E N SIFY IN G  DIVERGENT UPPER FLOW F I E L D . . .  ENHANCED BY M ID /U P P E R  
J E T  DIGGING ACROSS THE SOUTHERN R O CK IES. . .  H IL L  CONTINUE TO SUPPORT  
e v o l u t i o n  i n t o  l a r g e r  SEVERE CONVECTIVE SYSTEM. . .  AHEAD OF DRY L IN E  
. . .THROUGH THE EVENING HOURS. GIVEN ONGOING AND EXPECTED TRENDS.
WW MAY BE REPLACED WITH NEW WW INCLUDING NORTHERN OKLAHOMA AND 
PARTS OF NORTH CENTRAL TEXAS W ITHIN THE NEXT HOUR OR SO.
. . KERR . 0 5 / 0 3 / 9 9  
NNNN
ZCZC NKCSELS ALL 0 4 0 3 0 0 ; 3 3 5 , 0 9 9 3  3 6 0 ,0 9 9 3  3 6 0 ,0 9 6 1  3 3 5 , 0 9 6 2 ;  
WWÜS9 KMKC 0 3 2 1 3 0  
OMKC WW 0 3 2 1 3 0  
O K % 0 0 0 -0 4 0 3 0 0 -
URGENT -  IM 4ED IA TE BROADCAST REQUESTED 
TORNADO WATCH NUMBER 1 9 5  
STORM PRED ICT IO N  CENTER NORMAN OK 
4 3 0  PM COT MON MAY 3 1 9 9 9
THE STORM PR ED ICT IO N  CENTER HAS ISSUED A 
TORNADO WATCH FOR PORTIONS OF
WESTERN AND CENTRAL OKLAHOMA
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EF FEC T IV E T H I S  MONDAY AFTERNOON AND EVENING FROM 4 4 5  PM U N T IL  1 0 0 0  
PM COT.
TORNADOES. . .H A IL  TO 3 INCHES IN  DIAMETER. . .THUNDERSTORM H IN D  GUSTS 
TO 8 0  MPH. . AND DANGEROUS LIGHTNING ARE PO SS IB L E  IN  TH ESE A R E A S.
THE TORNADO MATCH AREA I S  ALONG AND 80  STATUTE M IL E S  EA ST AND N EST 
OF A L IN E  FROM 25  M ILE S EAST OF M ICHITA FALLS TEXAS TO 5 0  M IL E S  
NORTH NORTHWEST O F OKLAHOMA C ITY  OKLAHOMA.
R E M E M B E R ...A  TORNADO WATCH MEANS CONDITIONS ARE FAVORABLE FOR 
TORNADOES AND SEVERE THUNDERSTORMS IN  AND CLOSE TO THE WATCH AREA . 
PERSONS IN  THESE AREAS SHOULD BE ON THE LOOKOUT FOR THREATENING 
WEATHER CO N D ITIO N S AND L IS T E N  FOR LATER STATEMENTS AND P O S S IB L E  
WARNINGS.
D IS C U S S IO N . . .THUNDERSTORMS ARE BEGINNING TO DEVELOP OVER SWRN OK 
AHEAD O F DRYLINE WHERF r& P  h a S LOCALLY BROKEN. EXTREME IN S T A B IL IT Y  
AND FAVORABLE SHEAR SUGGEST THAT SUPERCELLS AND IS OLATED TORNADOES 
ARE P O S S IB L E .
A V IA T IO N . . .TORNADOES AND A FEW SEVERE THUNDERSTORMS WITH H A IL  
SURFACE AND ALOFT TO 3 IN C H E S. EXTREME TURBULENCE AND SURFACE WIND 
GUSTS TO TO KNOTS. A FEW CUHULONIMBI WITH MAXIMUM TO PS TO 5 5 0 .
MEAN STORM MOTION VECTOR 2 5 0 3 0 .
. . . VESCIO
; 3 3 5 ,  0 9 9 3  3 * 0 , 0 9 9 3  3 6 0 ,0 9 6 1  3 3 5 , 0 9 6 2 ;
NNNN
0
ZCZC MKCSEL8 ALL 0 4 0 5 0 0 ; 3 3 5 , 0 9 8 4  3 7 0 , 0 9 6 2  3 7 0 , 0 9 5 4  3 3 5 , 0 9 6 0 .
HWUS9 KMKC 0 3 2 3 5 9  
CMKC WW 0 3 2 3 5 9  
O K lO O O -0 4 0 5 0 0 -
URGENT -  IM 4ED IA TE BROADCAST REQUESTED 
TORNADO WATCH NUMBER 19 8
PRED ICTIO N  CENTER NORMAN OK 
COT MON MAY 3 1 9 9 9
/ w  STORM PRED ICT IO N  CENTER HAS ISSUED A 
t o r n a d o  WATCH FOR PORTIONS OF
CENTRAL OKLAHOMA ^
E FFEC T IV E T H IS  MONDAY NIGHT AND TUESDAY MORNING FROM 7 1 5  PM U N T IL  
MIDNIGHT CDT.
. . . T H I S  I S  A PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS S I T U A T IO N ...
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DESTRUCTIVE TORN A D O ES...L A R G E  HAIL TO 3 INCHES IN 
0IIW4ETBR. . .THUNDERSTORM WIND GUSTS TO 90  M P H ...A N D  DANGEROUS 
LIGHTNING ARE PO SSIB LE IN  THESE AREAS.
THE TORNADO NATCH AREA I S  ALONG AND l i  STATUTE M ILE S EAST AND WEST 
O f  A L IN E  FROM 35  M ILES SOUTHWEST OF ARDMORE OKLAHOMA TO 2 0  M IL E S  
NORTH OF PONCA C ITY  OKLAHOMA.
R E M E M B E R ...A  TORNADO HATCH MEANS CONDITIONS ARE FAVORABLE FOR 
TORNADOES AND SEVERE THUNDERSTORMS IN  AND CLOSE TO THE NATCH AREA. 
PERSONS IN  THESE AREAS SHOULD BE ON THE LOOKOUT FOR THREATENING 
HEATHER CONDITIONS AND L IST E N  FOR LATER STATEMENTS AND P O S S IB L E  
WARNINGS.
OTHER HATCH INFORMATION. . . T H IS TORNADO HATCH REPLACES TORNADO HATCH 
NUMBER 1 9 5 .  HATCH NUMBER 1 95  W ILL NOT BE IN  EFFECT AFTER 7 1 5  PM 
COT. C O N T IN U E .. HW 1 9 6 . . . HH 1 9 7 . . .
D IS C U S S IO N .. .LONG TRACKED VIOLENT TORNADO IS  APPROACHING THE OKC 
METRO AREA. EXTREME IN S T A B IL IT Y  I S  COMPENSATING FOR SOMEWHAT 
MARGINAL S H E A R .. . RESULTING IN  AN VERY DANGEROUS S IT U A T IO N .
A V IA T IO N .. .TORNADOES AND A FEW SEVERE THUNDERSTORMS WITH H A IL 
SURFACE AND ALOFT TO 3 IN C H ES. EXTREME TURBULENCE AND SURFACE WIND 
GUSTS TO 7 0  KNOTS. A FEW CUHULONIMBI WITH MAXIMUM TOPS TO 5 0 0 .
MEAN STORM MOTION VECTOR 2 302  5.
. . .V E S C IO





WFUSl KOKC 0 3 2 2 2 7  
TO.ROKÇ
G K Î J o i s ^ ' . o s i - o j a a i s -
ÉX8 ACTIVATION REQUESTED
SERVICE NORMAN OK 
NbN MAY 3 1 9 9 9
THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE IN NORMAN HAS ISSUED A
* TORNADO WARNING FOR. . .
GRADY COUNTY IN  CENTRAL OKLAHOMA 
CADDO COUNTY IN  SOUTHWEST OKLAHOMA
• U N TIL 6 1 5  PM CDT
* AT 5 2 1  PM CDT. . .A  TORNADO WAS REPORTED JU S T  WEST OF C Y R IL . T H IS  
STORM WAS MOVING NORTHEAST AT 3 5  MPH
• LOCATIONS IN THE WARNING INCLUDE AMBER. . ANADARKO. APACHE .
BINGER. . CEMENT. CHICKASHA. . COCAR. . CY RIL .  GRACEHONT MINCO. 
NINNEKAH . . . NORGE . . . POCASSET . . STECKER . . . TABLER . . . TUTTLE AND VERDEN
TAKE COVER NOW. ABANDON MOBILE HOMES AND V E H IC L E S. MOVE TO AN 
IN T E R IO R  ROOM OR HALLWAY ON THE LOWEST FLOOR. STAY AWAY FROM WINDOWS.
LAT . LON 3 4 8 8  9 8 4 1  3 4 8 8  9 7 8 6  3 5 3 1  9 7 6 9  3 5 3 7  9 8 3 5
3 0
WWUS34 KOKC 0 3 2 2 3 3  
SVSOKC
O K Z 0 2  3 -  0 2  7 - 0 3  2 3 0 0
SEVERE WEATHER STATEMENT 
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE NORMAN OK 
5 2 1  PM CDT MON MAY 3 1999
AT 52 8  PM CDT . .A  TORNADO WAS ON THE GROUND 3 M ILES NORTHWEST OF 
C Y R IL . THE STORM WAS MOVING NORTHEAST AT 35 MPH. A TORNADO WARNING 





WWU634 KOKC 0 3 2 2 4 3  
SVSOKC
O K Z 0 2 3 - 0 3 2 2 4 5 -
SEVERE WEATHER STATEMENT 
NATIONAL WEATHER SERV ICE NORMAN OK 
5 4 0  PN COT NON MAY )  1 9 9 9
AT 5 4 0  P N . . . A TORNADO HAS 2 N IL E S  SOUTH OP ANADARKO. . . MOVING 




MWU534 KOKC 0 3 2 3 0 0  
SVSOKC
O K Z 0 2 3 - 0 2 7 - 0 3 2 3 3 0 -
SEVERE WEATHER STATEMENT 
NATIONAL HEATHER SERVICE NORMAN OK 
5 5 5  PM CDT MON MAY 3 19 9 9
AT 5 5 5  PH C D T . .  A LARGE TORNADO WAS ON THE GROUND 2 M IL E S  NORTH OF 
LAVERTY MOVING NORTHEAST AT 35 MPH. A TORNADO WARNING REMAINS IN  
EFFECT UNTIL 6 1 5  PM FOR GRADY AND CADDO COUNTY PEOPLE IN  THE TOWN 





WFUSI KOKC 0 3 2 3 1 4  
TOROKC
O K C 0 5 1 - 0 4 0 0 0 0 -
BU LLETIN  -  EAS A CTIV A TIO N  REQUESTED 
TORNADO WARNING
NATIONAL HEATHER SE R V IC E  NORMAN OK 
6 0 7  PN CDT NON MAY 3 1 9 9 9
THE NATIONAL WEATHER SE R V IC E  IN  NORMAN HAS ISSU ED  A
• TORNADO WARNING F O R .. .
GRADY COUNTY IN  CENTRAL OKLAHOMA
• U N T IL  7 0 0  PN COT
-133-
’ AT toi  PH C D T . .  MULTI PLE TORNADOS WERE REPORTED IN GRADY COUNTY 
NEAR AND IN THE TOWN O F  CHICKASHA. THE TORNADOES WERE MOVING 
NORTHEAST AT 2 5 MPH
• LOCATIO NS IN  THE WARNING INCLUDE ALEX. . .AMBER. . .BRADLEY . . . 
C H IC K A S H A .. .M IDDLEBERO. . MINCO. . .NINNEKAH. . NORGE. .P O C A S S E T . . . 
TABLER AMD TVTTLB
TAKE COVER NOW. ABANDON MOBILE HOMES AND V E H IC L E S. MOVE TO AN 
IN TER IO R  ROOM OR HALLWAY ON THE LOWEST FLOOR. STAY AWAY FROM WINDOWS.
L A T . . .  LON 3 5 2 1  9 9 0 9  34B 1 9 8 0 9  3 4 8 1  9 7 6 9  3 5 3 1  9 1 6 1  
3 5 3 6  9 7 9 5
3 0
WWUS34 KOKC 0 3 2 3 2 3  
SVSOKC
O K Z 0 2 1 - 0 3 2 3 4 5 -
5  EVE RE WEATHER STATEMENT 
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE NORMAN OK 
6 1 9  PH CDT HON MAY 3 19 9 9
AT 6 1 9  PM CDT . A TORNADO WAS LOCATED ON THE NORTH SIDE OF 
CHICKASHA. NEAR THE AIRPORT DAMAGE TO STRUCTURES ON THE NORTH SIDE 




WWUS34 KOKC 0 3 2 3 3 0  
SVSOKC
O K Z 0 2 1 - 0 4 0 0 0 0 -
SEVER E WEATHER STATEMENT 
N ATIONAL HEATHER SERVICE NORMAN OK 
6 2 6  PM CDT MON MAY 3 1 9 9 9
A T  6 2 4  PM CDT. . A STORM SPOTTER REPORTED 4 1 / 2  INCH H A IL 5 M ILES  
SOUTH OF M INCO. ALSO A TORNADO WAS REPORTED AT 62 6 PM J U S T  SOUTH OF 





W U S l  KOKC 0 3 2 3 4 4  
TOROKC
O K C 0 2 7 - 0 5 1 - 0 8 7 - 0 4 0 0 3 0 -
BU LLETIN  -  BAS ACTIV ATIO N  REQUESTED  
TORNADO WARNING
NATIONAL WEATHER SE R V IC E  NORMAN OK 
6 4 0  PN CDT MON MAY 3 1 9 9 9
THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERV ICE IN  NORMAN HAS IS S U E D  A
• TORNADO WARNING FOR . .
CLEVELAND COUNTY IN  CENTRAL OKLAHOMA 
ORADY COUNTY IN  CENTRAL OKLAHOMA 
MCCLAIN COUNTY IN  CENTRAL OKLAHOMA
• U N T IL  7 3 0  PM CDT
• AT 6 4 0  PM CDT A TORNADO WAS REPORTED 6 M ILES NORTH OF 
MIDDLEBERO. .MOVING NORTHEAST AT 30  MPH
• LOCATIONS IN THE WARNING INCLUDE BLANCHARD MIDDLEBERO MOORE 
NEWCASTLE NORMAN AND TUTTLE
TAKE COVER NOW ABANDON MOBILE HOMES AND VEH ICLES MOVE TO AN 
IN T E R IO R  ROOM OR HALLWAY ON THE LOWEST FLOOR STAY AWAY FROM WINDOWS
L A T . LON 3 S 2 0  9 7 9 1  3 5 0 8  9 7 7 6  3 5 1 5  9 7 « e  3 5 3 5  9 7 3 7  
3 5 3 6  9 7 6 3
3 0
WWUS34 KOKC 0 3 2 3 5 5  
SVSOKC
OKZ02 5 - 0 2  7 > 0 2  9 - 0 4  0 0 1 5 -
SEVER E WEATHER STATEMENT 
NATIONAL WEATHER SE R V IC E  NORMAN OK 
6 5 1  PM CDT MON MAY 3 1 9 9 9
A T 6 5 1  PM C D T. . A TORNADO WAS REPORTED AT THE ACCESS TO THE H E 





WWUS34 KOKC 0 4 0 0 0 4  
SVSOKC
O K Z 0 2 5 -0 2  7 > 0 2 9 - 0 4  0 0 3  0 -
SEV ER S WEATHER STATEMENT 
NATIONAL. WEATHER SE R V IC E  NORMAN OK 
6 5 7  PM COT HON MAY 3 1 9 9 9
...T O R N A D O  EMERGENCY IN  SOUTH OKLAHOMA C IT Y  METRO AREA
AT 6 5 7  PH C D T . . A LARGE TORNADO HAS MOVING ALONG IN T E R ST A T E  4 4  WEST 
OF NEW CASTLE. ON IT S  PR ESEN T PATH . .T H I S  LARGE DAMAGING TORNADO 
W ILL ENTER SOUTHWEST SE C T IO N S OF THE OKLAHOMA C IT Y  METRO AREA  
BETWEEN 7 1 5  PM AND 7 30 PH . PERSONS IN  MOORE AND SOUTH OKLAHOMA C IT Y  
SHOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE TORNADO PRECAUTIONS!
T H IS  I S  AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AMD L I F E  THREATENING S IT U A T IO N . I F  
YOU ARE I N  THE PATH OF T H IS  LARGE AND D ESTR U CTIV E TORNADO. TAKE  
COVER IM M EDIATELY.
DOPPLER RADAR INDICATED T H IS  STORM MAY CONTAIN DESTRUCTIVE HAIL TO 
THE S I Z E  OF BASEBALLS OR LARGER
L A T . . . LON 3 5 2 4  97 8 4  351 I 9 7 6 9  3 5 3 6  9 7 35 3 55 2  9 7 5 4  
ANTRA
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A p p e n d i x  G  - NOAA S i o r m  D a t a  -
A reco rd  o u tb r e a k  o f  t o r n a d o e s  s t iu c k  O k la h o m a  from late a f t e n io o n  o f  M ay  3. I ' )09 , th r o u g h  ea rly  m o j i i l n g  o f  M a y  4. 1999 
T o  date , 58 to r n a d o e s  h av e  b e e n  rec o r d e d  ac ro ss  p o r t ion s  o f  w es te rn  aird eentit il  O k la h o m a ,  A d d i t i o n a l  to r n a d o e s  w e re  rep or ted  across  
eas tern  O k la h o m a  from late ev e n in g  o f  M a y  3rd  th ro ug h  the ea rly  m o n i i n g o f  M a y  4tli , and  a re  li sted u n d e r  the  e a s te rn  (Oklahoma portion  
o f S t o n n  D ata , p ro v id e d  by  th e  N a t io n a l  W e a th e r  S e n  ice O f f ic e  in T u lsa ,  O k la h o m a  All d ir ec t fat al i ti es  (4 0 )  an d  all d ir ec t in ju ries (6 75)  
o c c u n e d  in th e  N o n n a n  N a t io n a l  W e a th e r  S e n  ice W a n t in g  Area  I h e  m os t n o ta b le  to rn a do  w as  r.iled 15 a n d  fo rm e d  o v e r  G m d y  C o u n ty  
n e a r  A m b e r  a n d  t r a ck ed  n o r th eas t  for 37 m i le s  ev e n tu a l ly  into the  O k la h o m a  C i ty  m e t ro p o l i t a n  area  B r id ge  C r e e k ,  O k la h o m a  Ci ty , 
M o o re ,  Del C i ty ,  and  M id w e s t  C i ty  su f fe red  t r e m e n d o u s  d a m a g e  Th i r ty -s ix  d irect  fatali ties  a n d  583 d i tee t  it t junes  w e te  t e eo td ed  I he te 
w ere  m a n y  o th e r  s ign i f i can t  t o r n a d o e s  as well,  in c lu d in g  F4 to n ta d o e s  in K in g f i s h e r  and  L o ga n  C o u n t i e s ,  a n d  13 lo t i tadoes  m C ad do ,  
G rad y ,  K in g f ish e r ,  l_ogan, a n d  L in co ln  C o u n t i e s  D u e  to the  m a g n i tu d e  ol the  to rn a do  o u th t e a k ,  a n d  for ea s ie r  te fe te t tce , ea ch  to rnado 
has  rece iv ed  its o w n  id en t i f i ca t ion .  T h e t e  w e te  8 t o n i a d ic  p r o d u c i n g  th u n d e i s to m t s ,  c a l led  s u p e tc e l l s ,  and  m o s t  o f  th e m  sp aw n ed  
n u m e r o u s  t o rn a d o es ,  o n e  a f ter  an o th e r .  O cc a s io n a l ly ,  the se  th u n d e t s to m i s  spaw  n ed  to r n a d o e s  at  th e  s a m e  t im e  T h e  first to rnado  p r o d u c in g  
t h u n d c r s t o n n  o f  the  d a y  w as  labe led  s to im  A,  w hi le  the  last to r n a d o  p r o d u c i n g  th u n d e r s t o n n  o f  the  d a y  w as  labe led  s t o n n  I. T o rna d oes  
p r o d u e ed b y  th e  s a m e  su pe rce l l  t h u n d c r s t o n n  h av e  the  s a m e  le tte r  a n d  w e t e  th e n  nu m b e r e d  ch ro n o lo g ic a l ly .  For  e x a m p le ,  th e  3rd  to rnado  
p ro d u c e d  b y  s to r m  B was la b e led  B3.
S to r m  A p r o d u c e d  14 to r n a d o e s  o v e r  a pe r iod  o f  a bo u t  7 h o u rs  a n d  was  eve n tua l ly  r e s p o n s ib le  for the  F5 li r tn ado  tha t s truck  
B r id ge  C r e e k ,  O k l a h o m a  C i ty  arrd M o o r e .  T h e  I st to rn a d o  ol th e  o u tb re ak .  A I , to u c h e d  d o w n  orr DS 62,  2 m i le s  irorih o f  hrte rstate  44 
in Cortra rtche C o u n t y  at 1 6 4 1 C S T .  N o  d a m a g e  is be l ieved  to h av e  o c c u n e d  (IT)) li re 2nd  to rn a d o ,  A2,  f o n n ed  approxi ir ra te ly  3 miles  
w es t o f  E lg in  in C o m a n c h e  C o u n ty .  S ev e ra l  w itnesse s,  co r r f in n c d  th is  to rn a d o ,  how ev e r  no d a m a g e  w as  ob s e r v e d  (Ffl I Th e  3rd  tornado,  
A 3 ,  to u c h e d  d o w n  in a  rural a rea  3 m i le s  east  o f  A p a c h e  in C a d d o  C o u n ty  A s  the  to rn a d o  rn ox ed  n o r th w a r d  to near , \ n a d a r k o ,  on e  house  
w as  d e s t ro y e d  n e a r  th e  to w n  o f  S l e e k e r , w ith  its r o o f  r ipped  o f f  arrd s evera l  wall s  k n o ck e d  d o w n  (F3) . T h r e e  p e r s o n s  in s id e  the  ho u se  were 
in jured .  S ev e ra l  w i tn e ss e s  r ep o r ted  th e  4 th  to rn a d o ,  A4,  3 m i le s  n o r th w es t  o f  C y n l  in Cr rddo  C o u n t y  ju s t  west o f  S H  8 N o  darrrage was 
repor ted  (FO). T h e  5 th  to rn a do ,  A 5 ,  fo rm e d  2 m i le s  so u th  o f  .-Xnadai ko  in C a d d o  Counix  Tw o w itnesse s  repor ted  lire u tn ra d o  to be  brief,  
a n d  rro d a m a g e  w as  o b s e r v e d  (FO)
T h e  6 th  to rn a d o ,  \ 6 .  d e x e lo p e d  ,iboul 3 im les  north -noil lierrsi ol (  em en i  iie.n lire C adrlo ( l i adx  Co u n ix  border ,  arrd rjuicklx 
i nr errs i l ied lir a s tn n rg  loirrrrdo wiih  associa le il  d an rag e  rated  al lire h igh  e n d  o f  lire I ' sc.ile l i r e  lo i irado  i raekxd nortl reasl for 9 nr lies 
be fo re  d i s s ip a t in g  2 5 mi les  w e s t -rrcrrtlr west ol downtoxx n C h ic  k ash a  T w o  h o m e s  h ad  lusi a lexx inlenrM walls s t a n d i n g  IF3  r, o n e  located  
n e a r  U S  62 o n  th e  rrorlhxvest sirle o f  C h ic  k a s h a ,  arrd severa l xxnoden h igh  te n s io n  power  lines  w ere  dow ned Sex eral  p e t x i n s  were in ju red 
so u th  o f  V e r d e n  n ea r  the  C a d d o  G radx  C o u n ty  border  . T h e  7|)r l o in a d o ,  . \ 7 .  Iras b ee n  refeiTcd lo as  a sa te ll i te  l o i n a d o ,  and  lo tatcd  a round  
,A6 for a s ho r t  pe r iod  o f  time.  5 mi les  wes t o f  (T r ickasha  in G iadx C ou n tx  D a m a g e  from tins  sa te ll i te  lo inailo  was not r li scoxered  and 
th e re fo re  ra ted  FtJ. T h e  8th  to in a d o ,  AS, dev e lo p ed  2 5 m i le s  no r thw es t  iifrlow m o w n  C h ic  k asha  just  no r th  o f f  S 02 .  a n d  tn icked  northeas t,  
s t r ik in g  th e  C h i c k a s h a  M u n ic i p a l  .Arrport, re su lt ing  in h ig h -e n d  F2 darrrage to tw o  hangar  b u i l d in g s  a n d  d e s tm x in g  severa l ai rcraft An 
a i rc ra f t  w ing ,  b e l iev ed  to h a v e  o r ig i n a te d  from  th is  a i rport w as  even tu a lly  ca r r i ed  a i rb o rn e  a p p r o x i m a t e ly  45  m i le s  arrd d ro p p e d  iir 
so u th w es t  O k l a h o m a  C i ty  .A pprox im a te ly  20  m o b i le  honres  n ea r  the  a i rpor t  xvcre e i th e r  d a n r a g e d  or d e s t ro ye d  w i th  seveiirl  persons  
in ju red  T h e  to n r a d o  then  c ro s s ed  US 8 1 abou t  2 mi les  north  o f  its in tc isec tio i r  w itir f  S 62 dcs tiox  iirg a large b u i ld in g ,  then d iss ipa ted  
4 m i le s  n o r th -n o r th eas t  o f  d o w n to w n  C h ic k a s h a
The 9tlr to rn ad o ,  ,A9. w as  a v io lent a n d  lo ng - t r ack ed  to n ra d o .  a n d  ex ctrtuallx p r o d u c e d  15 d a n ra g e  nr B r id g e  t i e e k .  (iklalixxma 
C i ty ,  arrd M o o r e .  T h i s  to rn a d o  d e v e lo p e d  in G r a d y  C o u n ty  abou t  2 rrriles soir th-sou thxxest o f  Airrhcr, arrd q u ic k ly  rnterrsified as it c rossed  
S H  92.  F4 d a m a g e  w a s  first d i s c o v e r e d  a b o u t  4 m i les  ea s t -no r theas t  o f  A m b er  arrd e x ten ded  for  6 1 2  mi le s ,  as  the  to r n a d o  coi r tinued to 
m o v e  n o r th e as t .  T w o  areas  o f  F5 d a m a g e  w ere  observ ed Th e  first w as  in th e  Willoxx l a k e  A d d i t i o n ,  a rura l subd ix  isiorr o f  trrobile h o m e s  
a n d  s o m e  c o n c r e t e  s lab  h o m e s ,  in B r id g e  C r e e k  in fa r  ea s te ru  G n rdy  C o u n t y  Txvo h o m e s  xvcre c o m p le t e ly  sw ept f ro m  th e i r  co rrcre te s labs , 
a n d  ab o u t  o n e  d o z e n  a u t o m o b i l e s  w e r e  ca r r i ed  ab o u t  I 4 o f  a m i le  Alt m o b i le  h o m e s  in th is  ar ea in th e  d ir ec t p a th  o f  th e  to rn a d o  w ere  
o b l i te ra ted ,  res u l t in g  irr a h igh  c o n c e n t r a t io n  o f  fatal it ies  .Asphalt pax cn rent a b o u t  I - in c h  th i c k  w as  a lso  pee le d  from  a s e c t ion  o f  rural 
road  E W I 25 .  T h e  s e c o n d  a rea  o f  F5 d a m a g e  xvas o bse rv ed  ab o u t  I m i le  wes t o f t  he G r a d y M c C l a i n  C o u n t y  line a n d  c o n s i s te d  o f  a c lean ly  
sw e p t  s lab  h o m e  w i th  fo u n d a t io n  a n c h o r  bo l t s  an d  an o tb c r  vcb ic le  lo f ted  I 4 o f  a m i le  T h e  m a x i m u m  xvidth o f  d a m a g e  in B r id g e  C ree k  
xvas e s t i m a t e d  to  b e  I mile.  A p p r o x im a te l y  2 0 0  m ob i le  h o m e s  h o u ses  w e re  d es t ro y ed ,  a n d  h u n d r  e d s  o f  o th e r  s t ru c tu re s  wer e d a m ag ed .  
T h e  R id g e c re s t  B a p t is t  C h u r c h  in B r id g e  C r e e k  w as  a l so  des troy  ed . Tw elve  p e r s o n s  d ied  in B r id g e  C r e e k ,  n in e  in m o b i l e  h o m e s ,  an d  all 
fa ta li ti es  a n d  th e  m a jo r i t y  o f  in ju r ie s  w e re  c o n e e n t r a t e d  in the  W i l low  L i k e  A d d i t io n ,  S o u th e rn  H il l s  A d d i t i o n ,  an d  B r id g e  C r e e k  Esta tes , 
c o n s i s t i n g  m o s t l y  o f  m o b i le  ho m e s .  C o m p a r e d  to sec t io n s  o f  O k la h o m a  an d  C le v e la n d  C o u n t i e s ,  o th e r  c o u n t ie s  in th e  p a t h  o f  th is  to rn a d o  
w h ic h  a r e  m o r e  d e n s e ly  p o p u la te d ,  e a s t e r n  G r a d y  C o u n ty  in c lu d in g  th e  B r id g e  C ree k  area ,  is ru ra l  a n d  sp a r se ly  p o p u la te d .
T h e  to r n a d o  m a in ta in e d  a n ea r ly  s tr a igh t p a th  to th e  n o r the as t  pa ra l le l ing  In te rst ate 4 4 ,  a s  it e n te red  M c C la in  C o u n ty ,  excep t 
w h e n  it m a d e  a s l igh t  j o g  to th e  righ t a n d  m o v e d  d i re c t ly  over th e  16th Str ee t o v e r p a s s  in N e w c a s t le  wher  e a w o m a n  w as  ki l led  w h en  she  
w a s  b lo w n  o u t  f ro m  u n d e r  th e  o v e r p a s s .  T h e  to rn a d o  c o n t in u e d  in to  n o r th e rn  sec t io n s  o f  rura l N e w c a s t l e  arrd cr o s s e d  th e  In tc is ta tc  ag a in  
j u s t  nor th  o f  th e  US 62  N e w c a s t l e  i n t e r c h a n g e  W h i le  this  to rn a d o  w as  niox ing th ro u g h  the  n o r th e r n  p o r t io n  o f  N ew cas t le ,  a sa te ll i te  
to r n a d o  ( A lO )  t o u c h e d  d o w n  in a f ie ld  in rural  a reas  nor th  o f  N ew cas t le ,  and  ca u sed  no  d a m a g e  (FO) Two a rea s  o f  F4 d a m a g e  w ere  
o b s e r v e d  in M c C la in  C o u n ty ,  all a.s.sociated w i th  to rn a d o  .A9. T h e  11 rst a rea  ox c i i ap p ed  the  Grady M c C la in  C o u n t y  line  a n d  e x ten ded  to 
a bo u t  3 m i le s  n o r th w e s t  o f  N ew cas t le ,  e n d i n g  jus t wes t o f  the  16th St. o v e r p a s s  on  Inter s ta te  44 .  w h i le  the  other  a rea  w as  o b s e r v e d  2 m i le s  
n o r th w es t  o f  N e w c a s t l e  T h i r ty -e igh t  h o m e s  an d  2 b u s in esse s  w ere  des troy ed in M c C la in  C o u n ty ,  a n d  4 0  h o m e s  w e re  d a m a g e d  D am a g e  
th e n  d im in i s h e d  lo F2 intensilx as  th e  to r n a d o  c ro s s ed  the C a n a d ia n  Rixei  in to  n o r th c in  C le x e la n d  Countx
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A record outbreak o f tornadoes struck Oklahoma from late afternoon of May 3, 1999, through early morning of May 4, 1999. To 
date, 5 8 tornadoes have been recorded across portions o f western and central Oklahoma. Additional tornadoes were reported across eastern 
Oklahoma from late evening of May 3rd through the early morning of May 4th, and are listed under the eastern Oklahoma portion of 
Storm Data, provided by the National Weather Service Office in Tulsa, Oklahoma. All direct fatalities (40) and all direct injuries (675) 
occurred in the Norman National Weather Service Warning Area. The most notable tornado was rated F5 and formed over Grady Cotmty 
near Amber and tracked northeast For 37 miles eventually into the Oklahoma City metropolitan area. Bridge Creek, Oklahoma City, 
Moore, Del City, and Midwest City suffered tremendous damage. Thirty-six direct fatalities and 583 direct injtuies were recorded. There 
were many other significant tornadoes as well, including F4 tornadoes in Kingfisher and Logan Counties, and F3 tornadoes in Caddo, 
Grady, Kingfisher, Logan, and Lincoln Counties. Due to the magnitude of the tornado outbreak, and for easier reference, each tornado 
has received its own identification. There were 8 tomadic producing thunderstorms, called supercells, and most of them spawned 
numerous tornadoes, one after another. Occasionally, these thunderstorms spawned tornadoes at the same time. The first tornado producing 
thunderstorm of the day was labeled storm A, while the last tornado producing thunderstorm of the day was labeled storm I. Tornadoes 
produced by the same supercell thunderstorm have the same letter and were then numbered chronologically. For example, the 3rd tornado 
produced by storm B was labeled B3.
Storm A produced 14 tornadoes over a period of about 7 hours and was eventually responsible for the F5 tornado that struck 
Bridge Creek, Oklahoma City and Moore. The 1st tornado of the outbreak, A l, touched down on US 62, 2 miles north o f Interstate 44 
in Comanche County at 1641 CST. No damage is believed to have occurred (FO). The 2nd tornado, A2, formed approximately 3 miles 
west o f Elgin in Comanehe County. Several witnesses, confirmed this tornado, however no damage was observed (FO). The 3rd tornado, 
A3, touehed down in a rural area 3 miles east o f Apache in Caddo County. As the tornado moved northward to near Anadarko, one house 
was destroyed near the town of Stecker, with its roof ripped off and several walls knocked down (F3). Three persons inside the house were 
injured. Several witnesses reported the 4th tornado, A4, 3 miles northwest of Cyril in Caddo County just west o f  SH 8. No damage was 
reported (FO). The 5th tornado, A5, formed 2 miles south o f Anadarko in Caddo County. Two witnesses reported the tornado to be brief, 
and no damage was observed (FO).
The 6th tornado, A6, developed about 3 miles north-northeast o f  Cement near the Caddo/Grady County border, and quickly 
intensified to a strong tornado with associated damage rated at the high end o f the F3 scale. The tornado tracked northeast for 9 miles 
before dissipating 2.5 miles west-northwest o f downtown Chickasha. Two homes had just a few interior walls standing (F3), one located 
near US 62 on the northwest side of Chickasha, and several wooden high tension power lines were downed. Several persons were injured 
south o f Verden near the Caddo/Grady County border. The 7 th tornado, A7, has been referred to as a satellite tornado, and rotated around 
A6 for a short period o f time, 5 miles west o f Chiekasha in Grady County. Damage from this satellite tornado was not discovered and 
therefore rated FO. The 8th tornado, A8, developed 2.5 miles northwest of downtown Chickasha just north o f US 62, and tracked northeast, 
striking the Chickasha Municipal Airport, resulting in high-end F2 damage to two hangar buildings and destroying several aircraft. An 
aircraft wing, believed to have originated from this airport was eventually carried airborne approximately 45 miles and dropped in 
southwest Oklahoma City. Approximately 20 mobile homes near the airport were either damaged or destroyed with several persons 
injured. The tornado then crossed US 81 about 2 miles north o f its intersection with US 62 destroying a large building, then dissipated
4 miles north-northeast of downtown Chickasha.
The 9th tornado, A9, was a violent and long-tracked tornado, and eventually produced F5 damage in Bridge Creek, Oklahoma 
City, and Moore. This tornado developed in Grady County about 2 miles south-southwest of Amber, and quickly intensified as it crossed 
SH 92. F4 damage was first discovered about 4 miles east-northeast of Amber and extended for 6 1/2 miles, as the tornado eontinued to 
move northeast. Two areas ofF5 damage were observed. The first was in the Willow Lake Addition, a rural subdivision o f mobile homes 
and some concrete slab homes, in Bridge Creek in far eastern Grady County. Two homes were completely swept from their concrete slabs, 
and about one dozen automobiles were carried about 1/4 o f a mile. All mobile homes in this area in the direct path o f the tornado were 
obliterated, resulting in a high concentration o f  fatalities. Asphalt pavement about 1-inch thick was also peeled from a section o f rural 
road E W 125. The second area o f F5 damage was observed about 1 mile west o f the Grady/McClain Cotmty line and consisted o f  a cleanly 
swept slab home with foundation anchor bolts and another vehicle lofted 1/4 of a mile. The maximum width o f damage in Bridge Creek 
was estimated to be 1 mile. Approximately 200 mobile homes/houses were destroyed, and hundreds of other structures were damaged. 
The Ridgecrest Baptist Church in Bridge Creek was also destroyed. Twelve persons died in Bridge Creek, nine in mobile homes, and all 
fatalities and the majority o f injuries were concentrated in the Willow Lake Addition, Southern Hills Addition, and Bridge Creek Estates, 
consisting mostly o f mobile homes. Compared to sections o f Oklahoma and Cleveland Counties, other counties in the path o f this tornado 
which are more densely populated, eastern Grady County including the Bridge Creek area, is rural and sparsely populated.
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The tornado maintained a nearly straight path to the northeast paralleling Interstate 44, as it entered McClain County, except 
when it made a slight jog to the right and moved directly over the 16th Street overpass in Newcastle where a  woman was killed when she 
was blown out from under the overpass. The tornado continued into northern sections of rural Newcastle and crossed the Interstate again 
just north o f the US 62 Newcastle interchange. While this tornado was moving through the northern portion o f Newcastle, a satellite 
tornado (AlO) touched down in a field in rural areas north of Newcastle, and caused no damage (FO). Two areas of F4 damage were 
observed in McClain County, all associated with tornado A9. The first area overlapped the Grady/McClain Coimty line and extended to 
about 3 miles northwest o f Newcastle, ending just west o f the 16th St. overpass on Interstate 44, while the other area was observed 2 miles 
northwest o f Newcastle. Thirty-eight homes and 2 businesses were destroyed in McClain County, and 40 homes were damaged. Damage 
then diminished to F2 intensity as the tornado crossed the Canadian River into northern Cleveland County.
The tornado entered Cleveland County between Portland and May and between SW 164th and SW 179th in south Oklahoma 
City. Damage was rated F2 in this area with a path width averaging 1/2 of a mile. The first major housing development to be struck in 
Cleveland County was Cotmtry Place Estates located just west o f Pennsylvania Ave. where about 50 homes were damaged, with 1 dozen 
o f  these homes receiving F4 damage. One slab home was cleanly swept from its foundation, and several vehieles were picked up from 
the subdivision and tossed across Pennsylvania Ave., a distance o f approximately 1/4 o f a  mile. One vehicle was found under a bridge 
just east of the intersection o f  Pennsylvania and SW 134th. This particular area o f damage has been rated high F4/lowF5. Oklahoma City 
Police indicated that part o f an airplane wing, believed to have originated from Chickasha Mtmicipal Airport in Grady County, landed 
in this area. The tornado then tracked through Eastlake Estates, a densely populated housing development, located north o f SW 134 th and 
between Pennsylvania and Western Ave, where 3 fatalities occurred. Entire rows o f homes were virtually flattened to piles of rubble. Four 
adjacent homes on one street were virtually cleaned off their foundations leaving only concrete slabs, which earned an F5 rating. Three 
other homes in this housing division also received F5 damage, with the remaining destruction rated high F4. Three persons also died in 
the 600-unit Emerald Springs Apartments on Western Ave. located across the street from Eastlake Estates. One 2-story apartment building 
on the north end of the apartment complex was virtually flattened, and received an F5 rating. Westmoore High School, located just north 
o f Eastlake Estates, was also heavily damaged. Although a well-attended awards ceremony was being held at the school during the tornado, 
no one was injured, however dozens of vehicles in the school parking lot were either damaged or destroyed. F4 damage continued 
northeast into another residential area east of Western Ave. and south o f 119th St. The tornado then entered the western city limits o f 
Moore (Cleveland County) along Santa Fe and near NW 12th, and produced damage between 1/2 and 3/4 o f a mile wide. Maximum 
damage, rated high F4/low F5, extended northeast to near Janeway with several large groups o f  homes flattened. Four persons died in this 
residential area. F4 damage continued to S. Shields just north of the jtmction with Interstate 35. A woman was also killed when she was 
blown out from under the Shields overpass o f Interstate 35. The tornado appeared to weaken just slightly after crossing Interstate 35, 
however it remained a formidable storm with widespread high F3/low F4 damage observed in Highland Park, a residential area south o f 
the First Baptist Church on 27th St. in Moore. Escaping with relatively minor damage, and being located near the halfway point o f  the 
tornado path, the First Baptist Church in Moore eventually served as the primary coordination center for most tornado relief efforts. The 
tornado then continued northeast and entered the southern portion o f a sparsely populated industrial district. F4 damage continued through 
this area, to near SE 89th St., the Cleveland/Oklahoma County border.
Moving into Oklahoma County, the tornado curved northward, through the remaining industrial district north o f Interstate 240 
where 2 businesses were destroyed, with the damage rated F4. Two persons were also killed at a tmcking company near the intersection 
o f S. Bryant Ave. and Interstate 240. A freight car, with an approximate weight o f 18 tons, was picked up intermittently and blown 3/4 
o f  a mile across an open field, with the body of the freight car being deposited southeast of the intersection of S. Simnylane Rd. and SE 
59th. Gouge marks were observed in the field every 50 to 100 yards, suggesting the freight car had been airborne for at least a sbort 
distance. While tornado A9 was moving through southeast Oklahoma City, another tornado (A ll)  touched down briefly about 1/2 mile 
south o f  Interstate 240 (Oklahoma County), near the intersection o f SE 80th and Sooner Rd. Damage from tornado A l l ,  rated FO, included 
fences being blown down and minor roof damage inflicted to a couple o f houses. Tornado A9 then entered residential neighborhoods 
between SE 59th and SE 44th where 1 woman was killed in her house. Crossing SE 44th into Del City (Oklahoma Coimty) the tornado 
moved through the highly-populated Del Aire housing addition killing 6 persons and damaging or destroying hundreds o f homes, many 
with F3/F4 damage. The tornado then crossed Sooner Rd., damaged an entry gate and several costly structures at Tinker Air Force Base, 
then crossed 29th St. into Midwest City (Oklahoma County), destroying 1 building in the Boeing Complex and damaging 2 others. 
Widespread F3/F4 damage continued as the tornado moved across Interstate 40 affecting a large business district. Approximately 800 
vehicles were damaged at Hudiburg Auto Group, located just south o f Interstate 40. Hundreds o f the vehicles were moved from their 
original location, and dozens o f vehicles were picked up and tossed northward across Interstate 40 into several motels, a distance of 
approximately 2/10 of a  mile. Numerous motels and other businesses including Hampton Inn, Comfort Inn, Irm Suites, Clarion Irm, 
Cracker Barrel, and portions o f Rose State College, were destroyed. Some of the damage through this area was rated high F4, however 
low F5 was considered. The tornado then continued into another residential area located between SE 15th and Reno Ave. where 3 fatalities 
occurred. High F4 damage was inflicted to 4 homes in this area. Two of these homes were located between SE 12th and SE 11th, near 
Buena Vista, and the other 2 homes were located on Will Rogers Rd. just south o f  SE 15th. Damage then diminished rapidly to FO/Fl 
as the tornado crossed Reno Ave. before dissipating 3 blocks north o f Reno Ave. between Sooner Rd. and Air Depot Blvd.
The Oklahoma State Department o f  Health in Oklahoma City recorded 36 direct fatalities. In addition, 5 persons died o f illness 
or accident during or shortly after the tornado and were not considered in the direct fatality total. Five hundred eighty-three injuries were 
estimated based on numbers provided from the Department of Health, which were then adjusted to account for persons assumed to be
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unaccounted for. Injuries which resulted from removing debris, conducting search and rescue efforts, and taking shelter from the tornado, 
were not considered in the injury total. An estimated 1800 homes were destroyed, and 2500 homes were damaged, resulting in 
approximately 1 billion dollars in damage.
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